AS, Walsh Philosophy Collection PRESENTED to the LIBRARIES of the UNIVERSITY ^TORONTO &IAAJUW cy_ l\L- (Sam-^ ^eriA-CUrr' is "absolute" only in so far as it contains nothing derived from anything else, but is only itself, i. e. in so far as it is absolute identity with itself. Identity is, therefore, in itself (i. e., involves in its definition) absolute non-identity. But it is also the determination of identit}' (as a contrast to itself as the entire movement, it is the special form of identity). For as reflection into itself it posits itself as its own non-being ; it is the entire movement, but as reflection it posits itself in this movement as a single phase of itself, as posited-being (dependent being) from which it returns into itself (dependent being manifests that upon which it depends, and is the appearance of the same. In this it points towards the independent being, and is its reflection; i. e., the independent being reflects itself in what depends on it, or to use the words of the text, it is the return into itself from what depends on it, or is " posited " b}' it). Therefore, as a phase of its movement, it is first identity, as such, in the form of simple self-sameness, as opposed to absolute (<'. e., self-related) difference. Remark. In this remark I will consider more in detail the question of iden- tity, as found in the principle of identity which is set up as the first law of thought. This principle in its positive expression, Ar=A, is, in the first Laws of Thought. 33 place nothing else but the expression of empty tautology. It has, therefore, been truly said that this law of thought is without a con- tent, and adds nothing to our knowledge. Thus the empty identity to which those adhere who are accustomed to regard it as true, and <}uote it on all occasions — this identity excludes all difference, and is different from difference. They do not see that in this they have already conceived identity as possessing difference ; for they say that identity is different from difference. Now, since this must be con- ceded to be the nature of identity, the conclusion must be that iden- tity does not possess difference externally but in its own nature (identity cannot exclude difference without possessing it as its very nature). Moreover, when they conceive it strictly as an unmoved identity (». e., devoid of activity), which is, therefore, the opposite of difference, they do not see that by this they conceive identity as a one-sided determinateness, which as such has no truth ("truth" means here actuality). It is conceded that the principle of identity •expresses only a one-sided determinateness, — that it contains only formal, abstract, imperfect truth. In this concession, which is cor- rect, is contained the admission that the truth is to be found only in the unity of identity and difference. When it is asserted that "iden- tity " (as here conceived) is imperfect, there hovers before the mind this totality (?'. e., of identity and difference), compared with which -"identity" is something incomplete. The totality is the complete. When, however, identity is separated from difference, and regarded ■as absolute — being held as something essential, valid, and true in this state of isolation — there is nothing to be seen in these contra- dictory assumptions but the inability of thought to bring together and reconcile the idea of abstract identity conceived as essential with the idea of its incompleteness, — its want of totality, or wholeness. It is an inability of consciousness to grasp identity as a negative activity (i. e., self- relation of the negative), although in these very assertions identity is indirectly assumed to be such an activity ; in other words, since identity is expressly stated to be such only as separated from difference, or that its essence consists in this separation, we have its truth expressed directhy as consisting in separation, — its essen- tial characteristic is separation, — without separation it could not be ; therefore, this "identity" is nothing, considered for and by itself, but its existence lies wholty in this relation expressed in its separation from difference. As regards that confidence which was expressed in the principle of of identity as absolute truth, it was founded on experience, — 34 Essence. that is to say, the experience of every conscious being was appealed to, and the assertion made that in this proposition, A is A, or a tree is a tree, there is a direct concession and a complete conviction that the proposition is true and self-evident, and requires no proof what- ever. This appeal to experience, that every conscious being acknowl- edges the truth of the principle of identity, is merely a rhetorical statement. For no one will say that he has ever made the experi- ment of testing every conscious being in regard to the abstract prop- osition that Az=A. There is no serious attempt made at an appeal to real experience, but only an assurance that if such an appeal were made a universal assent would be the result. Bat, if the abstract- proposition, as such, is not meant, but rather a concrete application of it, from which the abstract proposition could be deduced, then it follows that the assertion of its universal validity for every conscious- being would amount to no more than this: that the principle of iden- tity lies at the basis, implicitly, of every act of predication by a con- scious being. But a concrete application is precisely the relation of simple identity to a multiplicity different from it. (Identity, as it appears in a concrete proposition, is in union with difference: i. e., every proposition expresses in the act of predication a relation of its- subject to some other subject, hence predication in its very nature asserts relation to others, and thus involves difference ; in this predi- cation the fact that the subject is posited as identical with the predi- cate signifies that the subject is dependent upon others. Dependence involves identity and difference. If a concrete proposition is reduced to the form of identity, or simple self-relation, the element of otherness is intentionally ignored, and the subject placed in the form of inde- pendence, or simple self-identity. It is evident in this that the reduc- tion of concrete propositions to identical ones does violence to their nature, — what is dependent is stated as independent. "A is B," means that the totality of B involves A, or that A is dependent upon the totality of B ; this is the type of the concrete proposition. To change this to " A is A " is to omit entirely the totality of B, in so far as it transcends A; for the proposition, "A is B," means that A is in a totality consistingof A-f-X, which equals B. "The Earth is a planet," asserts the dependence of the Earth [upon a sun] ; the solar system is the totality, containing this relation of dependence within it. "The Earth is the Earth," although having the form of a proposition, and thus involving difference, really expresses only self-identity and independence. This, in the case of the Earth, is not its truth ; it is partial only.) Expressed in the form of a proposition, that which is concrete requires a synthetical proposition ; and the abstract propo- Laws of Thought. 35 sition of identity may be derived, through analysis, from the con- crete itself, or from its synthetic proposition. But such derivation, through analysis or abstraction, does not leave experience as it found it, but changes it. For experience contains identity in unity with difference, and this fact refutes at once the assertion that abstract identity, as such, is something true (i. e., actually existing), for experience finds exactly the opposite to be true, — it finds, viz., identit}' only in union with difference in every example. On the other hand, experience often enough learns the true charac- ter of this proposition of pure identity, and ascertains what truth it has. If, for example, to the question, " What is a plant?" the answer is given, "A plant is — a plant," while the truth of such an answer would doubtless be conceded at once by the entire company present, yet there would be an equal unanimity on this point, viz.T that such a proposition had said nothing. If one opens his mouth for the purpose of announcing what God is, and says, "God is — God," the expectation of the listener finds itself deceived, for it looked for a different predicate. If such a proposition is called " absolute truth," such predications of " absolute " will be held very cheap. Nothing is more tedious and unendurable than a conversa- tion which travels round and round the same point, or than such identity-predication which is offered as truth. Upon analyzing the conditions of this tediousness, we find that the beginning of the proposition, "the plant is," leads us to expect something else for a predicate. But when the subject recurs in the predicate, we find the opposite of what we had expected, and noth- ing is the result. Such identity-predication, therefore, contradicts its own form. Identity, instead of being the absolute truth, is there- fore the opposite of the truth. Instead of being the unmoved sim- ple, it has the form of transcending itself and resulting in self-dissolu- tion. (If it states a dependent being in the form of the proposition of identity, it attributes to it independence ; if it states independent being in the form of the proposition of identity, it puts it in the form of dependence, but does not exhibit its reflection into itself by pre- dicating of the subject its dependent phases ; such dependent phases reflect it into itself, and thus "•manifest" the independence of the subject.) Therefore, in the form of the proposition in which identity is expressed there is involved something else than simple abstract. identity (i. e., the form of the proposition involves difference, anti- thesis, dependence). The form of the proposition involves the move- ment of reflection, in which movement otherness enters only as 36 Essence. "appearance," — i. e., as a vanishing. " A is — " is a beginning, in which difference hovers before the mind as the end to be reached ; but in the identity-proposition we do not arrive at the different: "A is — A ; " the difference is only a vanishing, the movement returns to itself. The form of the proposition may be looked upon as a latent necessity to add to the abstract identity something else through its movement. Therefore the predicate adds to the empty form of the subject, which has no meaning on account of its emptiness, an "A," ■or a "plant," or some substrate; and this addition of the predicate makes the difference to be seemingly an accidental increment. If identity itself is taken as the subject, instead of " A," or any other substrate — "identity is identity" — still it is conceded that, instead of this, any other substrate may be used. The significance of all this is that difference makes its appearance in the expression of identity ; or, in other words, as shown, this identity is negativity, which is ab- solute distinction from itself. The other expression of the principle of identity — "A cannot be at the same time A and not-A " — is its negative form; it is called the principle of contradiction. It is customary to regard this propo- sition as self-evident, and as requiring no explanation of its connec- tion with the principle of identity through the form of negation. But the form of the principle of contradiction arises necessarily from the fact that identity, as the pure movement of reflection, is the simple negativity ; and this negativity is expressed more explicitly in the principle of contradiction. There is "A," and "a not-A," the pure other of "A," expressed in this principle, but the difference vanishes as soon as it appears. Identity is, therefore, expressed in this principle as the negation of negation. "A" and "not-A" are distinguished, and these distinct somewhats are related to one and the same "A." Identity is, therefore, exhibited as this distinction of somewhats, which are in one unity, or as the simple distinction in itself (?". e., a distinction of itself from itself through its negative self-relation — i. e., through the relation of its negative activity to itself; self-determination is self-negation, or negative self-relation). It is evident, from this, that the principle of identity, — and still more the principle of contradiction, — is not merely an analytic prin- ciple, but that it possesses a synthetic nature. For the principle of •contradiction contains in its very expression not merely the empty, simple identity with itself, nor merely its opposite, but absolute non-identity, contradiction of itself. The principle of identity con- tains, as has been shown, the movement of reflection, — identity as the vanishing of otherness. Distinction. 37 * What, therefore, this investigation establishes, is this: first, the principle of identity, or that of contradiction, held abstractly in order to express truth by separating identity from difference, is no law of thought, but rather the opposite of it ; secondly, that these principles contain more than is intended, viz., their opposite, which is absolute distinction itself. B. Distinction.* 1. Absolute Distinction. Distinction ( Unterschied) is negativity as found in reflection. It is the "nothing" which is expressed in identity-predication ("the plant is a plant," etc.). The essential movement of identity itself is the negating of itself ; through this it determines itself, and dis- tingnishes itself from difference. (1.) This phase of distinction is absolute distinction (i. e., self- distinction), — distinction as a phase of Essence. It is distinction in and for itself, — not distinction through an external somewhat, but through its relation to itself, and, therefore, simple distinction (*'. e., "simple" in the sense of not-involved-with-others). It is essen- tial to apprehend absolute distinction as simple. In the absolute distinction of "A" and " not-A " from each other, it is the sim- ple "not" which constitutes this (absolute distinction). Distinction itself is a simple idea ; one expresses it thus: " two things are to be distinguished in this, that the}', etc." " In this," — that is to say, in one and the same respect, in the same ground of determination. It is distinction as a phase of Reflection, not " otherness" as a category of Being. One particular being and another particular being are posited as excluding each other ; each one of the two has immediate being (*'. e., not through each other, or through an}" other. The category of dependence belongs to the phase of Essence, and not to the phase of Being). The " other" in the sphere of Essence is the "other" of itself, not the "other" as existing independent, outside of it; it (the " other " in Essence) is a simple determinateness in itself {an sich sometimes means "in itself," in the sense of " poten- tial," that which is contained in it implicitly, i. e., in an undeveloped form; at other times an sich means "in itself" in the sense of in- dependence, of not-being-involved-with-others, — simple identity ■with itself). Likewise, in the sphere of Being, "otherness" and determinateness of this character proved to be simple determinate- 38 Essence. ness, — identity in opposition; but this identity (in the sphere of Being) was only transition from one determinateness into the other. Here, in the sphere of Reflection, distinction enters as reflected, as that which is posited to be what it is in itself (i. e., distinction is reflected when it is distinction not from another, but distinction from itself, and made by itself, as in human consciousness ; a distinction from another forms only a transition to that other, and shows up the limit or the non-being of the determinatenesses distinguished ; self-distinction, on the contrary, posits the true nature, — the "in itself" of the activity, which' has the form of reflection). (2.) Distinction in itself is distinction in the form of self-relation ; hence the negativity of itself, — distinction not from another, but of itself from itself. It is not itself, but its other. But that which is distinguished from distinction is identity. (" Distinction " and " dis- tinguished " are used for the German words, Unterschied, unterschie- dene, etc; these might be translated by "difference," "different," •etc., but "difference " is reserved as the equivalent of Verschiedenheit, and "distinction" is used as the general category, including the three phases of difference, antithesis, or contrariety, and contradiction; the use of "distinction" in this sense is, of course, at times some- what awkward, and the word " difference " has occasionally been .substituted for it.) It (Distinction) is, therefore, itself and identity; the two together constitute Distinction. It (Distinction) is, therefore, the whole and a phase of it (in the "external reflection " it was shown that the presupposing activity included the positing activity, — in other words, that the relation of the negative to itself produced identity or iramediateness as one result, while at the same time it negated and determined the identity or immediateness as another result; the first result was called "positing," the second result was called " pre-positing ; " the total activity is this process of "distinc- tion," but the pre-positing activity within the total is also the pro- cess of distinction; hence, "Distinction is the whole and a phase of it"). It can likewise be said that distinction, as simple, is no distinc- tion. It becomes distinction through relation to identity ; therefore it contains distinction and this relation to identity. Distinction is the whole and one of its own phases. And so, also, identity is the whole and a phase of itself. We must consider this as the essential nature of reflection, and as the primitive source of all activity and self- movement. Both identity and distinction are processes in which each becomes a moment as well as the total movement, and as a moment (reciprocally complemental element) it is a posited-being (i. e., a Distinction. 39 result, a dependent somewhat) ; inasmuch as identity and distinction both involve the activity of reflection (in fact, are constituted by it as the self-relation makes the identity, and relation being negation, the self-negation makes distinction,) they are both negative relation to themselves. Distinction, inasmuch as it is the unity of itself and identity, is distinction which is particularized within itself (/. e., containing con- trast within itself). It is not transition into another, — not a relation to another outside of it. .It has its other within itself; its other, namely, is identity (and identity is a phase of its own movement). And so, likewise, with identity; while it possesses the determination of distinction, it does not, for that reason, lose itself in distinction as its " other," but it preserves itself in its other, and finds it's reflection or return in it: Distinction is a moment of identity. ("To pre- serve itself in its other " means that it meets with its own activit}' in what should be its other or negation. For example, in the action of •cause and effect, we mviy turn our attention first to the phase of Identity : The cause reappears in the effect, the activity in the cause transplants itself into the effect; the cause determines or modifies the ■effect so as to bring it into identity with itself, — -that is, to assimilate the effect to the cause. Turning our attention to the aspect of dis- tinction or difference, we note that the activity of the cause utters itself, — expresses itself. Utterance and expression proceed out from the cause, and in obtaining independent subsistence — external realiza- tion — in an effect, they produce distinction. The original unity in the activity of the cause, conceived before its utterance or expression, is dualized, dirempted by its causal activity ; and through its self- related negation results the distinction or contrast of cause and effect. In the simple, precise, technical language with which Hegel analyzes the categories of reflection, such as cause and effect, force and man- ifestation, identity and distinction, essence and phenomenon, etc., the underlying movement is characterized as negative self-relation, — self-relation having two aspects, the first one of identity, the second one of self-negation, contrast, or distinction). (3.) Distinction has two moments, identit}' and distinction (or difference). The two moments are, therefore, posited-being, — deter- minateness (*. e., as moments each determines the other, and the unity of both is the resultant determinateness). But in this posited- being each is self-relation (as explained in the next sentence, each moment is a self-determining activity, which evolves the other within itself; one activit}', A, evolves another activity, viz., B; but the activity B evolves again the activity A ; such a process is called 40 Essence. self-relation). The one, — namely, identity — is in its first aspect a. phase of the movement of reflection into itself. In like manner, the other movement, — viz., distinction, — is distinction within itself (self- distinction), — reflected distinction ("reflected," i. e., an activity which produces another, but another which, in Us activity, produces the first activity. For example, the generic process of life: the activity of reproduction propagates the species ; the vital activity in the parents produces an independent vital activit}' having the same character. The species is identical in parents and offspring. The in- dividuals are different on the plane of life, — " The species lives, and the individual dies." But on a higher plane, that of thinking-activity, for another example, the universal reproduces itself in the same indi- vidual, and not in different individuals. This is consciousness. The ego, as universal subject, is an activity of knowing and willing ; di- rected upon itself, it makes itself its own object ; this is the stage of specialization; in its specialization it recognizes itself; hence in its third phase the activity returns into itself generically — just as it did on the plane of life in the propagation of the species — and also as particular individual; and this is personal, conscious identity). Distinction, inasmuch as it has two such moments within itself,, both of which are reflections into themselves, is Difference (dis-par- ateness, i. e., the reader will have noted that reflection into itself gives independence through the fact that it gives totality ; the activity proceeds to its other, a'id through its other returns to itself; this totality or reflection-into-itself does not stand in contrast to another outside of it, — all of its contrast is within itself as self-distinction; now [N. B.], the two moments which are each a reflection into itself are necessarily independent of each other, beir.g total processes ; such independent moments of Distinction are indifferent to each other; this phase of distinction between independent, indifferent objects is called "difference," "disparateness," \_VerscliiedenlitiQ "variety." The ordinary consciousness views distinction from this standpoint, but does not know that reflection-into-itself is presup- posed by it). 2. Difference. (1.) Identity is dirempted within itself in the category of differ- ence, inasmuch as it (identity) has absolute distinction within itself, posits itself as the negative of itself, and these its moments, viz., itself and its negative (i. e., identity and distinction), are reflections into themselves, and hence self-identities ; in other words, pre- cisely because the identity immediately annuls its negative activit}^ Difference. 41 and is reflected into itself in its determination (?'. e., the determina- tion produced upon itself Ity self-negation). The moments which are distinguished are contrasted with each other as different or dis- parate, because each is identical with itself — i. e., because identity constitutes the ground and element of each. (N. B. Identity is always to be regarded as the product of self-relation.) In other words, the different or disparate is what it is only in its opposite, — i. e., in identity. Difference or disparateness constitutes what may be regarded as the otherness (other-being — Andersseyn = that phase of a being which exists in it because of external limitation) of reflection. The other, as a category of particular being, has for its ground immediate being — and in this immediate being, the negative inheres (7. e., "the oilier " is a negative category, but a category to which negativity is onty incidental and not essential; the "other," as opposed to the "somewhat," is itself an independent existence as much as the "somewhat," and its relation to the "somewhat" as "other" is a mere external, subjective distinction; the "other" may itself be regarded as the "somewhat," and what was regarded as the "somewhat" may be its "other"). But in Reflection, self-iden- tity— reflected immediateness — constitutes the ground in which the negative inheres, and the basis of its indifference. (Self-relation, as the true ground of individuality, is not a relation founded on a being; being is, rather, founded on self-relation; being is the result of the process of self-relation or self-negation ; but being is not the only result of this process ; determination, or negation, in its annulling activity is likewise a result of self-negation. In the sphere of Being, in which the mind looks upon objects as essentially inde- pendent of each other, and regards each as having a substrate of being, all relation is considered to be incidental, or an external dis- tinction made by the observer. But the result of the investigation of Being has shewn that every phase of Being that can be conceived is necessarily transitory, and passes away into some other phase equally transitory. The entire system of the categories of Being forms a circular movement. The whole persists, but the parts con- tinually vanish. Any one part, in vanishing into another, is on its way back to itself, just as the movement onward in a circle is a return to the starting-point. The process in which the parts vanish is a negat- ing one ; hence the return, which is self-relation, is self-negation. Self-relation, self-negation, is all that persists .in the annulment of the categories of Being. Hence, the mode of view which regards objects as beings gives way, in the course of experience, to the view 42 Essence. which regards objects as appearances, — that is to say, as phases occurring in the course of the activity of a process of self-relation or self-negation. This view is able to understand the being and the annulment of objects. The aspect of the process wherein it is related to itself results in immediateness, or phases of being ; the aspect wherein the process is negative results in determination, annulment, and transition. Both being and negation are seen as results. They have the same activity for their basis, but neither one of them is an' ultimate basis or element itself. Thus the text in this paragraph draws attention again — as on former occasions — to the difference between Being and Essence, and to the negative as found in cate- gories of Being as contrasted with the negative in the sphere of Essence. "Other" is a category of Being, has a basis of being, and is negative only in a superficial aspect. Difference is a category of Essence, and consists in pure relation, having no being as its basis, but arising in and persisting in self-negation, solely. For difference, whether subjective or objective, is necessarily in the last analysis based on self-distinction ; and self-distinction is identity as well as distinction, and, in fact, all distinction is between identity as the one factor and difference as the other. An illustration in a more concrete sphere is found in the doctrine of the correlation of forces. A "thing" is regarded — like "somewhat" in the sphere of Being — as an independent existence; science shows the transi- toriness of " things," and finds them to be phases in the activity of "forces;" "forces," like "appearance" in the sphere of Essence, are taken as the abiding, and, being found to constitute phases of a process of return, — i. e., to pass over into each other reciprocally, — the entire process of force is seized as the persistent. Persistent force is a negative self- relation, producing particular forces ; these are its distinctions and differences, and through the annulment of these distinctions, the vanishing of the individual^ of the particular forces, the Persistent Force comes to identity with itself. Its distinctions as particular forces constituted its "other- ness" \_Andersseyn~] ; the vanishing of these distinctions constitutes its return into identity with itself. Since the return into identit}- is at the same time the act of further determination or particularization, it is the occasion for the continuance of the process. In this is found the idea or conception of an eternal activity). ("The basis of its indifference " — the category of Difference, or Disparateness, is spoken of as possessing " indifference." This re- fers to the fact that " Difference," as an undeveloped, implicit cate- gory of "Distinction," — a crude, first phase of distinction, — Difference. 43 regards the objects between which difference exists as independent of each other, — that is to sa}T, as indifferent. For example, it com- pares disparate objects, — as a lamp-post and a lead-pencil, — and finds * ' difference ;" the relation is an arbitrary one, — the objects are in- different towards each other. On the contrary, siveet is not indiffer- ent to sour, light to dark, nor heat to cold, nor the planet to its sun. The relation of dependence cancels indifference. The thoughtless consideration of objects discovers no dependence, no essential rela- tion. It discovers only difference, variousness, disparateness, i. e., external, " indifferent " distinction. " Indifference," as the char- acteristic of true independence, arises from self-relation. Inasmuch as distinction is a phase of the process of self-relation, indifference appertains to it. Tliere are all degrees of insight ; the degrees of insight which perceive objects as phases of Being are superficial ; the degrees of insight which perceive the processes of Essence are more profound ; but the first or crude phases of each and every category are the results of equally crude and imperfect insight. The category of Difference, e. g., is used by a stage of insight which is unconscious of some of the phases of Distinction implied by the phases included in the term "Difference." To use a figure: identity, difference, antithesis, etc., are portions of the total process of Dis- tinction, above the surface of consciousness ; other portions of the process of Distinction lie below the surface of consciousness, or, when brought to the surface, are not perceived to be identical with the former. So this phase, viz., the "indifference," which is inci- dental to the self-relation underlying Distinction, is, first of all, above the surface of consciousness, when it begins to reflect on things. "The basis of its indifference" is, therefore, explained in the text to be the general form of self-relation, i. e., of independ- ence, underlying the category of Distinction.) (" Indifference " has been predicated of Essence in general. [See above, page 3, line 4.] The same category [indifference] is used in expounding the categoiy of quantity in the sphere of Being. As above explained, indifference is the aspect of independence. Inde- pendence is a predicate applying only to a totality ; hence only to what has the form of self-relation. In the sphere of Being, quality is finitude, i. e., transitoriness, change; that which has its being in another finds its quality determined for it by what lies be3rond it. The category of quality is transcended by the discovery that determi- nation through another is, in the last analysis, determination through itself — because its determinateness being its character, its whatness [quiddity] is its being, and since this is derived from another being 44 Essence. lying beyond it, it follows that its being is outside of itself. The being of what is dependent lies in the independent; the being of that which is determined through another lies in this "other," and that same ''other," in the act of determination, determines only itself; that which is dependent is only a determinateness of the independ- ent, or self-determined. With this insight, all particular beings, as qualitative determinations, must be looked upon as parts of total processes of determination, which total processes are ones identical with each other — independent, and hence "indifferent" towards each other. This conception of indifferent ones is the insight into quantity. Hence the point of view of quantity is directed towards the aspect of indifference. The distinctions of quantity are indifferent as regards quality. Seven oxen are oxen as well as- fourteen oxen ; one house is as much a qualitative being as a mil- lion houses; the quantitative distinction of multiplicity is indifferent to quality. It has been remarked by acute lexicographers [e. g.r Noah Webster in his "Unabridged," 1st edition] that "quantity is undefinable ;" that they have been unable to find its genus and differentia. But there will be no difficulty for us here to define "quantity;" "quantity'1 and "quality" are species of determi- nateness which is the genus; "quality" is the determinateness which is immediately one with being — change the quality or " what- ness " of an object, and you change it; "quantity" is the de- terminateness indifferent to being — change the quantity of some- thing, and you do not change its being. Hence the transition from quantity to a new category, through the idea of maxima and minima, as limits within which quantitative indifference prevails, and beyond which there results a qualitative change, or change in the being. Indifference appertains universally to the categories of Essence, but chiefly to one category of Being, viz., quantity. All the categories of Essence are founded on self-relation, — the form of self-relation being essential to every totality, to every independent being. "Quan- tity" is the second of the three phases of Being, or Lnmediateness. Essence is the second of the three parts of Logic, or the system of Pure Thought. Being is the first part, and Idea the third part. The second part of any dialectic or exhaustive consideration expounds its subject in the form of self-antitheses. Quantity is the self-antithesis of Being; Essence the self-antithesis of the Idea [personality]. Indifference recurs, therefore, in every second phase of considera- tion in this Logic as an aspect of the categories introduced, but affecting them with various degrees of validity. For instance, even in the category of Becoming, the second phase of its consideration Difference. 45 finds two species of it, viz., beginning and ceasing, each of which contains the other as its own moment, and is thus the totality of Be- coming [a reflection-into-itself, in the language of Essence], and thus each is indifferent to the other ; as sundered from the other, — excluding it, — its lack of the other would annul itself; but as con- taining the other, it reflects [bends back] its dependence upon an- other, thereby converting it into dependence upon itself, or independ- ence and indifference of others). The moments of Distinction are Identity and Distinction itself. They are different, disparate, inasmuch as they are reflected into themselves, self-relating; in the determination (or category) of Identity they are relations exclusively to themselves ; Identity does not relate to Distinction, nor does Distinction relate to Identity ; for since each one of these moments is exclusively self-related, they are not determined in opposition to each other. And since this is the fact the distinction is external to them ; the different moments do not stand in relation to each other as Identity and Distinction, but only as different ones in general, which are indifferent towards each other and towards their determinateness. (2.) In the category of Difference (variousness or disparateness) as the phase of indifference, of Distinction, the reflection (which lies at the basis of the category) is " external reflection." Distinction is only a posited-being, or as annulled, but it is also the entire move- ment of reflection. If we take this into careful consideration we shall see that both its moments — Identity and distinction, as above determined — are reflections. Each one is a unity of itself and of the other — each is the total movement. Therefore the exclusiveness of the determinateness of Identity or of Distinction, according to which each was only itself and not the other, is annulled. They are, therefore, no Qualities {quiddities, i. e., particular beings, deter- mined through each other) ; but, on the contrary, their determinate- ness consists solely in reflection into itself, i. e., solely in self- negation. Therefore we have this duplication, viz., reflection into itself as such, and determinateness as negation or posited-being. Posited-being is the self-external reflection. It is negation as nega- tion. Hence, potentially, it is the self-relating negation and reflection into itself, but only potentially ; for it is the relation to it as to an ex- ternal (posited-being is the result of reflection considered as result, and, therefore, as dependent ; dependence is not reflection into itself, but a portion of its cycle. Hence, as it implies reflection, it is poten- tially or implicitly self-relation) . Reflection into itself and external reflection are consequently the 46 Essence. two determinations in which are posited the moments of Distinction — i. e., Identity and Distinction. ThejT are these moments just as they are defined here. Reflection into itself is Identity, but defined as- indifferent to Distinction, not as having no distinction at all, but as standing in relation to it as self-identical ; it is difference or disparate- ness. It is Identity, which has therefore reflected its movement into itself in such a manner that it is really the one reflection of the two moments into themselves, the two being reflections into themselves. Identity is this one reflection of the two which has distinction within it as an indifferent somewhat, and is difference or disparateness. On the other hand, external reflection is the particularized distinction of the same, not as absolute reflection into itself, but as determination, opposed to which the in-itself-existent reflection is indifferent. Its two moments, Identity and Distinction, are, therefore, posited exter- nally, not as inherent determinations. (It will be noticed that ex- ternal reflection looks upon the distinction between identity and dif- ference as something arising outside of the activity which constitutes them ; in fact, it does not recognize either as an activity ; it looks upon them as dead results.) This external identity (as result of external reflection) is equality, likeness, or sameness (Gleichheit), and the external distinction is un- likeness, inequality (or non-identity— Ungleichheit). "Sameness" or "likeness" is identity, but only as a posited-being, — an identity which is not in-and-for-itself (i. e., not essential, not appertaining to the nature of the things themselves). In like manner, unlikeness or inequality is distinction, but as an external one, not belonging to the objects themselves. It does not concern the objects themselves whether they are like or different (it is only a comparison made by the observer). Each object is self-related, and what it is is its own affair (there is in it no relation to another, and no occasion for the comparison which we make) ; the identity or non-identity, considered as likeness and unlikeness, is the result of an act of comparison, and is an external affair as regards the objects. (3.) External reflection compares objects in regard to likeness and difference, and the act of comparison deals with no other categories than these, and it flits to and fro between objects, in order to ascer- tain points of resemblance or of difference. But its flitting to and fro is an external affair, even to these very distinctions. They are not related to themselves, but each only to a third (the observer). Each makes its appearance in this interchange prima facie for itself (inde- pendent). External reflection is, as such, self-external. Particular- ized distinction is absolute distinction as annulled ; it is consequently Difference. 47 not simple, not reflection into itself, but external to the reflection into itself. (It is unconscious of the phases of the activity which unite the two sides.) Its elements (or " moments") fall asunder (iden- tity and difference are not seized as the same activity), and they relate, as opposed to each other, to the reflection-into-itself (the ob- jects ai-e regarded as independent, — " reflection-into-itself, " — and yet are compared with each other to discover likenesses and differ- ences which have nothing to do with the dependence of the objects upon each other). To reflection, estranged from itself (producing what is exactly the opposite of its own activity, — it being return-to-itself as identity, while its product is a relation of an alien to an alien, — and hence no return, but only a going abroad), likeness and difference, therefore, appear as utterly without connection, and it separates them by the use of such categories as "in so far," " sides," and "points of view," when they relate to the same thing. Thus, different things, which are one and the same as regards the fact that likeness and unlikeness are attributed to both, are according to one side like, and according to another side unlike ; and in so far as they are like, they are not unlike. Likeness, therefore, relates only to itself (is not dependent on unlikeness), and unlikeness is, in like manner, only unlikeness. Through this separation of the categories of likeness and unlikeness from each other they mutually annul themselves. Precisely the very distinction which has been introduced to prevent them from contra- diction and dissolution, namely, that something is like another in one respect and different from it in another respect — this isolation of likeness from unlikeness is their destruction. For both likeness and unlikeness are determinations of distinction. They are rela- tions to each other — the one is defined to be what the other is not: Like is not unlike, and unlike is not like. The two have essentially the same relation, and outside of it have no meaning at all. As determinations of distinction (i. e., as subordinate phases of the category of Distinction), each one is what it is in distinction from its other. But through their indifference to each other, likeness or equality is only a self-relation, and so also is unlikeness its own "point of view" and a "reflection " (t. e., when likeness and difference are predicated of the same subject, but are explained through different " points of view," the "point of view " belongs essentially to the predication, and must be added to the category predicated ; "likeness" predicated with a " point of view" is thereby conditioned, and its meaning is limited through the impli- cation of unlikeness thereby conveyed; likewise, "difference" predi- 48 Essence. cated in a certain "point of view" implies as its conditioning limit the "likeness," which is not expressly stated. An}?- category in the form of not-A is dependent wholly upon the extension and compre- hension of A for its signification ; in the separation of likeness and unlikeness by different "points of view," the essential limit is ex- pressed which is common to both, and hence their indissoluble unity is posited). Each one of these categories thus isolated (by "points of view") is self-identical (in the "point of view" is con- tained its own difference from itself, which really belongs to the totality of its thought ; " external reflection " is always trying to save its thoughts from contradiction ; therefore it places their essential self-opposition in something else outside of them, which it regards as subjective and unessential ; " a point of view" for example, is a merely subjective distinction, — the self-difference having been removed, nothing but abstract identity remains). The distinction between likeness and unlikeness has vanished, for they have no determinate- ness remaining in which they can be contrasted (all determinateness has been placed in the " point of view " — a mere external consider- ation) ; hence each is a mere abstract identity. This aspect of indifference — in other words, this external distinc-. tion — annuls itself, therefore, and is the negativity of itself through itself. (This refers to the contradiction involved in placing all of the determinateness in the " points of view," and in holding the same to be subjective and unessential ; the veiy distinction between likeness and unlikeness which external reflection thinks it necessary to pre- serve from annulment, and, thex*efore, seeks to prevent self-contra- diction by such devices as "points of view" and "in so far," is annulled by this very procedure ; for the distinction between likeness and unlikeness vanishes when their characteristic determinatenesses are removed and placed in something else. Hence this activity of distinguishing is a self-negating activity.) It is that negativity which, in the act of comparison, belongs to the objects compared. The act of comparing passes to and fro from likeness to unlikeness, and from the latter to the former ; it lets one vanish in the other, and is in fact the negative unity of both. The act of comparison is an external affair — a subjective performance outside of the objects compared, and outside of the aspects in which they are compared. But this negative unity is in fact the very nature of likeness and unlikeness, as we have seen above. This independent " point of view," which constitutes the validity of likeness in contrast to unlike- ness, and which in the same manner gives validity to unlikeness, is precisely the respect in which they lose their distinction from each Difference. 49 other, and become self-identical and identical with each other. (Their difference is posited in the point of view, and outside of their differ- ence— i. e., except wherein they differ — they are the same; but their difference is posited in the " point of view," i. e., it is in a unity ; hence this external reflection contradicts itself by doing pre- cisely what it attempts to avoid, viz., it brings together the contra- diction in a " point of view " in order to save likeness and difference from unity and consequent contradiction.) Accordingly, likeness and difference as moments of external reflec- tion, and as excluding each other, vanish in their identity. But this negative unit}7 of likeness and difference is posited (explicitly con- tained) in them, namely, the activit}- of reflection is stated as belong- ing to them, but as external to them ; in other words they are the like- ness and difference of a third somewhat — i. e., of something differ- ent from them. Thus likeness is not the likeness of itself, nor is unlikeness the unlikeness of itself, but of a somewhat unlike it, and the unlike is self-identical. Likeness and unlikeness are, therefore, each a self-contradiction. Each one is consequently an activity of reflection (a return into itself through its opposite), inasmuch as likeness is the identity of itself and unlikeness, and unlikeness is the identity of itself and likeness. Likeness and difference were seen to constitute the sides or phases of posited-being, as opposed to the objects compared,— i. e., the ob- jects held as different, — and these objects were regarded as an objec- tively existent reflection opposed to the distinction of likeness and unlikeness (i. e., the objects were regarded as independent* and their relation to each other only an external act of comparison). But this independence has been lost. Likeness and unlikeness, the deter- minations of external reflection, are determinations of the objectively- existing reflection, which reflection the different objects are supposed to be — likeness and unlikeness are only the undefined distinction between the existing objects. The objectively-existing Reflection (an sicli seyende Reflexion =z implicit or potential reflection ; the expression is used throughout this logic to characterize whatever is apprehended as independently existing, without stating, however, its mediation as return through the annulment of its other), is the relation to itself without negation (i. e., without the annulment of its other), the abstract identity with itself. Consequently, it is nothing but the posited-being itself. The mere difference passes over, through posited-being, into the negative reflection (/. e., the " posited-being " bnmediateness as a result; hence dependent; hence self-negative) ; 50 Essence. hence that phase of reflection which negates or determines the immediate. Difference is nothing but the posited distinction ; hence, distinction which is none ; hence a self-negation of • distinction. Thus likeness and difference — posited-being — return through their indif- ference, or the objectively existing reflection, into negative unity with themselves ; they return into the reflection which is potentially the distinction of likeness and difference. The difference (dispar- ateness) whose indifferent sides are mere moments and also negative unities, is Antithesis. Remark. Difference, like Identity, has been expressed in a principle of its own ; these two principles are held in a relation of indifference to- wards each other, each one having independent validity. "Everything is different from everything else" (Atte Dinge shirt vei'schiedeny, or in another form: " there are no two things which are identical with each other." This principle is, in fact, the opposite of the principle of Identity, for it states that A is something different; therefore that A is also not-A ; in another form, A is non-identical with another, and therefore it is not A-in-general, but rather a defi- nite, particular A. (" A is something different" — L e. it has no mean- ing except a negative one of dependence upon some other term ; i. e., the predication made of A is limited or conditioned through the other term of the relation posited in the predicate " different; " since dif- ference posits relation and dependence, its predication of A amounts in fact to the predication of not-A, as stated in the text, viz : "There- fore A is also not-A." If A were a universal existence, i. e., " true " in the Hegelian sense, it would not stand in opposition to something else, but would possess only self-distinction. Hence, if " A is some- thing different," it is partial and complementary — and, as a "definite particular," demands another to complete the totality of its sphere of being): In the place of A in the principle of Identity any other sub- strate may be substituted, but for A in the principle of Difference there can be no such exchange. It is not intended by this principle to affirm of something that it is different from itself, but only that it is different from another ; but this difference is (in truth) its own de- termination. As self-identical, A is an indeterminate somewhat; but, as determinate or particular, it is the opposite of this ; it has not only identity with itself, but also negation, and, consequently, differ- ence of itself from itself. That everything is different from everything else, is a superfluous Difference. » 51 principle, for in the plural "things," involving multiplicity, there is implied unparticularized difference. But the principle : " There are no two things perfectly identical with each other," expresses more than this, to-wit: particularized difference. Two things are not merely two ; numerical multiplicity implies sameness of quality, but the two spoken of are different through a " qualitative " determina- tion. The principle which states, that there are no two things identi- cal with each other, calls to mind the anecdote in which Leibnitz sug- gested to the ladies at the court, the impossibility of finding two leaves- in the forest that were just alike. — Those were happy times for meta- physics, when people at court busied themselves with it, and when it needed no greater exertion to prove its principles, than to compare the leaves of trees ! — The reason why the mentioned principle at- tracts attention, lies in the explanation given that "two," or num- erical multiplicity, contains no definite, or particularized difference ; and, that difference, as such, in its abstraction, is indifferent as regards likeness and unlikeness. For the imagination, (Vorstelleii) since it attains only to qualitative determination, (Bestimmung) these moments (the "two"), are presented as indifferent towards each other, so that the one or the other — the mere likeness of things ob- tains determination without unlikeness, or that things are different if they have mere numerical multiplicity, difference in general, and are not unlike. On the contrary, the principle of difference asserts that things are different through unlikeness, from each other (qualitative opposition), that the determination of unlikeness belongs to them as well as the determination of likeness, for it requires the two to make a definite distinction. Now, this principle that the determination of unlikeness belongs to each and everything, requires a proof. It cannot be appealed to as a self-evident truth, (unmittelbarer Salz) ; for the ordinary stage of consciousness demands a proof for every combination of different predicates in a synthetical proposition ; it asks for a third term in which they are mediated. This proof must show the transition of Identity into Difference, and likewise the transition of the latter into particularized (bestimmte — qualitatively determined) difference, i. e. into unlikeness. But this is not usually attempted. For it is evident that difference, or external distinction, is, in truth, reflected into itself ; it is distinction in itself ; the indifferent attitude of the different ones towards each other is a mere posited-being, and hence not an external, indifferent distinction, but one (including) relation of the two moments. There is also involved in this, the dissolution and nugatoriness 52 Essence. of the principle of Difference. Two things are perfectly like (equal) : then they are like and unlike at the same time ; like, in the fact that the}' are both " things," or that they are " two ; " for each one is a "thing" and a one of two; each is, therefore, the same as the other ; but they are assumed as unlike. Consequently the two moments, likeness and unlikeness, are different in one and the same respect, or in that their distinction is one and the same relation. Consequently they have passed over into Antithesis (Entgegensetzung = opposition, or contrariety). When the two predicates are affirmed at the same time, contradic- tion is prevented by the reservation, "in so far." Two things are like in so far as they are not unlike ; or, they are like according to one side, or respect, and unlike according to another, etc. By such a process the unity of likeness and unlikeness is supposed to be re- moved from the things, and this unity held to be an external reflec- tion. This is, however, a process in which the two sides of likeness and unlikeness are distinguished, although they are contained in one and the same activity, and it is one and the same activity which dis- tinguishes them — each one reflects the other, and manifests itself in it. That kind considerateness for the welfare of "things," which sees to it that they are not allowed to contradict themselves, is utterly oblivious here as elsewhere of the fact that it does not do away with the contradiction, but it only places it in another, viz. : in the subject- ive or external reflection, and leaves in this external reflection both moments (of the contradiction) which are expressed by this removal or transposition as mere posited-oeing, as annulled, and as related to each other in one unity (annulled, because posited in one unity — be- ino" negative toward each other). 3. Antithesis. In Antithesis the particularized reflection as found in the category of Distinction is perfected. It (antithesis) is the unity of identity and difference. Its moments are in one identity, but in this identity are differentiated. Being different and yet identical, they are contraries (opposites — antithetic). Identity and distinction arc the moments of distinction as found within it. They are reflected moments of its unity ("reflected " in that each is a return to itself through the other ; each moment devel- ops its " other " within itself). Likeness and unlikeness (sameness and difference), however, belong to reflection as externalized («'. e., are a distinction supposed to be subjective and arbitrary). Their identity with themselves is not only the indifference of each towards the Antithesis. 53 other, but it is the indifference towards being in-and-for-itself (i. e., towards essence — towards the independent being or totality). Their identity is an identity of each as opposed to the identity reflected into itself; it is, therefore, immediateness which is not reflected into itself. The posited-being of the sides (opposite phases) of external reflection is, therefore, a being while its not-posited-being is a non- being. The moments (elements or terms) of Antithesis when examined carefully, prove to be posited-being or determination reflected into itself. The posited-being takes the form of likeness and unlikeness, (sameness and difference). The two, as reflected into themselves, constitute the determinations of antithesis. Their reflection into themselves consists in this, that each is in itself the unity of same- ness and difference. Sameness, for example, is found only in the movement of reflection, which makes comparison of different some- whats ; consequent^, sameness is mediated through its other moment, which is indifferent to it (i. e., not dependent upon it, for difference seems to be independent of sameness). Likewise, also, difference is found only in the same activity of reflection, which makes comparison and involves sameness as one of its results. Each of these moments is, therefore, in its determinateness the entire process. It is the whole, because it contains its other moment, (its opposite) ; but this, its other, exists indifferently, or independent of it ; and so each con- tains a relation to its own non-being; and, in fact, is only reflection into itself, or the total process in its relation to its own non-being. This "sameness " (identity) which is reflected into itself — which contains within itself relation to difference — is the Positive; and, in like manner, difference which contains within itself its relation to its non-being, to sameness, is the Negative. In other words, the two are posited-being. In so fur as the determinateness of distinction is taken as the relation of posited-being to itself, in a particularizing (differ- entiating) form of relation, the antithesis is reflected into its self- sameness as one aspect of its posited-being ; in another aspect it is reflected into self-difference. Thus arises the distinction of positive and negative. The positive is the posited-being, reflected into itself as self-sameness. But what is reflected is the posited-being, i. e.y negation as negation ; therefore, this reflection into itself contains relation to another as its own determination. The negative, on the other hand, is posited-being, as difference reflccted-into-itself. But the posited-being is difference itself; hence this reflection (in- volved ir the "negative") is the identity of difference with itself, or its absolute self-relation. Therefore, each contains the other ; 54 Essence. the posited-being reflected into itself as sameness contains difference ; and reflected into itself as difference contains sameness. (The reader must not fail to remember that we are treating here of relation. Sameness is relation, and difference is relation. The dis- tinction of sameness and difference belongs to posited-being. In ■"posited-being" the distinction made is regarded as an external or arbitrary one. Sameness and difference are distinguished in it, and are referred to independently-existing somewhats between which comparison is instituted. The Maya of reflection — the illusion of abstract knowing is found right here. It sees the distinctions of sameness and difference, but sees no essential inter-dependence ex- isting between the objects which it compares. It, therefore, in its impotencv, supposes the individuality of the objects compared to be perfect without reference of each to the other. But all distinction which it makes, rests upon, and presupposes objectively-existent dis- tinction. And, in general, every existence possesses individuality and preserves the same through such distinction. But this distinguish- ing is a process of relation, essential to the existence of things, and hence the arbitrary subjective distinguishing of external reflec- tion, explains no real process of distinguishing, and in so far as it supposes all relations to belong to external reflection, it completely shuts its eyes to the fact that all real existence is such through rela- tion — essential relation. Since the individuality of objects depends on distinction, such objects are, in reality, terms of a process ; in relating to another — distinguishing itself from another — an object is obtaining its own individuality. In this process the rela- tion is first an expression of its own dependence: the object seems to depend upon another — seems to point out or manifest the other — directing us, so to speak, to the other as its essence. But the other in the process manifests the first somewhat, depends upon it in like manner ; hence the total process re-affirms our first object. The total process is a reflection into itself made up of two positings — the positing of the other by the first, and the positing of the first by the other. The two positings are two manifestations — two expres- sions of dependence ; and, hence, the positing phases are negative, and express the nugatoriness, or lack of essentiality of the depend- ent somewhats. A somewhat, regarded as through another, is regarded as a posited-being, a somewhat regarded as positing another is a pre- supposed-being, i. e., presupposed by that which it posits. In the total process which contains two positings — or two negations, i. e., expressions of dependence — there results identity, self-relation, but self-relation which contains self-distinction, viz., the two-fold nega- Antithesis. 55 tive expression contained in the double-positing. Tiie total process which as a whole, is identity, has been shown to be a two-fold differ- entiation. The differentiation or negative aspect of the process is essential to the identity. Unless the two negative movements are of equal value, the return into itself or reflection is not realized. But if it is realized, the equality of the movements named is presupposed, and with this the validity of the distinction and the independence of its moments. This contradiction has its solution only in the fact pointed out, namely the mutual reflection into themselves of the two moments, each through the other. This reflection into itself makes each moment a total movement, and elevates each one to independence — in short, makes each an identity with itself, containing distinction between itself and its other, within itself. This is the idea of Antithesis or self-opposition, the moments whereof are "contraries." But external reflection, while it discovers sameness and difference in objects, and vainly supposes these distinctions to be due to its own exploits, in this conduct does both too much and too little. In one respect, it is modest in regarding its distinctions as un- essential to the existence of things. But in another respect, it is the height of presumption on its part to den}' the objectivity of sameness and difference, as essential relations. In other words, to deny that relation has more validity than immediate being has. For relation is the essence of particular things. They exist only as moments of total processes, and whatever identity the}7 have is derived solely from the process of self-relation. But the self-relation, being a process of self-determination, is a process of self-particularization, or self-dis- tinction. In the text, Hegel has shown the implication of this ex- ternal reflection, which treats sameness and difference as subjective distinctions. He has shown that in all cases sucli distinctions imply each other, and that each contains wTithin itself the contrary of itself. They are distinctions of posited-being, and each involves duality — a duality of dependence and independence, of identity and distinction, •of self-relation and self-negation.) The Positive and the Negative are thus the two extremes of the an- tithesis which have become independent. They are independent through this fact, that each one of them is the reflection of the whole, of the totality, into itself, and they belong to the antithesis in so far as it is the determinateness which is reflected into itself as the total- ity (the positive is within itself the antithesis of identity and distinc- tion, i. e., it is itself as the opposite of something which is negative ; so likewise the negative. Hence, since each is the antithesis, each is the totality including the other, and each is reflected into itself through 56 Essence. the totality, and the totality is the " determinateness, which is reflected into itself as totality "). On account of their independence they constitute an antithesis which is particularized in itself. Each is itself and its other, and through this each has its determinateness, not in and through another, but in itself. Each relates to itself, and is only self-relation when it relates to its other (for the other relates back to the first, and thereby produces a return or reflection). This has two aspects ; each is relation to its non-being as a cancelling of this other-being in itself; therefore, its non-being is only an element within it. But, on the other hand, the posited-being has here become a being, and possesses an aspect of indifference. Its other, which each contains, is, therefore, the non-being of that in which it is supposed to be contained as a mere element. Each, therefore, is only in so far as its non-being is, and therefore its being as a totality is the being of its non-being (ztcar in einer identischen Beziehung"). The determinations which constitute the positive and negative, sus- tain themselves, therefore, through this fact, that the positive and the negative are, in the first place, absolute moments or elements of the antithesis. Their existence is one undivided reflection ; it is one act of mediation in which each exists through the non-being of its other, and, hence, through its other, or through its own non-being. Therefore they are contraries in general ; in other words, each is only the con- trary of its other, and, in this respect, one is not positive and the other negative, but both are negative to each other. Each, therefore, ex- ists in so far as the other does. It is, through the other — through its own non-being — what it is ; it is only posited-being. But, on the other hand, it is in so far as the other is not ; it is through the non- being of its other that it exists ; it is reflection into itself. These two phases are, however, the one mediation of the antithesis, and in this they are only posited somewhats. But, besides this, the mere posited-being is reflected into itself. The positive and the negative are, in this respect — according to ex- ternal reflection — indifferent to the first identity in which they are only moments. In other words, since that first reflection belongs to the positive and the negative as their own reflection into themselves, each is within itself its own posited-being, and, therefore, each is in- different towards (independent of) its reflection into its non-being and towards its own posited-being. The two sides are, therefore merely different (a. e., are distinguished from each other, without rela- tion of dependence), and in so far as their determinateness of posi- tive and negative constitutes their posited-being (relation of mutual dependence), each is not determined in itself in that manner, but is Antithesis. 57 only determinateness in general. To each side belongs, therefore, one of the determinatenesses of positive and negative ; but they could be interchanged, and each side is of such a kind that it can be taken as positive or as negative. But the positive and the negative are in the third place not merely a posited-being, nor merely an indifferent being, but their posited- being or the relation which each has to the other within one unity — which unity neither one is — is recalled from each. Each is within itself both positive and negative ; the positive and the negative are determinations of reflection, each per se ; in this reflection of the con- traries into themselves they first become positive and negative, prop- erly so called. The positive possesses relation to the other within its own being, in as much as the other contains the determinateness of the positive. Likewise the negative is not negative, as the opposite of another : but it has the determinateness throusrh which it is nega- tive, within itself. Therefore, each one is an independent, for-itself existing unity with itself. Although the positive is a posited-being, it is this in such a manner, that the posited-being for it is such only as annulled. It is the not-opposed (not in an antithesis, not a contrary), the annulled antithesis, but as a term of its own antithesis (e. g. the positive, containing as it does identity and distinction, is totality and, therefore, exists as its own element or as part and whole at the same time. So also exists the negative as its own negative and posi- tive, or totality. The nature of this process to be whole and part of itself, is the nature of the universal as a process of self-determination, to be general or generic, and special or particular as a result of its own process, at the same time. All self-activity dirempts or dua- lizes itself in the form of antithesis, and this dualizing process is the origin of all particularity. But the process which produces particu- larity by its self-determination, is the total — generic — universal). As a positive, something is described as in relation to another but in such a relation to this other, that it is not a posited (dependent) ; it is within itself the activity of reflection which negates otherness. But its other, the negative, is also no posited-being or dependent ele- ment, but an independent being. Hence the negating reflection which belongs to the positive, must exclude from itself, this, its non-being. Therefore the negative as absolute reflection is not the immediate negative, but the negative as a cancelled posited-being. The nega- tive is in and for itself, and the positive rests upon itself alone. As reflection into itself it negates its relation to another; its other is the positive, an independent being. Its negative relation to the latter is, 58 Essence. therefore, one of exclusion. The negative is an opposite, or contrary, which exists independently, although opposed to the positive which is the determination of the annulled antithesis, the entire antithesis op- posed to the self-identical posited being. The positive and the negative are, consequent^, not only in them- selves positive and negative, but in and for themselves positive and negative (L e., not only by nature, but as realized through the ac- tivity of a process). "/n themselves " they are positive and nega- tive in so far as their excluding their other is not considered, but each is taken only in its own determination. Something is positive or negative " in itself" when it is thus described as not merely in opposi- tion to another. But the positive or negative not as a posited-being, and, consequently, not as antithetic, would be the immediate — being or non-being. But the positive and the negative are the elements of antithesis; their nature consists only in this form of reflection into themselves. Something is positive ''in itself " outside of its relation to the negative, and somethino; is neo-ative in itself outside of its re- lation to the positive. In this predication a close regard is had to the abstract phases of this reflected-being. But the positive or negative, as existing in itself, is understood to be that which is opposed to another, and not merely as dependent moment nor as belonging to the comparison (i. e., objectively relative), but to be the determina- tion which belongs to the sides of the antithesis. They are, therefore, positive or negative in themselves, not outside of the relation to another, but this relation to another constitutes their very nature, or the function of their process, and in fact as excluding. In this pro- cess they are, therefore, positive or negative in and for themselves (/. €., and at the same time independent). Remark. This is the proper place to refer to the terms "positive and nega- tive," as they are used in mathematics. They are employed as well- known expressions needing no definition. But for the reason that they are not defined accurately, their treatmont does not escape inso- luble difficulties. There occur, first, the two concepts of positive and neo-ative as real distinctions — apart from their distinction as contra- ries. In this sense, there lies at the basis an immediate particular beino-, taken thus, in the first place, as mere difference — dispar- ateness: the simple reflection into itself is distinguished from its posited-being — the relation of opposition. The relation of opposi- tion is, therefore, taken as an arbitrary distinction, as something Antithesis. 59 "which does not objectively exist, and does not belong to the disparate somewhats. In that case, each one may be regarded as an opposite, or, on the other hand, as existing independent]}'. And it is a matter of indifference which of the two things is regarded as positive or as negative. The second view which one may take of the positive and negative, regards each of these terms as essentially antithetic ; the posi- tive as in-itself positive, and the negative as in-ilself negative, in such a manner that the two different somewhats stand in essential relation to each other. These two views of the positive and negative are found in the first definitions given of the positive and negative in arithmetic. The -|- a and — a are in the first place opposite magnitudes ; a lies at the basis of each, and is an independent unity which is indifferent to the antithetic relation ; a lifeless substrate if no further determina- tion is added. The — a is characterized as the negative, the -f- « as the positive, and each is treated as antithetic. Moreover, a itself is not only the simple unity which lies at the basis, but, as -\- a and — a, it is the reflection into-self of these con- traries. There are two different a's, and it is indifferent which of the two is characterized as positive or as negative. Each has a particular phase of persistence, and is positive. According to the first view, -\-y — y = 0 ; or in the expression — 8 -f- 3, the three is positive, but negative as regards — 8. The contra- ries cancel each other in the combination. An hour's journey towards the East and a similar journey back towards the West cancel each other. A given sum of liabilities cancels an equal amount of assets. And whatever assets are on hand balance a like amount of liabilities. 1 The hour's journey towards the East is not positive as regards di- rection, nor the return towards the West negative ; but these direc- tions are indifferent as regards the terms of antithesis ; they become positive and negative only when referred to a third point of view, ex- ternal to them. So, too, the liabilities are not essentially negative; they are negative only in relation to the debtor; for the creditor they are positive assets ; for him they are equivalent to a sum of money, or a certain definite value which becomes assets or liabilities through an external standpoint. Contraries cancel each other, so that the result is zero. But there is a relation of identity in them and in this relation they are indiffer- ent to the antithesis ; this constitutes the unity underlying it. The sum of money mentioned fcbove, which was only one sum, although from one point of view, liabilities, and from the other point, assets, is a unity of this kind ; so, also, the a which is the same in -\- a 60 Essence. and — a; and the journey which travels over the same road, and not over two roads, one of which extends to the East and the other to the West. In like manner an ordinate y is the same whether taken on this side or that side of the axis; in this sense -\-y — y = y. It is only the ordinate, it is only one determination and its law. From another point of view the contraries are not one independent somewhat (t'.'e., as underlying the antithesis), but they are two inde- pendent somewhats. They are namely as opposed, also reflected into themselves, and they have independent subsistence as dis- parates. In the expression — 8 -\- 3, considered in this manner, there are 11 units ; -\- y — y are ordinates upon opposite sides of the axis. Each one is an independent being opposed to this limit, and opposed to the antithetic relation; therefore, -\- y — y=2 y. Also, the journey to the East and back to the West over the same road is the sum of two exertions, or the sum of two periods of time. Likewise in political economy, a quantity of money, or of value, is not merely this one quantity as a means of subsistence, but it has a two-fold validity : it is means of subsistence both for the creditor and for the debtor. The wealth of the nation includes not merely the cash, and besides this the value of real and personal property in the nation, still less what remains after deducting liabilities from assets ; but its capital, even if the liabilities and assets balance each other, remains positive capital ; as -f- a — a = a; but, in the second place, since the capital may be regarded as liabilities over and over again, being loaned re- peatedly, it becomes a multiplied means. But the antithetic quantities are not merely contraries ; in another respect they are real or independent, and indifferent to each other. But whether a quantity is the particular being with indifferent limits or not, the positive and negative belongs to it potentially. For example, a, in so far as it has no sign of -(- or — attached to it, is taken in a positive sense as though the -|- belonged to it. But if it was intended to be a contrary only, it might be taken as — a, just as well. But the positive sign is readily given it, because the positive is regarded as somewhat which is identical with itself, and the self-iden- tical is the immediate independent, that which is not in a relation of antithesis to anvthins;. Moreover, when positive and negative magnitudes are added or sub- stracted they are taken for such as would be positive or negative by themselves, and not as though this distinction depended upon the oper- ation of addition or subtraction. In the expression, 8 — ( — 3), the first minus is opposed to 8, but the second minus, ( — 3) is taken as Antithesis. 61 though the 3 were negative in itself, independent of its relation within the entire expression. This peculiarity comes out more clearly in multiplication and di- vision : in these operations the positive is essentially not antithetic, but the negative, on the contrary, is taken as antithetic. The ex- pressions positive and negative are not taken as opposites of each other. While the text-books, in their demonstrations of the mathe- matical operations in which positive and negative occur, treat them in all cases as contraries, the}' mistake their nature, and, therefore, in- volve themselves in .contradictions. Plus and minus, in the operations of multiplication and division, obtain this more specific meaning of positive and negative, for the reason that the relation of the factors (which are that of sum and unity — Einheit tend Anzahl — i. e., mul- tiplier or divisor being the " sum," or the how-many-times, and the multiplicand or quotient being the " unity," or the that-which-is-re- peated), is not a relation of mere increase and diminution, as is found in addition and substraction, but it is a qualitative relation ; where- fore plus and minus receive the qualitative meaning of positive and negative. Unless this distinction is kept in mind it is easy to show, on the supposition that these are mere antithetic magnitudes, that if the product of — a into -\- a is — a 2, conversely, the product of -)- a into — ■ a will be -j- a 2, obviously a false conclusion. When the one factor is taken as sum (how-many-times), and the other factor is taken as unity (the unit of repetition) — and the first factor is usually written first in the expression — the two expressions ( — a) X (+ a) and (-f-ct) X ( — ft) differ in this respect: in the former, -pa is the " unit}'," and — a the " sum," and in the other the converse is true. In explaining the former it is customary to say : " If I take -j- a, — a times, then I take -f- a not merely a times, but at the same time in a negative manner, i. e., -f- a times — a; hence the -\- a has to.be taken negatively, and the product is — a 2. Now, in the second case, if — a is to be taken -j- a times, then — a ought likewise to be taken not — a times, but in the opposite relation, viz.: -\~a times; if thepJws sign indicated antithetic relation, the reasoning which holds good in the case of the negative multiplier would prove here in the case of a posi- tive multiplier that the product should be -\- a~. The same remark applies to division. (But Hegel holds, as above shown, that in mul- tiplication and division the minus sign indicates a negative quantity, negative having the sense of contrary ; while the plus sign does not indicate a positive quantity, i. e., "positive " in the sense of a term of an antithesis). This consequence (that a plus multiplier should give as product a 62 Essence. positive result, while a negative multiplier gives a negative result), is- a necessary one, provided that -f- and — are taken as indicating antithetic magnitudes (as they are taken in the demonstrations usually found in text-books). To minus is ascribed the power of changing the plus; but, on the other hand, no such power of changing minus is ascribed to plus, notwithstanding plus is looked upon as an anti- thetic quantity just as much as minus is. In fact, plus does not pos- sess this power of changing minus, because it is here taken in its qualitative relation to minus, inasmuch as the factors have a qualitative relation to each other. Hence, in so far as the negative is here taken as antithetic, the positive, on the other hand, is taken as indetermin- ate, indifferent. The plus is, indeed, also, the negative, but the negative of the minus, not the in-itself-negative as the minus is. Hence, the negative effect of changing the sign of the unity (multi- plicand) appertains to the minus and not to the plus. Therefore — a into — a gives -f- a2, for the reason that the negative a is not to be taken merely as antithetic (for it would be thus taken if multiplied by minus a) but because it is to be taken negatively. The negation of negation is the positive. c. Contradiction. (1.) Distinction contains its.two sides as moments; in the phase of difference (disparateness) they are sundered and indifferent towards each other ; in the phase of antithesis, these moments are sides, each one of which is determined through the other, so that they are recip- rocally complemental elements. They are, however, likewise deter- mined in themselves (as well as through each other), and, therefore, indifferent towards each other, and at the same time reciprocally excluding each other. These are the independent determinations of Reflection. The one is the positive, the other the negative ; the former, how- ever, as the in-itself positive, the latter as the in-itself negative. Each one possesses this indifference and independence for-and-by- itself through the fact that it has the relation to its other moment, in itself; in this manner it is the entire antithesis — including both moments in itself. (It was shown that the identity was a phase of activity of the entire process of self-difference, and that difference was another phase of the same process. The " positive " is this pro- cess looked upon as self-determined in the form of identity, while the negative is the same in the form of difference). Each moment, as Contradiction. 63 this entire process is mediated through its other within itself, and contains the same. But it is mediated, also, through the non-being of its other, within itself; hence, it is a unity existing for itself (as independent), and it excludes the other from itself. Since the independent determination of reflection excludes the other, and in the same respect in which it contains it, and thereby is inde- pendent, it follows that it excludes its independence from itself in the very attitude in which it is independent. For this independence con- sists in the fact that it contains the other determination within itself, and lias, through this very circumstance, no relation to an external somewhat ; but, at the same time, this independence consists also in the fact that it is itself, and excludes from itself its negative determination. In this, it is CONTRADICTION. Distinction is always contradiction, at least implicitly. For it is the unity of moments which are only in so far as they are not one, and it is the separation of moments which are separated only as exist- ing terms of the same relation. But when distinction develops into positive and negative, we have the contradiction as posited ; because they, as negative unities, are the positing of themselves, and, at the same time, each one of them is the cancelling of itself and the positing of its opposite. They constitute the determining reflection as an exclud- ing reflection ; because the act of exclusion is one of distinguishing:, and each of the terms distinguished, as also excluding, is the entire process of exclusion, and hence each, within its own activity, excludes itself. The two independent determinations of reflection, considered by themselves, are the following: (a) the positive is the posited-being as reflected into identity with itself ; and this is the posited-being which is not relation to another, and is, therefore, independent sub- sistence, in so far as the posited-being is cancelled and excluded from it. With this, however, the positive enters into relation to a non-being — to a posited-being. It is, therefore, contradiction in that as the positing of identity-with-itself through the act of excluding the negative, it makes itself into a negative somewhat, and, therefore, into another, which it excludes from itself. This other is, as excluded, posited as independent of that which excludes it; hence, as reflected into itself and self-excluding. Therefore, the excluding reflection is the positing of the positive as excluding the other, and, therefore, this positing is immediately the positing of its other which excludes it. This is the absolute contradiction of the positive, but it is at the same time, also, the absolute contradiction of the negative, for the one reflection posits both. 64 Essence. (b) The negative considered for-and-by itself as the contrary of the positive, is the posited-being as reflected into non-identity with itself, i. e., the negative as negative. But the negative is itself the non-identical, i. e., the non-being of another; consequently the re- flection in its non-identity is rather its relation to itself. Negation in the first place is the negative as quality, or as immediate determinate- ness ; but the negative as negative, is the same, as related to the nega- tive of itself, i. e., to its other. If this negative is taken as identical with the former (qualitative) negative, it is then only an immediate negative, in which case it would not be taken as other opposed to other, consequently not as negative at all ; the negative is not an imme- diate. Furthermore, since each one is the same that the other is, this relation of the non-identical somewhats is at the same time an identi- cal relation. This (the negative) is, therefore, the same contradiction that the positive is, namely, posited-being. or negation as relation to itself (*'. e., dependence which is dependence on itself). But the positive is only potentially this contradiction; the negative, on the other hand, is the posited contradiction ; for in its reflection into itself, in which it is for-itself negative, or identical with itself as negative, it is non- identical or the exclusion of identity. While it is in opposition to identity it is identical with itself, and hence, through its excluding- reflection it is the exclusion of itself from itself. The negative is, therefore, the entire movement — the antithesis which is self-antithesis; the distinction which does not relate to another but only to itself ; it excludes, as antithesis, identity from itself ; and consequentl}* it excludes itself, for as relation to itself it determines itself in the form of identity which it excludes. (2) Contradiction cancels itself. In the self-excluding reflection which has been considered, the posi- tive and the negative cancel — each itself in its independence ; each is nothing but the transition, or rather the translation, of itself into its opposite. This ceaseless vanishing of the opposites is the first unity in which the contradiction results. It is that of zero. Contradiction contains, however, not merely the negative, but also the positive ; in other words, the self-excluding reflection is, at the same time, the positing reflection ; hence, the result of the contradic- tion is not merely zero. The positive and negative constitute the posited-being of independence ; their negation through themselves cancels the posited-being of the independence. It is this posited- being which is annulled (geld zu Grand) in contradiction. Reflection into itself, through which the sides of the antithesis are Contradiction. G5 reduced to independent self-relations, is, in the first place, their inde- pendence as separate moments. They are, therefore, only potentially this independence, for they are still in opposition to each other, and this potential or implicit state which belongs to them is their posiled- bzing. But their excluding reflection cancels this posited-being, and reduces them to independent somewhats — i. e., to somewhals that exist, not only in potent ia but, to such as through their negative rela- tion to their others, are independent. Their independence becomes posited in this way. But they still reduce themselves to a posited- being through this positing which they have. They cancel them- selves, in that they determine themselves into self-identical some- whats, but in the same, being still negative — a self-identity which is a relation to another. But this excluding reflection is not merely this formal determina- tion. It is excluding independence, and is the annulling of this posited-being, and through this annulling it becomes for itself, and in fact, a truly independent unity. Through the annulling of the other- being, the posited-being again makes its appearance as the negative of another. But, in fact, this negation is not again a merely first, immediate relation to another, not a posited-being as cancelled immediateness, but as cancelled posited-being. The excluding reflec- tion which belongs to independence, for the reason that it is exclud- ing, becomes a posited-being, but is at the same time a cancelling of its posited-being. It is a cancelling relation to itself. It annuls in this relation, first, the negative ; secondly, it posits itself as negative, and thereby becomes the very negative which it cancels : in the annul- ling of the negative it posits it and annuls it at the same time. This activity of exclusion is, therefore, the other whose negation it is ; the annulment of this posited-being is, therefore, not again posited-being in the sense that it is a negative of another, but it is the identification with itself, a posited unity with itself. Independence is, therefore, through its own negation, unity which returns into itself through the circumstance that it returns into itself by negating its posited-being. It is the unity of Essence, a unity which arises, not through the nega- tion of another, but through a negation of itself, being through this act self-identical. (3.) According to this positive side of the question, and through the fact that the independence which we find in the Antithesis has reduced itself, through its excluding activity of reflection, to posited- being, and at the same time annulled this posited-being, the Antithe- sis has not only been destroyed, but has gone back into its ground. 5 66 Essence. The excluding activity of reflection which appertains to an independ- ent contrary makes it a negative, and therefore a mere posited somewhat. Through this it reduces its determinations, which at first have the phase of independence (the positive and negative), to mere determinations — (i. e., to dependence). Since the posited-being is by this means made to become posited-being, it returns into unity with itself (its becoming is a becoming of itself ; herein the circular movement of reflection makes itself manifest) ; it is the simple essence, but the simplicity of essence in this phase is the category of Ground, or Reason (Grund). Through the annulling of the self-con- tradictory determinations of essence, we have the restoration of the simplicity of essence, but as an excluding unity of reflection. This is a simple unity which determines itself as negative, but in this posited- being is immediately self-identical. The independent Antithesis, through its contradiction, is cancelled, and results in a ground which is the first immediate whence issued the antithesis ; the annulled antithesis, or the annulled posited-being, is itself a posited-being. Hence, essence as ground is a posited-being, a result which has become. But, conversely, only this has resulted r that the antithesis, or the posited-being, is annulled or only as posited- being. Essence i&, therefore, as ground, this excluding reflection, which makes itself a posited-being, so that the antithesis with which it began, and which was immediate, is only the posited, definite inde- pendence of essence, and that at the same time it is only the self- annulling ; but essence is reflected into itself in its determinateness. Essence as ground excludes itself from itself, and thereby posits itself. Its posited-being, which is that which is excluded, is only as posited-being, as identity of the negative with itself. This independ- ent somewhat is the negative, posited as negative. It is a self- contradictory which, therefore, remains immediately in essence as its ground. (Posited-being is the immediate being which has shown itself to be transitory or dependent upon something else ; this de- pendence, traced out, is found to be a relation to that wh>ch posits it, again ; so the dependence is a dependence on its own dependence, and this is independence ; or, in the language of the text, the posited- being is an "annulled posited-being," being annulled through this very self-relation ; it is a posited-being which is annulled by being posited, again, as posited-being; i. e., its dependence is cancelled by being made self-dependent. N. B. It is only the tracing out of the entire relation which changes the aspect of the category here in- volved.) Contradiction. 67 The annulled contradiction is, therefore, the ground ; it is essence as the unity of positive and negative ; in antithesis, determination at- tains to independence, but its independence is perfected in the cate- gory of Ground. The negative is developed into independent essence in it, but still as negative. Therefore, it is at the same time the posi- tive, while it is self-identical in this negativity. The antithesis and its contradiction are, therefore, annulled in the category of Ground, as well as preserved. Ground is essence as positive identity with itself ; but it at the same time relates to itself as negativity, and, there- fore, determines itself, and becomes the excluded posited-being. This posited-being, however, is the wholly independent essence ; and the essence is ground through the fact that in this, its negation, it is self-identical and positive. The self-contradicting, independent an- tithesis was, therefore, ground already. There was added only the determination of unity with itself. This (unity) made its appearance through the fact that the independent opposites cancelled each itself, and each became its other, and consequently was annulled. But in that annulment each one came into self-identity ; and, therefore, proved itself to be self-identical essence, a somewhat reflected into itself, even in its destruction, in its posited-being, or self -negation. Remark 1. The positive and the negative are the same. This expression belongs to external reflection in so far as it institutes a comparison of these two determinations ; but the question is not what the relation is between two categories, as found by external comparison ; they must be considered in themselves, and their own reflection discovered. And in the case of these two categories, we have seen that each is essen- tially the manifestation of itself in the other, and the positing itself as the other. The thinking which deals with images ( Vorstellen), does not con- sider the positive and negative in themselves, and has recourse to the act of comparison in order to seize these distinctions, which are evanes- cent, but which it nevertheless holds to be fixed and abiding opposites to each other. A very little experience in the habits of reflecting- thinking will suffice to convince one that when it defines a somewhat as positive, it will often invert the same into negative upon very slight pretexts ; and, conversely, what it has defined as negative, into positive. The reflecting-thinking falls into confusion and self-con- tradiction in dealing with these categories. To one who is ignorant of the nature of these categories, it looks as though this confusion were something improper, and which ought not to happen ; it there- 68 Essence. fore ascribes it to subjective incompetency. This transition of one contrary into the other does, in fact, produce mere confusion so long as the necessity for the transformation has not been seen. It is, however, even for external reflection, a matter of simple observation that the positive is not a somewhat immediately identical with itself, but it is opposed to a negative, and has significance only in this rela- tion ; therefore, the negative itself is involved in the positive ; and, more than this, the positive is the self-relating negation of the nega- tive, which is the mere posited-being ; therefore, the positive is the absolute negation in itself. Likewise the negative, which is opposed to the positive, has its meaning in this relation to its other. Its totalit}', therefore, involves the positive. But the negative has also — outside of its relation to the positive — a subsistence of its own; it is self-identical. Hence the negative has all that belongs to the defi- nition of the positive. The opposition of positive and negative is most commonly under- stood in the sense that the positive is something objective, notwith- standing its very name expresses posited-being. On the contrary, it understands the negative, in a subjective sense, as belonging only to external reflection, which never concerns itself with the objective ; and, indeed, for which the objective does not exist. In fact, if the nega- tive expresses nothing else than an arbitrary abstraction, or the result of an external comparison, then, of course, it has no existence for the objective positive, and the positive is not in itself related to such an empty abstraction. But in that case the determination of " positive" is likewise merely an external and arbitraiy designation. For an ex- ample of these fixed contraries of reflection : light is generally taken as the positive, and darkness as the negative. But light has in its infinite expansion, and in the force of its unfolding and vitalizing in- fluences, the nature of absolute negativity. Darkness, on the con- trary, as devoid of multiplicity, or as the womb of productive ac- tivity, in which no distinctions are produced by its own energy, is rather the simple identity with itself, the positive. It is taken as negative in the sense that it, as the mere absence of light, does not ex- ist at all, and has no relation to light ; so that light, inasmuch as it is a self -relation, and is regarded as not depending upon others, but as related purely to itself, should cause darkness to vanish before it. But it is a familiar fact that light may be dimmed through the agency of darkness, so that it becomes gray ; and besides this merely quanti- tative change into gray, it also suffers qualitative changes through relation to darkness, and is modified into color. So, too, for an ex- ample : virtue is not without struggle ; it is rather the highest, most Conlardiction. 69 perfect struggle ; therefore, it is not onty the positive, but it is abso- lute negativity. Virtue, moreover, is not such merely in comparison with vice, but it is in its very nature opposition and struggling. In other words, vice is not only the absence of virtue — innocence, too, is this absence — and not distinguished from virtue by external reflec- tion, but it is in its very nature opposed to it ; it is evil. Evil consists in self-persistence in active opposition to good ; it is the positive negativity. But innocence is the absence of good as well as of evil, is indifferent toward both determinations, and is neither positive nor negative. But at the same time this absence is to be taken also as determinateness. On the one hand, it is to be regarded as the positive nature of something, and, on the other hand, it relates to a contrary; and all natures emerge from their state of innocence — from their in- different identity with themselves, and come into relation to their others, and through this go to destruction, or, in the positive sense, go back into their ground. The truth also is the positive, as the knowing which corresponds to its object ; but it is only this self-identity in so far as the knowing conducts itself negatively towards its other, pene- trates the object, and cancels its negation (for the object is the nega- tion of the subject). Error is something positive, as an opinion known and asserted regarding that which does not exist. Ignorance, however, is either indifferent towards truth and error, and, conse- quently, neither positive nor negative, in which case the distinction belongs to external reflection ; or, when taken objectiveby, as a quality of a person, it is the impulse which is directed against itself, a nega- tive which contains a positive direction in itself. It is one of the most important principles of philosophy, this insight into the nature of the determinations of reflection, as here considered ; that their truth consists only in their relation to each other, and that each in- cludes (in its totality) the other. Without this principle there can be no true step made in philosophy. Remark 2. The determination of Antithesis has likewise been set up as a prin- ciple — the so-called principle of Excluded Middle : Something is either A or not-A ; there is no middle term. This principle involves, in the first place, the proposition that every- thing is a contrary, an antithetic somewhat, and that it is either posi- tive or negative. This is an important principle, which finds its necessity in this fact that identit}7 involves (iibergeht) difference, and difference involves antithesis (i. e., the totality of each includes the other). 70 Essence. But it is not usual to take these determinations in this meaning. Ordinarily, the principle is understood to assert that of the predicates belonging to a thing, a given predicate either does or does not belong to it. The opposite signifies in this case merely absence, or, rather, indefiniteness ; and the principle taken in this sense is so empty of meaning that it is not worth the trouble of quoting. If the qualities street, green, square are taken — and all predicates are allowable by this principle — and predicated of the mind thus : the mind is siveet or not sweet, green or not green, etc., this would be pronounced trivial, and as leading to nothing. The determinateness contained in the predicate is related to something ; every proposition expresses that something is determined. It ought essentially to contain this : that the determinateness expresses what is essential, in the form of antithe- sis. Instead of that, however, the proposition quoted goes in the opposite direction, back toindeterminateness, in the fact that it predi- cates in a trivial manner the determinateness, or its indefinite non- being. The principle of Excluded Middle is further to be distinguished from the principles of Identity and Contradiction, already discussed. It asserts that there is no thing which is neither A nor not- A, no tertium quid indifferent to the antithesis. In fact, however, this very principle gives a tertium quid which is indifferent to the antithesis — viz. : A, itself. This A is neither -\- A nor — A, and it is equalby -\- A and — A. That which is to be either -|- A or not-A is hence related to -f- A, as well to not-A ; and, again, in the fact that it is related to A it ousrht not to be related to not-A, nor when it is related to not-A should it be related to A. The somewhat itself is, therefore, the tertium quid which was to be excluded. Since the contraries are both posited and annulled in the somewhat, the tertium quid, which is here a lifeless abstraction, if taken in a more profound meaning, is the unity of reflection into which, as the ground, the Antithesis recedes. Memark 3. If the first determinations of Reflection, viz.. Identity, Difference, and Antithesis (Polarity), can be set up as principles, as has been shown, it is certain that Contradiction ought also to admit of state- ment in the form of a principle ; for contradiction is the result of the mentioned determinations of reflection {i. e., the truth or totality of which Identity, Difference, and Antithesis are phases. Contra- diction is their " pre-supposition"), and if stated in the form of a principle would run thus: All things are in themselves contradic- Contradiction. 71 tory ; and this principle should be understood in the sense that it expresses the ' truth and essence of things better than the former principles mentioned. Contradiction, which succeeds the category of Antithesis, is only the category of Naught, fully unfolded (become explicit) — the category of Naught as contained in the category of Identity ; and this was partially seen in the expression that the principle of Identity says nothing (adds nothing in the predicate to the contents of the subject). This negation was further defined in the categories of Difference and Antithesis, and still further in the posited Contradiction. (The principle of Contradiction as here set up by Hegel, is the basis of all relation and of all being. Being has been found to depend upon Relation, and all Relation has been found to be Return or Reflection ; Reflection is a phase of self-relation or of self-negation ; all relation is negation ; self-relation or self-negation is the origin at once of all identity, subsistence, persistence, repose, and individuality, as well as of all distinction, opposition, activity, dependence, and manifestation. Contradiction makes explicit what was implicit in the determinations of Reflection previously discussed. " All things are in themselves contradictory," means nothing more nor less than that all finite or dependent things, when traced out as totalities, will be found to belong to self -relation, self-determina- tion, self-negation. And all independent things are self-determining and totalities.) It is, however, one of the fundamental prejudices of the formal logic and of the ordinary mode of viewing things, that Contradiction is not a determination of such essential and immanent character as that possessed by Identity. Yet, if order of rank is the question, and the two determinations are to be compared as separately valid, Contradiction will certainby be found to be the deeper and more essential. For Identity is in comparison with Contradiction only a determination expressing simple immediateness, the immediateness of dead being ; but Contradiction, on the other hand, is the root of all activity and vitality (self-movement is the basis of all movement, for no thing can move another until it originates movement within itself; but self-movement is self-negation, contradiction). Only in so far as something contains a contradiction within itself, does it move itself, and possess impulse and activity. Contradiction is usually held to be excluded from things, from all existence and from all truth. In fact, it is asserted that there is nothing self-contradictory ; on the other hand, regardless of this assertion, Contradiction is thrust into the subjective reflection which posits it through its act of relating and comparing. (The activity of 72 Essence. reflection brings disparate objects into relation and compares them ; it thereby unites contradictories.) Bat it is denied that Contradiction really exists in this subjective activity of reflection ; for it is said that the self-contradictory cannot be conceived or thought. If it were found in reality, or in the thinking reflection, it would pass for an accident or for something abnormal, or a transitory state of delirium. Now, as regards the assertion that there is no Contradiction, and that it cannot appertain to reality, we need not give ourselves any concern. A category of Essence will certainly be found in all experi- ence, and in all reality as well. Already, when speaking of the cate- gory of the Infinite, we have made the same remark ; and indeed Contradiction is the category of the Infinite as occurring in the sphere of Being (i. e., Contradiction is self-determination in the category of Essence, and the Infinite is the category of self-determi- nation in the sphere of Being). But even common experience itself bears testimony to the fact that there are a multitude of self-contra- dictory things, of self-contradictory plans, and so forth, whose self- contradiction is not merely one of external reflection, but is inherent. And moreover, their self-contradiction is not to be taken as some- thing abnormal which is found only here and there, and not in a majority of cases ; but it is the negative in its essential characteristic, the principle of all self-activity ; for self-activity is nothing else than an exhibition of self-contradiction. External movement perceptible- by the senses is the immediate existence of self-contradiction. Some- thing moves, not through the fact that it is now here, and in the next moment there, but through the fact that in one and the same moment of time it is here and not here — through the fact that in this "here" it is and is not, at the same time. It is necessaiy to acknowledge the contradictions which the ancient philosophers have shown up in the category of movement, but in conceding the validity of the contra- diction shown by their dialectic, we must not adopt their conclusion and deny the existence of movement ; on the contrary, we must affirm that movement is the real existence of contradiction. Likewise, the internal, real self-activity, viz., impulse in general (Trieb) — appetite or nisus of the monads (Leibnitz) the Entelechy of absolute, simple essence (Aristotle) — is nothing else than this contradiction that something is in itself, and at the same time the lack of itself, its own negative, and this in one and the same respect. (Instinct, impulse, desire, are manifestations within a being of its dependence upon another ; they express its lack or want of its own true being, that upon which it depends ; and at the same time they express this want as the true nature, the being-in-itself of the thing. Contradiction. 73 itself. Even gravity in matter is a similar expression of self-contra- diction ; the very essence of matter expresses its own non-being. ) The mere abstract identity is not yet the category of vitality (it is not adequate to it), but the category of vitality demands that the positive shall be the negative in itself, and through this fact issue forth from itself, and thereby posit change within itself. Something is vital, therefore, only so far as it contains the contradiction within itself, and nevertheless is a force sufficient to preserve itself in spite of this contradiction within itself. If, however, an existence does not possess the capacity to retain its positive determination in the face of its negative, and to hold the one in the other, in other words, cannot endure the contradiction within itself, then it is not a vital unity, not a Ground, but the contradiction destroys it. Speculative thinking consists only in this, that the thinking activity grasps firmly the cate- gory of contradiction and holds it within itself, but not as conceived b}r the ordinary thinking which thinks only in images ; for the picture- making thinking thinks contradiction only as a principle which rules thought and which allows of no other solution for contradictory deter- minations than zero. The contradiction contained in movement and in impulse, desire, and the like categories is concealed from the thinking which deals only with images through the appearance of simplicity which belongs to such categories. But, on the other hand, in the categories of Kela- tion the self-contradiction involved becomes immediately manifest. The most trivial examples, those of above and beneath, of right and left, of father and son, etc., etc., contain each the antithesis in unity. Above is that wdrich is not beneath; above is thus defined to be only the non-being of beneath, and is only in so far as the beneath is (the totality of its being is one with the totality of the being of the other); and vice versa, in each category is contained its opposite. Father is the other of son, and son the other of father, and each is only as this other of another ; and at the same time the one determination exists only in relation to the other; their being is one totality. Father is besides this relation to son also some- thing independent, it is true ; but as such he is not father, but only man in general. So also, above and beneath, right and left, reflected into themselves (i. e., considered not as terms of relation to another, but in regard to themselves), are something independ- ent outside of this relation, but as such they are only places in general. Contraries (polar opposites) contain self-contradiction in so far as they are in one and the same respect related negatively to another, or reciprocally annulling and at the same time indifferent to 74 Essence. each other. The thinking which deals in images, when it passes over to the phase of indifference in categories, forgets their negative unity, and treats them, consequently, only as disparate in general ; and thus regarded, " right " is no longer " right," "left " no longer " left," etc. But when it has right and left really before it, it has these determinations in their self-negating activity, the one existing in the other, and in this unity at the same time not annulling itself, but each one existing indifferent and independent. The thinking which deals in images has, thei'efore, self-contradic- tion always for its content, but is never conscious of this fact. It remains external reflection, therefore, and flits to and fro from like- ness to difference, or from the negative relation of objects distin- guished to their reflection into themselves. It holds these two deter- minations (of we^a^'ye-relation and of self- relation) apart and opposite to each other, and has in mind only their indifference and not their transition, which is the essential thing, and contains the contradiction. The genial reflection (the speculative form of reflection), if we may mention it here, consists — in contrast to the forms of reflection mentioned — in the apprehension and expression of contradiction, although it does not express the comprehension (Begriff = ideal totalit}r) of things and their relations, and has only image-forms of thought for its materials and contents, yet it brings them into a relation which contains their contradiction, and thereby manifests their com- prehension (ideal totality). The thinking reason, however, sharpens, so to speak, the blunted distinction of Difference, the mere multi- plicity of image-thinking, to essential distinction, to antithesis; multi- plicity when sharpened to the point of contradiction becomes vital and active, each of its individuals manifesting itself against the others, and thus multiplicity obtains for itself the negativity which is the in-dwelling pulsation of self-movement and vitality. In speaking of the ontological proof of the existence of God, we have already mentioned that the basis of that proof is the idea of an including totality of all real things. Of this idea it is customary to prove first its possibility ; this being done by showing that it contains no contradiction, because reality merely as reality has no limits. Attention has been called to the fact that with this proof, the men- tioned including totality is reduced to the simple, indeterminate being ; or if the realities are taken in fact as a multiplicity of par- ticulars, then it becomes an including totality of all negations. Critically examined, the distinction of realities passes from the cate- gory of difference to antithesis, and then to contradiction, and the including totality of all realities goes over into absolute self-contra- Contradiction. 75 diction. The prevailing horror of contradiction which possesses the thinking that deals with images, but not the speculative thinking — a feeling similar to that which nature is said to have for a vacuum — objects to this result ; for it holds fast to the one-sided solution of self-contradiction in zero, and ignores the positive side of it, accord- ing to which contradiction becomes absolute activity and absolute ground. We have seen from the consideration of the nature of contradic- tion that it is, so to say, no fault, or lack, or failure of a thing to exhibit a contradiction within it. On the contrary, every determina- tion, every concrete thing, every idea, is essentially a unity of distinct, and separable moments, which pass over into contradictory moments through the particular essential distinction in them (forming the basis of their difference). This contradictory unity, of course, resolves itself into a zero — it goes back into its negative unity. The thing, the subject, the idea, is precisely this negative unity itself; it is an in-itself-contradictory, but at the same time equally a resolved contradiction ; it is the ground which retains and carries with it its determinations. The thing, subject, or idea is as reflected into itself, as regards its own sphere, its solved contradiction ; but its entire sphere is a particularized one, a " different" as regards some other sphere ; hence it is a finite somewhat, and to be a " finite " is to be , a contradiction. Of this higher contradiction, in which its entire sphere is involved, the thing, subject, or idea is not itself the solu- tion ; but there is a still higher sphere as its negative unity, as its ground. Finite things, in their indifferent manifoldness, involve always a contradiction ; for they are within themselves sundered, and exist only in their ground (into which they return through the activity of the process to which they belong). As will be shown further on, the true inference from a finite and contingent to an absolutely nec- essary essence does not consist in this : that the latter is inferred from a finite and contingent being which is an abiding ground underlying it, but rather that the inference is made because contingency implies an in-itself-contradictory being, a merely transitory one. In other words, the inference is based on the fact, that the contingent being returns into its ground necessarily, and therein annuls itself ; and, moreover, that through this return into its ground, it posits that ground (fur- nishes the basis for the inference that it exists) only by exhibiting itself as a posited (£. e., as a dependent being, and thereb}^ positing an independent being). In the ordinary syllogism, the being of the finite appears to be the ground of the absolute: " therefore, because the finite is, it follows that the absolute is." The true inference, 76 Essence. however, is this: "Therefore, because the finite is an in-itself-con- tradictory antithesis — i. e., because it is not — the absolute is." In the former case the conclusion is : The being of the finite is the being of the absolute. In the latter case it is : The non-being of the finite is the being of the absolute. Third Chapter. Ground or Reason. Essence defines itself as ground (or reason). As Naught was found (in the dialectic of Immediateness) to be in simple, direct unity with Being, so here is found the immediate unity of the simple Identity of essence with its absolute Negativity (the Identity of Essence attains and preserves itself through its activity of negating ; through its negating arise all particular determinations- which constitute the different elements of its content, and through the same determining activity this multiplicity is negated, and disap- pears ; only the process, the negative activity, abiding as ground or essence). Essence is only this negative activity, the same which pure Reflection is. (All proving or demonstration depends upon reflection — i. e., on the fact that a finite, or immediate being is a process of mani- festing its dependence; its incompleteness, its imperfection, its fragmentariness, are all only a manifestation of the independent being, its ground. This reference of a finite somewhat to its ground, as that upon which it essentially depends, is reflection; it comes from the ground, and is a process of return to the ground.) It is this pure negativity, as the return of being into itself. Hence, it is in-itself, or for-us determined as (i. e., seen to essentially consist in or depend upon) ground into which being (immediateness) dissolves. But this determinateness (£. e.. ground) is not posited through itself (». e.r through the immediate being, because the immediate being is only an appearance — its essence lies outside of itself, in the ground; it cannot posit anything, because it possesses no essence to bestow upon another). In other words, the determinateness of immediate being,, through which immediate being is cancelled, is a result of the deter- mining activity of ground or essence acting upon immediate being from without; and, therefore, this determinateness is not self-posited. Its reflection consists in this : what the immediate being is, is posited as negative, and thereby determined (i. e., negated by the activity of the ground). The distinction of positive and negative constitutes the essential determination in which it (being) is lost, as in its nega- tion. These independent determinations of reflection cancel each Ground. 77 other, and the determination thus annulled — gone to the ground — is the true determination of essence. Ground is, therefore, also one of the determinations of reflection which form the categories of essence ; but it is the final one, and its determination consists rather in being the annulment of determina- tion. The determination of reflection, when it annuls itself, "goes to the ground," obtains its true significance, that of absolute counter- impulse within itself, viz., that the posited-being which belongs to essence is only an annulled posited-being; and, conversely, only the self-annulling posited-being is the posited-being of essence ("pos- ited-being" = the being-established through another; all categories of essence are categories of mediation, categories posited through another ; but the starting-point in this positing or mediating is, of course, always being or immediateness ; its positing is always due to its self-annulment, to its transitoriness, its evanescence ; on the other hand, that which is posited is the totality of its negative process; hence the abiding, the essence, the ground ; but the essence or abid- ing thus posited is posited as the primordial source, the origin ^vhence the evanescent being proceeded ; hence the immediate being which posited the essence, posits rather the being which posited it — its positing is rather a presupposing activity, or, in the words of the text, " its positing is only a cancelling or annulment " of its positing ; it is a return movement, or reflection, rather than an origination or posit- ing). Essence, when it defines itself as ground, defines itself as the non-determined, and it is only the annulment of this, its being-deter- mined, which determines it as essence (i. e., the cancelling of its other being — the particularized somewhats which have arisen from essence, and stand over against it as immediate being — the cancelling of this otherness is the true determination of essence). In this being- determined (of essence), as the self-annulling essence, it is not a derivative somewhat derived from another (originating in im- mediate being), but it is self-identical in and through this negativity (£. e., through this cancelling of all otherness, it exhibits itself as primordial). In so far as the category of Ground is reached through the annul- ment of Determination (i. e. Particular Being), as the first or imme- diate from which we begin, and which proves transitory ( " goes to the ground") — a result which follows from the very nature of Determination — the category of ground is, as such result, condi- tioned through its origin, and thus a determined somewhat. But this determining is, in the first place, an annulment of determination, 78 Essence. and hence only a restored, purified, or revealed identity of Essence — it is what the determination of reflection is potentially (and not }ret realized). In the second place, this determining is, as annulment of determining, the positing of that determinateness of reflection which was called the Immediate ( on its appearance in the positing reflection), but which is posited only by the self-excluding reflection of Ground, and in this is only as posited or as annulled ( in its independence). Essence, when it is defined as ground in this sense is a self-result. As Ground, therefore, it posits itself as Essence ; and in this fact, that it posits itself as Essence, consists its determination. This positing is the reflection that appertains to Essence — a determining that annuls itself in the very act of deter- mining itself — being in one respect a positing, and in another re- spect a positing of Essence, and, consequently, both in one act ( the positing of itself, and of Essence which is its own annulment). Reflection is pure mediation ; Ground, on the other hand, is real mediation of Essence. Reflection is the movement of Naught to Naugfct, through itself ; it is its manifestation of another ; but since the antithesis does not attain to independence, as regards its sides (the contraries), it follows that in Reflection the first is not a pos- itive — that which appears ; nor is the other the negative — that in which it appears. The two are mere substrates of the imagina- tion ; they are not purely self-related terms. Pure mediation is only pure relation without any terms that stand in relation. (The rela- tion is that of self-determination, and hence an activity which pro- duces itself through the pure activity, and is not a relation which exists between two already existing somewhats.) The "Deter- mining Reflection" posits such terms as are self-identical, but at the same time are particular (concrete) relations. Ground, on the contrary, is the real mediation, because it contains reflection as annulled reflection ; it is Essence positing itself and returning into it- self, through its non-being. (Ground, thus defined and distin- guished from the activity of reflection, which has been discussed at such length, is here called by Hegel a real mediation, instead of a pure mediation, because its result is a reality, and not simply a nega- tion of something that exhibits itself as a phenomenal or transitory being, or a mere appearance ; in this determination, the real some- what is restored to validity again, so that it finds its explanation and justification, and, in short, is shown to be a well-grounded some- what. Of course, it is only a more entire view that yields us this in- sight. We see the general form of the activity which at first seemed Ground. 79 to have only a negative result ; it is seen to have a positive result, and to produce reality, instead of mere annulment. This insight is akin to the insight which sees Law underlying change — it sees Return where at first there appeared to be only a vanishing of whatever appeared. But the idea of Law is much more concrete or deeper than this idea of Ground, which here is only the explana- tion of multiplicity by means of the distinction of form and matter.) According to this phase of annulment of Reflection ( that in which it is found that the vanishing of the immediate being is not into nothing, but into a process which returns again to the being which had before vanished — and so the reflection is thereby annulled), the posited somewhat is determined as an immediate — as a somewhat that possesses self -identity outside of its relation or outside of its appear- ance (?'. e., outside of its relation of dependence.) This immediate- ness is the phase of Being restored through the process of Essence ; it is the non-being of Reflection, as that through which essence mediates itself. Essence returns into itself as negating ; hence it determines itself in this return, and for the reason that this is a determination arising in the identity of the negative, in its self-rela- tion, which is the annulment of the positing (of the dependence) ; it is, therefore, existing — or real; it is the identity of Essence as Ground. Ground is first to be considered as Absolute Ground (£. e., because that is its most immediate phase, its most abstract, or empti- est phase). In the phase of Absolute Ground, Essence is regarded as the "Basis" for the distinction; when defined with more atten- tion, it is stated as the distinction of Form and Matter, or as Form and Content. In the second place, it becomes a still more definitely seized dis- tinction— that of Gronnd of a special content ; and since the relation of Ground is one in which the Essence is regarded as externalizing itself in this distinction of Ground and Content, it becomes Condi- tioning Mediation. Thirdly, Ground presupposes a condition, but the condition like- wise presupposes a ground ; the unity of the two is the uncondi- tioned— the nature of the thing whereby it realizes itself in the cat- egory of Existence, through its mediation with its conditioning relations. ( It will be understood that the preceding is a general chara(ftei'- ization of the entire contents of the third chapter of this work ; this chapter concludes the first division of the treatment of Essence, and 80 Essence. inducts us into the consideration of more explicit categories of Rela- tion. This introduction to the chapter merely states the general results, which we may expect to see proved in detail in what is to follo\y.) Remark. Ground, too, like the other categories of Reflection, has been expressed in the form of a Principle: Everything has a sufficient Ground, or Reason. The general meaning of this principle is nothing more than this: that whatever is, is to be considered, not as a something existing isolatedly for itself, but as a dependent some- thing. It implies, therefore, that we must look beyond that which we see, and seek a ground or explanation for it — a ground in which the somewhat is not as it at first seemed, but is annulled as regards its iramediateness, and is seen as it is in its being-in-and- for itself ( i. e., in its law or in the general type of its process). In the principle of Ground the essentiality of Reflection-into-itself, as compared with mere immediate being, is expressed. That the ground must be a "sufficient" ground needs not be added, for it is superfluous ; that for which the ground is not suffi- cient, would not have a ground at all. Leibnitz, who placed a high estimate upon the principle of sufficient reason, and made it the basis of his whole system, attached to it a deeper signification and a more important conception than is ordinarily given to it. Yet even in the ordinary acceptation it has a very important meaning, inasmuch as it implies that being, as such, in its immediateness, is to be taken as untrue, and essentially as a posited (t. e., as a dependent), but its ground is to be taken as the true immediate (£. e., as the true individu- ality). But Leibnitz added the designation " sufficient," in order to distinguish it sharply from the mechanical conception of cause as an external activity or influence. When causality is conceived as a form external to its content, as an activity that produces a determina- tion in an effect that is, after all, a merely external modification superinduced upon the so-called " effect," this category is rnereby a loose and fortuitous connection of the determinations involved. The fact that the parts belong to the whole is comprehended in causality, but the definite relation of these parts is not stated in the concept of mechanical cause. This relation, the whole as the essential unity of the parts, lies only in the idea (ideal, the totality of its being), or in the final cause. Mechanical causes are not "sufficient" for this unity, because the final cause, as the unity of their determinations, Absolute Ground. 81 does not lie at the basis of mechanical causes. Under the concept of sufficient cause, therefore, Leibnitz has conceived a cause that suf- ficed for this unity ; and, therefore, not a mere cause, but the final cause. This definition of ground, as understood hy Leibnitz, is not the proper one of ground as it belongs here ; the teleological ground is a category of the Idea (or Begriff), and its mediation is the Reason. The Absolute Ground. 1. Form and Essence. The determination of Reflection, in so far as it returns to a ground (i.e., shows that the idea of ground underlies the immediate being), constitutes only an immediate being in general with which a beginning- is to be made. But the immediate being has only the meaning of a posited (dependent) being, and presupposes a ground, of necessity. It presupposes a ground in the sense that it does not posit this ground, but rather that this presupposition on its part is indeed a negation of itself (for it is a confession of its own dependence and consequent lack of individuality) ; the immediate is only the posited, and the ground is the non-posited. As it has been shown, the presupposi- tion, which is a positing that points back to that which posited it, is the ground, but not as undetermined, in the annulment of all determinateness, but the self-determined essence that is undetermined or determined only as cancelled posited-being. It is the essence that is identical with itself in its own negativity. The determinateness of essence as ground is therefore duplicate — that of ground and grounded. It is, first, essence as ground, deter- mined as essence, as non-posited-being, in opposition to the posited- being. Secondly, it is the grounded, the immediate, which, however, is not in-and-for-itself, but the posited being as posited-being. This is, consequently, self-identical, but the identity of the negative with itself. The negative which is self-identical, and the positive that is self-identical, are one and the same identity. For the ground is iden- tity of the positive, or of itself, and of the posited-being ; and that which is grounded is the posited-being as posited-being, and this reflection-into-itself is the identity of the ground. This simple identity is, therefore, not the ground itself ; for the ground is the essence, posited as the non-posited, in opposition to the posited-being. As this unity of the definite identity — of ground — and of the negative 82 Essence. identity — of the grounded — it is the essence in general, distin- guished from its mediation. This mediation, compared with the reflections that have preceded it, and from which it has originated, is, in the first place (as is obvious), not the pure reflection, as which it is not distinguished from the essence ; nor is it the negative, as which it would possess the independ- ence of the determinations within itself. In the category of Ground as the annulled reflection, however, these determinations have a per- sistence. Moreover, it is not the determining reflection whose deter- minations possess essential independence ; for this independence of determinations has been shown to be groundless when we were demon- strating the categoiy of Ground, and within its unity those deter- minations are as merely "posited" determinations. This mediation of Ground is, therefore, the unity of the pure reflection and the determining reflection. Its determinations, or the posited, have persistence ; and, conversely, the persistence of the same is a posited somewhat. For the reason that this persistence which it has is a posited one, or has determinateness, it follows that its determinations are different from its simple unity, and constitute the form as opposed to the Essence. Essence has a form, and determinations of that form. First, as ground it has a fixed immediateness, or is a substratum. Essence is one with its reflection, and its movement is indistinguishable from it. It is, therefore, not the Essence which it penetrates ; and, more- over, it is not that which constitutes its commencement. This circumstance makes the exposition of reflection very difficult ; for it is not proper to say that the essence returns into itself, that it appears in itself, because it is not before its movement, nor in its movement, and the movement has no basis which supports it. A re- lated somewhat makes its appearance in the ground according to the moment of annulled reflection. Essence, as the related substratum, is, however, the particularized Essence ; and on account of this posited- being it has the form as essentially belonging to it. The form- determinations, on the other hand, are the determinations as belong- ing to Essence. Essence lies at the basis, as the indeterminate, which in its determination is indifferent towards them. They have in it their reflection into themselves. The determinations of reflection are defined as possessing their subsistence in themselves, and as being independent ; but their independence is their dissolution ; there- fore, they have their independence in another ; but this very dissolu- tion is at the same time their very identity, or the ground of their persistence. Form and Essence. 83 Form belongs to everything that is determined (or to all particular being) ; form-determination is distinguished from that whose form it is, and it is always a posited somewhat ; the deterininatcness as quality is one with its substratum, with immediate being. Being is that which is immediately determined, that which is not distinct from its determinateness ; it is that which is not reflected into itself, and hence it is an existent, and not a posited. The form-determinations of essence are, moreover, as determinations of reflection and as regards- their definite particularity of content, the moments of reflection that have been considered above. Identity and distinction, the latter partly as difference, partly as antithesis, are these moments of reflec- tion. Besides these, the determination of ground belongs to these form-determinations — that is, in so far as it is the annulled determi- nation of reflection, or through this, essence is at the same time a posited. On the contrary, Identity does not belong to form, nainelj', that which is contained in the ground, that the posited-being as- annulled, and the posited-being as such — the ground and the grounded — is one reflection, which constitutes the essence as simple basis — that is, the subsistence of the form. But this subsistence is posited in the ground ; in other words, this essence is essentially as determined ; consequently, it is also a moment of ground-relation and of form. This is the absolute reciprocal relation of form and essence : this simple unity of ground and grounded which is in this, at the same time a particular, or a negative, and distinguishes itself from the form, but at the same time is ground itself, and a moment of form. Form is, therefore, the complete totality of reflection ; it contains, moreover, this determination of reflection — it is annulled. There- fore it is likewise a unity of its determinations, and also related to their annulment, to another which is not form, but to which the form belongs. As the essential negativity which relates to itself, it is the positing and determining as opposed to this simple negative ; as simple essence, on the other hand, it is the undetermined and non-active basis in which the determinations of form have their inherence or their reflection into themselves. External Reflection takes its stand upon this distinction between essence and form. (It has not the ability to transcend this category). It is necessary to discriminate between matter and form, but this very discrimination is their unity ; and this unity of ground is essence which repels from itself and reduces what is repelled to a posited-being. Form is the absolute negativity itself, or the negative, absolute self-identity, through which essence is essence, and not mere being. This identity, taken abstractly, is essence as 84 Essence. opposed to form ; just as negativity, taken abstractly as the posited- being, is the particular determination of form. This determination, however, as has been shown, is, in its truth, the total self-relating negativity, which is, consequently, as this identity, the simple essence in itself. Form, therefore, has essence as appertaining to its own identity ; so, likewise, essence has as its own negative nature, the absolute form. Therefore, the question cannot be asked: how form is added to essence ; for form is only the manifestation of essence in itself; it is the inherent reflection of essence. Form likewise is, by itself, the reflection which returns into itself ; or, in other words, it is the self-identical essence. In its act of determining, it reduces its determination to posited-being as posited -being. It, therefore, does not determine essence as though it were presupposed, as though it were divided from the essence ; for, as thus existing, it would be the unessential, a mere determination of reflection, restless, and perishing •(going into its ground), and with this it would be rather the ground (or result) of its own cancelling, or the identical self-relation of its determinations. Form determines essence, in the sense that form, in its separation from essence, annuls this very separation, and is the self-identity of essence as the persistence of the determination. It is the contradiction which is annulled in its posited-being, and in this being-annulled finds its persistence ; consequently it is ground as essence, which is self-identical in its being determined or negated. These distinctions, therefore, of form and essence are mere ele- ments or phases of the simple form-relation itself. But, considered more in detail, the determining form relates to itself as posited- being which has been annulled ; and, therefore, it relates to its iden- tit}- as though it were another. It posits itself as annulled, hence it presupposes its identity ; essence is, in this phase, the indetermin- ate for which form is its other. Therefore, it is not essence which is the absolute reflection into itself, but this reflection is determined as the formless identity ; it is matter. 2. Form and Matter. Essence becomes matter, in the fact that its reflection determines itself, so that its reflection relates to it as to the formless indeterminate. Matter is, therefore, the simple identity devoid of distinctions, the identity which is essence determined as the other of Form. It is, therefore, the real basis or the substrate of Form ; since it constitutes the reflection into itself of the form-determinations, which reflection is the independent, to which it relates as to its positive subsistence. If abstraction is made from all the determinations which belong to Form and Mailer. 85 the form of a somewhat, there remains nothing but the undetermined matter. Matter is a pure abstraction. One cannot see matter, nor feel it; what one sees or feels is the determinations of matter, i. e., the unity of matter and form. This act of abstraction from which the idea of matter proceeds is, however, not a mere external removal and annulment of form ; but the activity of form (the self-determi- nation which belongs to form) evolves this simple identity of and from itself, as we have already seen in the above consideration. Moreover, form presupposes matter to which it relates. But for this reason form and matter are not found as two external categories accidentally opposed to each other ; neither of the two is self-originat- ing, or, in other words, eternal. Matter is indifferent as opposed to form, but this indifference is the determinateness of self-identity into which form returns as into its basis. Form presupposes matter. In this very fact that it posits itself as anulled, and consequently relates to this, its identity (matter), as to another, it presupposes matter. Conversely, form is presupposed by matter. For matter is not the simple essence which is the absolute reflection itself, but it is the same determined as the positive, i. e., that which is only as annulled negation. But, on the other hand, because the form posits itself only as matter, in so far as it annuls itself and presupposes mat- ter, matter is also determined to be persistence without a ground. Likewise, matter is not determined as the ground of form ; but since matter posits itself as the abstract identity of the annulled form-determination, it is not identity as ground ; and form, as opposed to it, is groundless. Form and matter are consequently defined as not posited through each other, and as not the ground of each other. Matter is rather the identity of the ground and the grounded — i. e., as the basis (foundation) which stands opposed to this form-relation. This determination of indifference, which belongs in common to form and matter, is the determination of matter as such (i. e., its definition), and constitutes also the relation of the two to each other. And in the same manner the defi- nition of form, that it is the relation of distinct somewhats, is also the other side of the relation of the two to each other. Matter which s defined as indifferent is the passive opposed to the form as active. And this as the self-related negative is the contradiction within itself, the self-annulling, self-repelling, and self-determining. It relates to matter, and it is posited to relate to its subsistence as though to another. Matter is, therefore, posited as relating only to itself, and as indifferent towards others ; but it relates to form poten- tially (cm sich) ; for it contains annulled negativity, and is matter only $6 Essence, "because of this characteristic. It relates to matter, therefore, as though matter were another being, because form is not posited os belonging to it — i. e., because the same is onby potentially attached to it. It contains the form involved within itself, and is the absolute receptivity for it, and only for this reason : that it has the some within it, and that this is its undeveloped nature. Matter must, there- fore, receive form, and form must materialize itself ; in other words, form must come into self-identity, or must reach its reality in matter. (2.) Form, therefore, determines matter, and matter is determined by form ; since form is the absolute self-identity, it follows that it contains matter within itself ; in the same manner, matter possesses in its pure abstraction or absolute negativity the form within itself. Hence the activity of form upon the matter, and the being-determined of the latter through the former is only the annulment of the appar- ent indifference and independence of each as regards the other. This relation of the activity of determining is, therefore, the medi- ation of each with itself, by means of its own non-being. But these two mediations are one activity, and the restoration of their original identity — the re-collection from their externalization. First. Form and matter presuppose each other reciprocally. As we have seen above, the one essential unity is negative relation to itself, and, therefore, dirempts itself into the essential identity, deter- mined as the indifferent basis, and into the essential distinction or negativity as the determining form. That unity of essence and form which posits form and matter in opposition to itself is the absolute ground which determines itself. Since it reduces itself to a dis- parate somewhat, the relation, on account of the identity of the dis- parates which lies at the basis, becomes reciprocal presupposition. Secondly. Form, as independent, is the self-annulling contradic- tion ; and it is also posited as such inasmuch as it is at the same time both independent and essentially related to another ; it there- fore annuls itself. Since it is ambiguous, this annulment has two aspects : In the first place, it annuls its independence, reduces itself to a posited-being, to a somewhat that belongs to another — this, its other, being matter. In the second place, it annuls its distinction from matter, its relation to the same, consequently its posited-being; and, therefore, attains self-subsistence. Since it cancels its posited- being, the latter is its reflection and its own identity, into which it passes. But since this identit}* externalizes itself and polarizes against itself as matter, the mentioned reflection of the posited-being into itself is a union with a matter, and as such it obtains its self- subsistence. Therefore, in this union with a matter as with another Form and Matter. 87 "being, as regards the first aspect in which it reduces itself to a posited-somewhat, it passes into identity with itself. Therefore, the activity of form through which matter is determined consists in a negative relation of form to itself. But, conversely, it, too, relates negatively to matter ; but this being-determined of matter is likewise the activity that belongs properly to form itself. Form is free as regards matter (£. e., independent of or indifferent to matter), but it annuls this independence ; however, its independence is matter itself, for to this belongs its essential identity. Since it reduces itself, therefore, to a posited-somewhat, this is one and the same activity which gives particularity to the matter. But, considered from the other point of view, the identity that belongs to form is expressed, and matter is the "other" thus expressed; to that extent matter is not particularized, for the reason that form annuls its (matter's) own independence. But matter is independent only as opposed to form ; since the negative annuls itself, it annuls also the positive ; therefore, since the form annuls itself, the particular determinations of matter fall away — those determinations which it has as opposed to form, viz., its indeterminateness and persistence. This which seems to be an activit}' of form is, therefore, likewise the movement which belongs properly to matter itself. The nature of matter, or its ideal destiny (what it should realize) is its absolute negativity. Through this, matter relates not only to form as to another, but this external (j. e., this relation itself) is the form which it contained in an undeveloped state within itself. Matter is the same contradiction potentially as that which form contains, and this contradiction is like its resolution, only one. Matter, how- ever, is in itself a contradiction, because it is absolute negativity while it is an undetermined self-identity ; it therefore annuls itself within itself, and its identity is dirempted in its negativity, and the latter preserves its independence through the former. While, there- fore, matter is particularized (determined or rendered definite) by form as by somewhat external to it, it by this means realizes itself ; and the externality involved in the relation, as well on the part of form as on the part of matter, consists in this : that each of the two, or rather that their original unity, is in its positing likewise a presup- posing ; whence it follows that the relation to itself is a relation to itself as annulled, and, therefore, a relation to its " other." Thirdly. Through the activity of form and matter their original unity is restored, but as a posited. Matter determines itself, although this determining is, as far as matter is concerned, an exter- nal deed emanating from form. Conversely, form determines only 88 Essence. itself, or contains matter that is determined by it within itself, although at the same time this self-determining appears to be a deter- mining of something else. And finally, the two — the activity of form and the activity of matter — ■ are one and the same ; only that the former is an activity (ein Tliun, a deed) in which the negative appears as a posited, while the latter is an activity (Beivegung, i. e., a movement) which is a becoming, in which the negativity appears as characteristic of its very nature (t. e., its potentiality, or its ideal). The result is, therefore, the unity of the being-in-itself (its nature, or potentiality, or ideal) and its being-posited (£. e., its dependence upon others, or what it derives from others). Matter, as such, is- determined (particularized, made special), or, in other words, has- necessarily a form; and form, on the other hand, necessarily implies matter, or is self-subsistent form. Form, in so far as it presupposes matter as its other, is finite. It is not Ground, but only activity. So also matter, in so far as it pre- supposes form as its not-being, is finite matter ; it is likewise not the ground of its unity with form, but only the basis or substrate for the form. But this finite matter, as finite form, has no truth ; each of the two relates to the other, and their unity only is their truth. In this unity the two determinations have their return, and in it they annul their independence ; hence this unity is proved to be their ground. Therefore, matter is the ground of its determination of form only in so far as it is not matter as matter, but the absolute unity of essence and form. Form, too, is the ground of the persistence of its deter- minations only in so far as it is the same one unity. But this one unity as the absolute negativity, and more definitely as excluding unity, is in its act of reflection a presupposing somewhat. In other words, it is an activity which, in positing itself as a posited, preserves itself in the unity, and repels itself from itself, i. e., relates to itself as itself, and to itself as though itself were another. Or. again, it may be stated in this way: The particularizing (die Bestimmtwer- clen) of matter through form is the mediation of Essence as Ground in one unity, through itself and through its own negation. Matter which has received a form, or form which has obtained realization on a matter, is not merely that absolute unity of the ground with itself which has been mentioned, but also the posited unity. The movement already considered is that in which the absolute ground has exhibited its movements (or phases) as at the same time self-annulling, and hence as posited. In other words, the restored unity has, in its return to itself, at the same time repelled itself and determined itself (reduced itself to particularity) ; for its- Form and Content. 89 unity, inasmuch as it has come into existence through negation, is also a negative unity. It is, therefore, the unity of form and matter as their basis which, however, is their definite, particular basis or sub- strate ; and this matter that has received its form is indifferent to form and matter as to something that is annulled and unessential. It is content. 3. Form and Content. Form, in the first place, stands opposed to Essence ; hence it is a relation which belongs to the category of Ground, and its determina- tions are the Ground and the grounded. In the next place, it stands opposed to matter; and in this phase it is a " determining reflec- tion," and its determinations are the determination-of-reflection itself and its persistence ("determination of reflection "includes Identity, Difference, Antithesis, and Contradiction ; its persistence is its reality). Thirdly, and finally, it stands opposed to Content (Inhalt); in this phase its determinations are itself (i. e. , form) and matter. That which was previously self-identical, to wit, Ground, in the first place, and afterwards its persistence (or reality), and, finally, matter, now comes under the dominion of form, and is again one of its determinations. Content has, in the first place, one form and one matter, which belong to it, and are essential ; it is their unity. But since this unity is at the same time a particularized or posited unity, it stands opposed to form ; the latter constitutes the posited-being of the unity (i. e., the form is that which comes from the activity of that on which it depends), and is, as regards the content, unessential. The content is, therefore, indifferent to the form ; it comprehends both the form, as such, and also the matter ; and it has, therefore, a form and a matter, and it constitutes their basis, and they are for it a mere posited-being (mere result of its activity). The Content is, in the second place, that which is identical in the form and matter ; and in this respect the difference between form and matter would be a mere indifferent externality. ' They are noth- ing but posited-being, which, however, has returned to its unity in the content, and thus into its ground. The self-identity of the content is, from one point of view, therefore, the identity which is indifferent to the form ; but from the other point of view it is the identity of the ground. Ground has vanished into Content ; but content is mean- while the negative reflection of form-determinations into themselves. Its unity, which in its first aspect is onby indifference as regards form, is, therefore, also the formal unity or ground-relation as such. Con- 90 Essence. tent has, therefore, this unity for its essential form ; and the Ground, conversely, a content. The content of the Ground is therefore the Ground, which has returned into its unity with itself. Ground, in the first place, is Essence, which is identical with itself in its posited-being ; as distinct from and indifferent towards its posited-being it is the undetermined (the indefinite) matter; but as content, it is the identity which has received form, and this form becomes on this account a ground-rela- tion, because the determinations of its antithesis are posited in the content as also negated. Content is, moreover, determined (defined, particularized) within itself (by its own nature), not only as matter in the phase of indifference in general, but as matter that has received form, so that the determinations of form have a material realit}7, an indifferent persistence (independence). In one respect the content is the essential identity of the ground with itself in its posited-being. In another respect it is the posited identity as opposed to the ground- relation. This posited-being, which as form-determination belongs to this identity, is opposed to the free posited-being — i. e., it is opposed to the form as the totality of the relation of the Ground and the grounded. This form is the total posited-being which returns into itself. The first-mentioned form, therefore, is only the posited- beinsr as an immediate somewhat — determinateness, as such. Ground with this has become determined (particularized) ground, and the determinateness itself is twofold : First, that of form ; sec- ondly, that of content. The former (the determinateness of form) is the determinateness which is external to the content, the content being indifferent to this relation. The latter is the determinateness of content that belongs to the ground. B. The Definite {particular) Ground. 1. The Formal Ground. Ground has a definite content. The definiteness of the content (its particularity) is, as we have seen, the basis for the form, or the simple immediate that is opposed to the mediation of the form. Ground is identity relating to itself negatively (t. e., annulling its inde- terminateness and proceeding into determinations), and this, there- fore, reduces itself to posited-being (». e., to dependent somewhats). It relates negatively to itself (determines itself), since it is self- identical, in this its negativity ; this identity is the basis or the con- The Formal Ground. 91 tent which constitutes in this manner the indifferent or positive unity of the oround-relation, and that which mediates it. In this content the determinateness of ground and grounded, as opposed to each other, has vanished. The mediation is, however, besides this, negative unity. The negative as belonging to the indif- ferent basis is its immediate determinateness, and through it the ground possesses a definite content. But in the next place, the nega- tive is the negative relation of form to itself. On the one hand, the posited annuls itself and goes back into its ground ; but the ground, essential independence, relates negatively to itself, and reduces itself to posited-being. This negative mediation of the ground and grounded is the mediation peculiar to form, as such — the formal mediation. The two sides of form now, since they pass over into one another, posit themselves in one common identity as annulled; through this, at the same time, they presuppose this identity. It is the definite, particular content to which, therefore, the formal mediation relates, as the positive act of mediating itself through itself. It is the identical phase of both, and while they are different, each, however, being in its distinction in relation to the other, the content is the persistence (reality) of the same, and of each one as being the -whole. According to this, it results that the following is present in the par- ticularized ground : In the first place, a particularized content is re- garded from two points of view, viz. : ( 1 ) in so far as it is posited as ©round ; (2) as grounded. The content itself is indifferent as regards this form ; it is only one determination in both. Secondly, the ground itself is as much an element {Moment') of the form, as it is a somewhat posited by it ; this is its identity according to the form. It is indif- ferent which of the two determinations are taken as the first — from which as the posited to proceed to the other as its ground, or from which as the ground to proceed to the other as the posited. The orounded, considered for and by itself, is the annulling of itself ; with this it reduces itself on the one hand to a posited, and is at the same time the positing of the ground. The same movement is the ground as such ; it reduces itself to a posited, and through this it becomes a ground of something — that is to say, it is present in this as a posited, and also as ground. That a ground exists implies a posited as a ground of this fact ; and, conversely, through this the ground is in so far the posited. The mediation begins with the one just as well as with the other; each side is just as much ground as posited, and each is the entire mediation of the entire form. This entire form is further- more the basis of the determinations as their self-identity, and since 92 Essence. the determinations are the two sides of the ground and the grounded, the form and content are thus precisely one and the same identity. On account of this identity of the ground and grounded, and as well according to the content as according to the form, the ground is sufficient ("sufficient ground" is an important category used by Leibnitz) — the " sufficient " being limited to this relation. There is nothing in the ground which is not in the grounded, and nothing in the grounded which is not in the ground. If one asks for a ground, he expects to see the characteristic which constitutes the content used in a twofold manner : First, in the form of the posited ; secondly, in the form of the reflection into itself of the particular being, i.e., in the form of essentiality. In so far as ground and grounded are each the entire form in the category of determined (particularized) ground, and their content is one and the same, although particularized ground is not yet fully determined (i.e., particularized) in its two sides, they have not a dif- ferent content ; the determinateness is first simple, and not a cleter- minateness that has passed over into the two sides. We have here the determined (particularized) ground first in its pure form — "the formal ground." Since the content is only this simple determinate- ness, to which the form of ground-relation does not belong, it is a self-identical content, indifferent as regards form, and form is external to it ; it is another than the form. Remark. If reflection goes no further than the consideration of determined ground, as here defined, it follows that to adduce such a ground for any thing is a mere formalism, an empt}r tautology, which expresses over again the same content in the form of reflection-into-itself, or in the form of essentiality, what has already been expressed in the form of an immediate somewhat. Such a mention of grounds for any thing is as empty an affair as the appeal to the principle of identit}' which has been mentioned. Sciences, and more especially the physical sci- ences, are full of tautologies of this kind, and indeed this seems to constitute a sort of prerogative. For example, it is mentioned as the ground of the fact that the planets move around the sun — that there is an attractive force existing between the former and the lat- ter. The content of this statement expresses nothing besides what the phenomenon contains, viz., the relation of these bodies to each other in their movement, but it expresses it in the form of a reflected deter- mination— that is, by means of the category of "force." If it be The Formal Ground. 03 asked, in reference to this, what kind of a force the attractive force is, the answer given is, that the force is what causes the planets to move around the sun ; in these statements there is the same content throughout : First, as the fact to be explained ; secondly, as the ground or reason given for it. The relation of the planets to the sun, as regards movement, is the basis of the ground and the grounded alike. If a crystalline form is explained by the particular arrange- ment which its molecules have, we have the same tautology ; the fact of the crystallization is this arrangement itself, which is again ex- pressed as the ground. In ordinary life, these aetiologies (methods of causal explanation) which are in vogue in the sciences pass for what they really are — for tautology, for empty talk. For example : if to the question, why this man goes to the city, it should be stated, as a reason, that he goes to the city because there is an attractive force which draws him there, such an answer would pass for trivial, although it would have the high sanction of being scientific. Leib- nitz urged, as an objection against the Newtonian force of attraction, that it was an occult quality, similar to those which the scholastics «mplo3red for the purposes of explanation ; but one might urge the opposite objection that it is a too well known, too obvious quality, for it has no other content than the phenomenon itself. Precisely what recommends this mode of explanation is its great clearness and intelligibility ; for there is nothing clearer and more intelligible than to say, for example, that a plant is produced by (i. e., has its ground in) a vegetative power, %. e., a plant-producing power. It could be called an "occult" quality only when the ground had a different content from that which it is intended to explain. But such grounds are not given. The power which is used as an explanation is an " occult " ground, in so far as it is not such aground as is demanded for explanation (?'. e., the ground demanded is not given, but remains " occult"). Through this formalism there is as little explained as there is explained of the nature of a plant when I say of it : It is a plant. Notwithstanding all the clearness of this proposition, or of that other proposition, that it has its ground in a plant-producing power, one might still call this a very " occult" method of explaining things. Secondly. As regards form, we find in this mode of explanation the two opposite phases of ground-relation, without recognizing in them their definite relation to each other. Ground is ground, (1) as the into-itself-reflected content of a being of which it is the ground ; (2) it is the posited. It is that b}^ means of which the being is to be com- prehended. But, on the other hand, the ground is an inference from 94 Essence, the being ; so that it in turn is comprehended by reference to the being. The chief business of this sort of reflection consists in finding grounds for particular being — i.e., in converting immediate beings into the form of reflection. The ground, instead of being independ- ent, and in and for itself, is, therefore, rather what is posited and deduced. Now, for the reason that this procedure of finding a ground is guided by the phenomenon investigated, and the character of the ground determined by the latter, it follows quite smoothly and pros- perously from its ground. But scientific knowledge has not by this means gone forward a particle ; it has busied itself only with a differ- ence in form, which has been confounded and annulled by this very procedure. One of the chief difficulties met with in the study of the sciences, in which this method prevails, consists in this confound- ing of the positions of the ground and grounded ; placing that beforehand as ground which in fact is deduced, and arriving at a sequence which in fact should have been placed first, as the ground of the alleged ground. In the exposition the beginning is made with the grounds ; they are set up in the air as principles, or first ideas ; they are simple definitions, without any apparent necesshvy in and for them- selves ; that which follows is deduced from them ; whoever, therefore, would master these sciences must begin with the study of those grounds, a task which reason finds unpleasant, because it has to take that which has no ground as a basis. He will come out best who takes these principles for granted without much reflection, and uses them as the fundamental rules of his intellect. Without this method he cannot make a beginning, and without them he can make no progress. This inconsistency, however, impedes his progress : he contradicts his method by deducing — from grounds which have been assumed — sequences which contain grounds of the former assumptions. Moreover, since the sequence proves to be the fact from whence the ground was deduced, this method of treating it causes one to distrust the exposition of it; for it is not expressed in its immediateness, but as a result of the ground. Since, however, the ground is likewise deduced from the immediate fact, one demands rather to see the fact in its immediateness, in order to decide upon the validity of its alleged ground. In such an exposition, therefore, in which that which is properly the ground is brought in as a deduc- tion, one knows neither how to regard the ground nor the phenomenon. The uncertaint3T is increased by this circumstance, especially if the exposition is not strictly consequent, but is given out on authoritj', viz., that eveiy where in the phenomenon there are traces and con- ditions which point to other and quite different things from those con- The Real Ground. 95 tained in the mere principles. The confusion is, finally, still greater when reflected and merely hypothetical determinations are mixed in with immediate determinations of the phenomenon, and the former are spoken of as if they belonged to immediate experience. Thus, many who take up the study of these sciences with implicit faith are of the opinion that the molecules, and the void spaces, the repulsion, ether, single beams of light, electric or magnetic matter, and a multitude of the like distinctions, are real things which may be found in actual observation existing in the same manner as described in the sciences. They serve as first grounds for another ; are ex- pressed as actualities, and confidently applied. And they are allowed in good faith to pass for realities, before one is aware that they are determinations derived from those things for which they are offered as the grounds, being mere hypotheses formed by an uncritical reflec- tion. In fact, one finds himself in a kind of witch's circle when he uses them, in which determinations of particular being and determina- tions of reflection — ground and grounded, phenomena and phan- toms — course through each other promiscuously, and are all received as of equal rank and validity. In this formal occupation of explaining things by means of grounds, one hears again and again, notwithstanding all this explanation by means of well-known powers and matters, that we do not know the internal essence of these powers and matters. In this, we have only a confession that this activity of explanation is wholly insufficient, and that it demands something quite different from the grounds which it offers ; and the only difficult thing that remains for us to understand is, why all this trouble has been taken to make such explanations ; why something else has not been sought, or at least that species of explanation dispensed with, and the simple facts themselves accepted without any explanation. 2. The Real Ground. The determinateness of ground is, as has been shown, in the first place, the determinatenessof basis (substrate) or of the content; in the second place, it is the other-being in the ground-determination itself, viz., the difference between its content and the form. The rela- tion of ground and grounded becomes a mere external form to the content, which is indifferent to these determinations. But in fact the two are not external to each other ; for the content is really the self- identity of the ground in the grounded, and vice versa, of the grounded in the ground. The side which belongs to the ground has shown itself to be a posited somewhat, and the side which belongs to the grounded 96 Essence. has shown itself to be the ground itself ; each is in itself the identity of the whole, but because they belong at the same time to the form, and constitute its special distinctions, each of them is in its determinate- ness the self-identity of the totalit}\ Each has consequently a sepa- rate content opposed to the other. In other words, considered from the side of content, inasmuch as it is self-identity as ground-relation, it has esssentially this form-distinction in itself, and is, as ground, another than the grounded. In this fact, now that ground and grounded have a different con- tent, the ground-relation has really ceased to be a formal distinc- tion. The return into the ground, and the procedure out of it into posited-being, is no longer a mere tautology, and thus the ground is realized. When one asks for a ground, he desires to be answered by the statement of some other content-determination than the very one for which he has asked a ground or sought an explanation. This relation can now be defined more accurately. In so far, namely, as its two sides are different in content, they are independ- ent of each other ; each is an immediate self-identical determination. Moreover, as ground and grounded are related to each other, the ground is reflected into itself in the other as in its posited-being ; the content, therefore, which belongs to the side of the ground is likewise in the grounded ; and the grounded, as the posited, has in that content its self-identity and reality. Besides this content of the ground, the grounded has also its proper, peculiar content, and is consequently the unity of a twofold content. Although this unity is, as a unity of contents which differ, their negative unity ; for the reason that these content-determinations are indifferent towards each other, it follows that this unity is only an empty one, a relation devoid of content, and not their mediation ; it is a one or a somewhat as an external bond of union. In the real ground-relation, therefore, the twofold content is to be found, in the first instance, as content-determination, which is con- tinued as self-identical in the posited-being, so that it constitutes the simple identity of ground and grounded. The grounded contains, therefore, the ground perfectly within itself ; its relation, therefore, is an essential continuity, without break or^separation. What therefore appertains to the grounded as additional to this simple essence, is, therefore, only an unessential form, external content-determinations which, as such, are independent of the ground, and possess an imme- diate manifoldness. And hence, the mentioned essential relation is not the ground of this unessential (superfluity and immediate manifold- ness) ; it is the ground of the relation of the two to each other in the Tlie Real Ground. 97 grounded. It is a positive, identical somewhat which inheres in the grounded ; although it is posited within it, not as in a form-distinction, but as a self-relating content is an indifferent positive basis or principle. Finally, that which is externally connected to this basis or principle is an indifferent content as the unessential side. The chief thing is the relation of the basis or substrate to the manifoldness which is regarded as unessential. But this relation, since the determinations which stand in relation constitute the indifferent content, is also not the ground, although the one is essential, and the other is defined as unessential or a posited-content ; but this form is external to both, as self-relating content. The one of the somewhat which constitutes their relation is, therefore, not form-determination, but only an exter- nal bond which contains the unessential manifold content, but not as a posited somewhat ; it is, therefore, only basis or substrate. Ground, determined as real on account of the diversity of the con- tent which constitutes its reality, falls asunder, therefore, into external determinations. The two relations — on the one hand, the essential content, as the simple immediate identity of ground and grounded ; and, on the other hand, the somewhat, as the relation of the different elements of the content — these two relations are two different sub- strates. The self-identical form of the ground, according to which the same thing is at one time essential and at another time posited, has vanished, and the ground-relation has, therefore, become self- external. There is, therefore, now an external ground, which brings into external relation different elements of the content, and determines what is ground and what is posited through the ground ; in the two phases of the content itself, there is not to be found the means for determining this question. The real ground is, therefore, relation- to-other, on the one hand, of content to other content, and, on the other hand, of ground-relation, or form, to something else, viz., to an immediate that is not posited through it. Remark. The formal ground-relation contains only one content for ground and grounded ; and in this identity of content lies its necessity, but, at the same time, its tautology. The real ground contains a diversity of content, but through this diversity there enters contingency and externality as regards the ground-relation. In the first place, that which is regarded as essential, and on this account as ground-deter- mination, is not the ground of the other determinations which are connected with it. In the second place, it is not determined which 98 Essence. of the several content-determinations of a concrete thing is to Tie assumed as essential and as ground. The choice between them, there- fore, is left free ; thus, in the first aspect, for example, the ground of a house is its foundation ; wherefore this ground depends upon the gravity inherent in sensuous matter, and gravity is identical in this case in the ground and grounded. The fact that there belongs to heavy matter such a distinction, viz., that one part should be a sub- strate and the other a modification different from it: this distinction appertaining to a dwelling-house is perfectly indifferent to gravity itself. Its relation to the other content-determinations of the final cause, the arrangement of the house, etc., is external to it; it is therefore a substrate, a foundation, but not a ground or cause of the same. Gravity is the ground or cause to which is to be attributed the fact that a house stands, and, as well, the fact that a stone falls. The stone has this ground, gravity, in itself ; but the fact that it has other determinations of content besides gravity — determinations which make it to be a stone — is a fact indifferent to gravity. More- over, the stone is a somewhat posited through another somewhat: that it was previously at a distance from the body to which it fell, and also that the time, the space, and their relation, the movement, are another content than gravity, and are capable of being conceived without it — to use the ordinary mode of expression — and are accordingly not essentially posited through it. They are also the ground that a projectile makes a flight opposed to gravity. It is evident, from the diversity of the determinations whose ground it is, that something else is demanded, which makes it the ground of this or of another determination. If the assertion is made regarding nature, that it is the ground of the world ; on the one hand, that which is called nature is identical with the world, and the world is nothing but nature itself. And yet they are also different, so that nature is rather the indeterminate, or at least determined only in such general characteristics as natural laws, for example ; so, too, that nature is the self-identical essence of the world, and requires a multitude of determinations to be added to it in order to become the world. But these determinations have their ground not in nature as such ; the}- are rather to be regarded as contingent and indifferent to it. We have the same relation between God and nature when God is defined as the ground of nature. As ground, He is its essence. Nature contains God within it, and is identical with Him ; but nature has further manifold determinations which are different from the ground itself. Nature is the third term, therefore, in which these two different factors unite. The men- The Ileal Ground. 99 tioned ground is neither the ground of the manifoldness different from it, nor for its connection with it. Nature is, therefore, not cog- nized as having its ground in God ; for in that case He would only be the general essence of nature, whereas the ground of nature is a defi- nite, particularized essence. This producing of real grounds is, therefore, a formalism just as much as the formal ground itself, because of this diversity in the content of the ground, or the difference between the substrate and that which is connected with it in the grounded somewhat. In this formal ground, the self-identical content is indifferent as regards the form ; in the real ground, the same thing is true. Through this fact, moreover, it does not contain within itself the ground or reason for deciding which of the many determinations shall be taken as the essential one. A somewhat is concrete, and has a manifold of deter- minations which show themselves self-subsistent and abiding. There- fore, one of them as well as another may be taken as ground, and may be held to be essential, and in comparison with it the others are a mere posited. What was formerly mentioned applies here : that if a determination occurs which in one aspect is viewed as the ground of another, it does not follow that the other is to be regarded as pos- ited by it in any other, or in all aspects. Punishment, for example,, has a variety of aspects in which it may be regarded, — that of retri- bution, that of a warning example, deterring from the infraction of law, and also that of the reformation of the criminal. Each of these different aspects has been regarded as the ground or reason of pun- ishment, because each one is an essential determination ; and, viewed in reference to it, the other determinations are defined as contingent. But the one which is assumed as ground is not identical with the total compass of punishment (in all its aspects) ; punishment, as a concrete, contains not only one, but all of the aspects which are connected with each other, being contained in punishment, but are not the ground of each other. As another example : an officer has fitness for the duties of his office, and as an individual has relations to kindred, and to this and that acquaintance ; he possesses a charac- ter of his own, and has been in these or those circumstances, and has had such and such opportunities to show his capacity, etc. Each one of these things may be taken as the ground or reason for his possession of this office ; they constitute a diversified content, whose elements are united in a third. The form, as the essential and as determined, in antithesis to the posited, is external to it. Each of these things is essential to the officer, because as a particular indi- 100 Essence. vicinal he needs them for his realization. In so far as his office may "be regarded as an external posited determination, each one of the things mentioned may be regarded as the ground of the office ; but, ■on the contrary, the office could also be regarded as the ground of each one of them, and in that case they would be the posited. As the}* actually stand — that is to say, considered in an individual case — the office is an external determination as regards content and ground. It is a third, which confers upon them the form of ground and grounded. Eveiy being may have a variety of grounds ; each one of the determinations of its content, as self-identical, penetrates the concrete totality, and for this reason may be regarded as essential. The various aspects, i. e. , determinations which lie outside of the thing itself, have no limit as to number, for the reason that the method of making combinations is a purely arbitrary one. Whether a ground has this or that sequence is, therefore, quite an accidental affair. Moral motives, for example, are essential determinations of an ethical nature ; but what follows from them is an external affair quite differ- ent from them ; it follows, and it does not follow, from them ; it is added to them by the agency of a third somewhat. In fact, when a moral determination is taken for a ground, it is not contingent that it shall have a result or a ground, but it is a contingency whether it shall become a ground or not ; but since the content, which is its result when the moral determination has been taken as a ground, is an externality, it may be annulled through another externality. From one moral motive, therefore, there may or may not result a deed. Conversely, a deed may have a variety of grounds ; it contains as a concrete many essential determinations, each one of which, therefore, may be assigned as the ground. The search for grounds, in which ratiocination principally consists, is, therefore, an endless procedure. Each and every thing may have one or more good grounds assigned for it, and there can be a multitude assigned for a thing without any result following from them. That which Socrates and Plato called sophistry is only ratiocination by means of assign- ing grounds. Plato opposes to this process the consideration of the Idea, i. e., of the necessary nature of things, or their ideal totality (Begriff.) Grounds are selected only from essential determinations of content, essential relations, and aspects ; and each thing, as well as its opposite, possesses several of these. In their form of essen- tiality, one does as well as the other ; and since no one of them con- tains the entire compass of the object, each of them is a one-sided The Perfect Ground. 101 ground, which does not exhaust the object which contains all these sides within it; no one of them is a " sufficient " ground, i. e., ideal totality (Beyriff). 3. The Perfect Ground. (1.) In the real ground, the ground as content and the ground as relation are contained as mere substrates. Ground as content is only posited as essential and as ground. Ground as relation is the some- what of the grounded, as the indefinite substrate of a diversified con- tent, a connection between the different elements of the content, which is not its own reflection, but something external, and, conse- quently, only a posited. The real ground-relation is, therefore, rather the ground as annulled ; and, therefore, it is rather the side of posited-being or of the grounded. As posited-being, however, the ground has returned into its own ground, and hence is a grounded, and has another ground ; this other ground, therefore, determines itself to be identical, in the first place, with the real ground as grounded through it; both sides have, therefore, one and the same content ; the two determinations of content, and their union in the somewhat, are therefore contained in a new ground. Secondly, the new ground, in which that merely posited external union {Yerloiuep- fung) as been annulled, is, as their reflection into themselves, the absolute relation of the two determinations of content. Through this fact — that the real ground has returned into its own ground — the identity of the ground and grounded, or formal ground, is restored. The ground-relation which has arisen is, therefore, the perfect ground, which contains within itself the formal and the real grounds, and which mediates in the latter, through each other, its immediate content-determinations. (2.) The ground-relation has thus far developed the following determinations : First, a somewhat has a ground ; it contains the con- tent-determination, which the ground is, and a second determination posited through the ground. But as indifferent content, the one is not within itself ground, nor the other within itself the grounded of the former ; on the contrary, this relation is, in the immediatencss of the content, annulled or posited, and as such has another somewhat for its ground. This second relation, which differs only in respect to form, has the same content as the former, viz., the two determina- tions of content, but is the immediate union of the two. Since, however, the different elements of the content, thus united, are con- sequently indifferent as regards each other, the union is not their true, absolute relation, in which the one of the determinations would 102 Essence. be self-identical in the posited-being, while the other would be only this posited-being of the same self-identical determination ; but a some- what is their substrate, and constitutes their relation, which is not reflected, but is only an immediate relation, and which, therefore, is only a relative ground as opposed to their union in another some- what. The two somewhats are, therefore, the two different relations of content which we have found; they stand in the identical ground- relation of form ; they are one and the same content as a totalit}', viz., the two determinations of content and their relation. They are, therefore, distinct only through the nature of this relation, which in the one is an immediate and in the other is a posited relation ; through which the one is distinguished from the other only according to form, as ground and grounded. Secondly, this ground-relation is not only formal, but also real. The formal ground passes over into the real ground, as we have seen. The moments of form are reflected into themselves ; they are an independent content, and the ground-relation contains also a peculiar content of its own as ground, and one as grounded. The content constitutes the immediate iden- tity of the two sides of the formal ground, and hence they have one and the same content. But it has also within itself the form ; hence it is a two-fold content, which stands in the relation of ground and grounded. One of the two determinations of content which belong to the two somewhats is, therefore, defined not as merely common to them, as found by external comparison, but as their identical sub- strate and the basis of their relation. Opposed to the other deter- mination of content it is essential and the ground of it as posited, viz., in the somewhat whose relation the grounded is. In the first somewhat, which is the ground-relation, this second deter- mination of content is also immediately united to the first, and according to its nature. The other somewhat, however, contains only the one potentially, as that in which it is immediately identical with the first somewhat ; but it contains the other as a posited within it. The first determination of content is the ground of the same, through this fact: that it is united within the first somewhat primordially to the other determination of content. The ground-relation of the determinations of content in the second somewhat is mediated, therefore, through the first self-existent rela- tion of the first somewhat. The conclusion is this : for the reason that within a somewhat the determination B is united with the deter- mination A by nature (an sich), there is in the second somewhat, to which only the determination A belongs, immediately also united with it the determination B. In the second somewhat this second determina- Hie Relatively Unconditioned. 103 tion is contained not only mediately, but also the inference that its immediate ground is, viz., through its immediate relation to B, in the first somewhat. This relation is consequently the ground of the o-round A, and the entire ground-relation is in the second somewhat as posited or grounded. 3. The real ground thus appears as the self-external reflection of o-round ; the perfect mediation thereof is the restoration of its self- identity. But since the latter has retained at the same time the externality of the real ground, it follows that the formal ground- relation in this unit}' of itself and the real ground is self-positing as well as self-cancelling ground. The ground-relation mediates itself through its self-negation. In the first place, the ground, as the orig- inal relation, is the relation of immediate determinations of content. The o-round-relation has, as essential form for its sides or terms, such somewhats as have already been cancelled or reduced to moments. Therefore, as form of immediate determinations, it is the self-identi- cal relation, which is at the same time relation of its negation. Hence it is ground not in and for itself (by its own nature), but as a relation to the annulled ground-relation. In the second place, the annulled relation, or the immediate, which is the identical substrate in the original and in the posited relation, is a real ground likewise not in and for itself, but it is posited through that original bond of union to be ground. The ground-relation in its totality is, consequently, essentially pre- supposing reflection ; the formal ground presupposes the immediate content-determination ; and the latter, as real ground, presupposes the form. The ground is therefore the form, as immediate bond of union, but in such a manner that it repels itself from itself, and pre- supposes the immediateness, and in this relates to itself as to another. This immediate is the determination of content, the simple ground ; but as this simple ground it is repelled from itself, and relates to itself as to another. In this manner the total ground-relation is -determined as conditioning mediation. o c. The Condition. 1. The Relatively Unconditioned. (1.) Ground is the immediate, and the grounded is the mediated. But ground is the positing reflection, and, as such, it reduces itself to posited-being, and is presupposing reflection ; it therefore re- 104 Essence. lates to itself as annulled, as an immediate through which it, itselfr is mediated. This mediation, as progress from the immediate to the ground, is not an external reflection, hut, as has been developed, it is due to the activity of ground itself ; or, what is the same thing, the ground-relation is, as reflection into self-identity, likewise essentially self-externalizing reflection. The immediate to which ground relates as to its essential presupposition is the Condition {%. e., the condi- tioning limits — Bedingung) ; the real ground is, therefore, essentially conditioned ; the determinateness which it contains is the otherness of itself. The conditioning limit is, therefore, in the first place, an immediate, manifold being. In the second place, this being is related to another, to a somewhat which is ground, not of this being, but of something else ; for the being itself is immediate, and without ground. In this relation it is a posited somewhat ; according to it, the immediate being would be a conditioning limit, not of itself, but of another ; but at the same time this being for another is itself only a posited-being ; that it is a posited-being is annulled in its immediateness, and a being is indifferent as regards its function as conditioning limit. In the third place, the conditioning limit is, therefore, an immediate, so that it constitutes the presupposition of the ground. In this phase it is the form-relation of the ground, which has returned into self-iden- tit}T, and hence it is its content. But the content, as such, is only the indifferent unity of the ground as it is in the form — without form, no content. The content frees itself from the form through the fact that the ground-relation in the perfect ground becomes a relation external to its identit}' ; through this the content preserves its immediateness. In so far, therefore, as the conditioning limit is that in which the ground-relation possesses its self-identity, it constitutes its content ; but for the reason that it is indifferent to this form, it is only potentially its content — that is, it ought to be the content, and hence it constitutes the material for the ground. Posited as conditioning limit, the being, according to the second moment (element or phase), possesses this peculiarity ; it loses its indifferent immediateness. and becomes a moment of another being. Through its immediateness, it is indiffer- ent to this relation ; but, in so far as it enters this relation, it consti- tutes the nature (Ansicliseyn) of the ground, and is the uncondi- tioned for it. In order to be conditioning limit, it has its presupposi- tion in the ground, and is itself conditioned, but this characteristic is an external (accidental) one for it. (2.) A somewhat is not through its conditioning limit; its condi- The Relatively Unconditioned. 105 tionins limit is not its ground. It is the moment (phase) of uncon- tioned immediateness for the ground, but it is not the activity and the positing which relates negatively to itself, and reduces itself to a posited-being. The ground-relation, therefore, stands opposed to the conditioning limit. A somewhat has, besides its conditioning- limit, also a ground. This is the active movement of reflection, because it has the immediateness outside of it as its presupposition. But it is the entire form ; and the independent activity of mediation for the conditioning limit, is not its ground. For the reason that this mediating activity relates to itself as a positing activity, it is in this respect, also, an immediate and unconditioned, although it pre- supposes itself as externalized and annulled positing activity ; hence, that which it is, according to its determination ( Bestimmung = destina- tion), it is in and for itself. Therefore, in so far as the ground- relation is independent self-relation, and possesses the identity of reflection within itself, it has a peculiar content, opposed to the con- tent of the conditioning limit. The former is the content of the ground, and therefore possesses an essential form. The latter, therefore, is only immediate material, for which the relation to the ground is external, while it constitutes also its nature. Consequently it is a mingling of the independent content, which possesses no rela- tion to the content of ground, with that which goes into itself, and as its material becomes a moment of the same. (3.) The two terms of the totality — the conditioning limit and the ground — are therefore, in one respect, indifferent and unconditioned as opposed to each other; the one, which is the non-related, is external to the relation in which it is conditioning limit ; the other as the relation or form, for which the particularized being of the con- ditioning limit is only as material, as a passive something whose form, which it possesses for itself within it, is an unessential somewhat. Moreover, both are mediated. The conditioning limit is the being in itself of the ground. It is essential moment of the ground-relation to the extent that it is its simple self-identity. But this simple self- identity is also annulled ; this being in itself, or nature, is only a posited ; the immediate being is indifferent as regards the phase of conditioning limit. The fact that the conditioning limit of the being in itself is for the ground, constitutes its phase of mediation. Like- wise, the ground-relation possesses, in its independence, a presuppo- sition, and has its being in itself (nature) outside itself. Conse- quently, each of the two phases is a contradiction, inasmuch as it includes the indifferent immediateness and the essential mediation 106 Essence. both in one relation. In other words, the contradiction consists in being an independent self -subsistence and a mere element at the same time. 2. The Absolutely Unconditioned. The two relatively unconditioned somewhats manifest themselves each in the other. The conditioning limit, as immediate, manifests itself in the form-relation of the ground, and the latter manifests itself in immediate being as its posited-being (dependence). But each of these relatively unconditioned somewhats is independent of this manifestation of its other within it, and has a proper content of its own. In the first place, the conditioning limit is immediate being. Its form has these two phases : the posited-being, according to which it is, as conditioning limit, material and element of the ground ; and (the other phase is) being-in-itself (Ausichseyn — its own nature, which is through itself, and not a mere "•posited-being," or being derived from another, and dependent on it), which constitutes the essentiality of the ground, or its simple reflection-into-itself (" reflection- into-itself," it will be remembered, is always the form of self-relation in its positive aspect of identity, independence, and infinitude). The two sides of form are external to the immediate being, for immediate being is the cancelled ground-relation. But, first, being is by itself only the process of self-annullment in its immediateness, and of ceasing to be (i. e., of " going to the ground"). The sphere of Being (treated in the first part of this logic, and including all categories of immediateness, such as quality, quantity, and measure) is only the becoming of Essence (transi- tion to Essence) ; it is its essential nature to reduce itself to a posited- being, and to an identity which is the immediate, through the nega- tive of it (as a posited). Therefore, the determinations of form, viz., of posited-being, and of self- identical being-in-itself — the form through which immediate being is conditioning limit — are therefore not external to it, but immediate being is this reflection itself. Secondly, as conditioning limit, what being essentially is, is now also posited; it is, viz., a moment, consequently a phase of another, and at the same time likewise the being-in-itself of another ; but it is in itself only through the negation of itself, i. e., through the ground, and through its reflection, which is self-annulling, and consequently presupposing. The being-in-itself of the categories of the sphere of Being is, consequently, only a posited. This being-in-itself of the The Absolutely Unconditioned, 107 conditioning limit has these two aspects: (1) its essentialit}' as ground, and (2) the immediateness of its particular being. These two are the same. The particular being is an immediate, but the immediateness is essentially what is mediated — mediated, viz., through the self-annulling ground. As this immediateness, which is mediated through the self-annulling mediation, it is the being-in- itself of ground, and at the same time its unconditioned. But this being-in-itself is, at the same time, likewise only a moment or posited being, for it is mediated. The conditioning limit is, therefore, the entire form of the ground-relation. It is the presupposed being-in- itself of the same. But, as such, is as a posited-being, and its immediateness reduces it to posited-being ; it consequently repels itself from itself, so that it is annulled (goes to the ground) as ground, which reduces itself to posited-being, and consequently to the grounded. And the two are one and the same. Being-in-itself is likewise found in connection with the conditioned ground, not merely as manifestation of another upon it. It is independent, and this means that it is the self-relating reflection of the activity of positing. Hence, it is the self-identical — i. e., it is its being-in-itself, and its content. But at the same time it is pre- supposing reflection. It relates negatively to itself, and posits its own being-in-itself as something opposed to it in another ; and the •conditioning limit is the real phase of ground-relation, as well accord- ing to the moment of being-in-itself as according to that of imme- diate being. Immediate being is essentially and solely through its ground, and is a moment of its ground as a presupposing activity; hence, this presupposing activity is likewise the entire movement. For this reason, there is only one totality of form extant, and likewise only one totality of content. For the proper content of the ■conditioning limit is essential content only in so far as the identity of self-reflection in the form, or in so far as this immediate being is in itself the ground-relation. This immediate being is, moreover, con- ditioning limit only through the presupposing reflection of the ground. It is its self -identity, or its content, posited by it in opposi- tion to itself. Particular being is, therefore, not merely a formless material for the ground-relation, but it is matter that has received form ; for it already possesses this form, and it is content since it is indifferent towards it, wrhile it is in identity with it. Finally, it is the same content which ground has, for it is content precisely in so far as it is the phase of self-identit}' in the form-relation. The two sides of the totality — the conditioning limit and the ground — are therefore one essential unit}', both as content and as 108 Essence. form. They pass over into each other through their own activity ; or, in other words, since the}7 are movements of reflection, the}7 posit themselves as annulled, and relate to this annulment, which is their negation, and therefore mutually presuppose each other. But this is, at the same time, only one movement of reflection for both ; their mutual presupposition is therefore only one activity ; the antithetic attitude of the two passes over into the phase in which they presup- pose their one identity as their persistence (self-dependence) and as their substrate. This substrate, which is the one content and form unity of both, is the truly unconditioned ; it is the thing in itself {die Sache an sich selbst). The conditioning limit, as defined above, is- only the relatively unconditioned. It is usually, therefore, regarded as itself conditioned through something else, and a new condition i& asked for ; hence the progress, ad infinitum, from condition to condition is introduced. Why one asks for the condition which limits another condition means the same thing as the question, why does one assume it as conditioned? The answer to this is, because it is a finite being. But this idea of finite being is something which does not belong to the conception of conditioning limit. The conditioning limit, as such, is therefore itself conditioned through something else, because it is the posited being-in-itself. The conditioning limit is therefore annulled in the absolutely unconditioned. The absolutely unconditioned contains the two moments : (1) the conditioning limit and (2) the ground. It is the unity into which they have returned. The two together constitute the form or the posited-being of the absolutely unconditioned. The unconditioned thing {Sache) is the conditioning limit of both, but it is the abso- lute— that is to sa}7, the conditioning limit, which is ground itself. As ground, it is the negative identity which has repelled itself into the two moments mentioned), viz., (1) into the shape of the annulled ground-relation, i. e., that of an immediate self-external multiplicity, devoid of unity, which relates to its ground as to its other, and at the same time constitutes its being-in-itself; (2) it has repelled it into an internal, simple form, which is ground, but which relates to the self-identical immediate as to another, and determines the same as conditioning limit, i. e., determines its being-in-itself as its own moment. These two sides presuppose the totality, therefore, as that wdiich posits them. Conversely, since they presuppose the totality, the totality seems to be conditioned through them, and the "thing in itself" {Sache) seems to originate from its conditioning limit and from its ground. But since these two sides have shown themselves identical, the relation of conditioning limit and ground The Thing Emerges into Existence. 109 * has vanished, and these two categories are reduced to an appearance. The absolutely unconditioned, in its activity of positing and pre- positing, is only the activity in which this appearance annuls itself. It is the activity of the thing (Sache) which conditions itself, and places itself over against its conditions as their ground. Its rela- tion as that of conditions and their ground is, however, a manifesta- tion within it, and it stands in relation to them as its own self- identity (Zusammevgehen mit sicJi selbst). S. The Thing {Sache) Emerges into Existence. The absolutely unconditioned is the absolute ground, identical with its conditioning limit; it is the immediate thing as the truly essential. As ground it relates negatively to itself, and reduces itself to posited- being ; but this posited-being is the reflection which is completed in its two phases or sides, and in them it is self-identical form-relation, as has been ascertained is the foregoing investigation of its nature (Begriff). This posited-being, therefore, is, in the first place, an- nulled ground, or the thing as immediate and without any activity of reflection : this is the side of the conditioning limit. This is the totality of the determinations of the thing — the thfng itself, but cast forth into the externality of being ; it is the restored circle of being. In the conditioning limit, essence sets free the unity of its reflection into itself as an immediateness, which, however, has now the charac- teristic of being a presupposition which is a conditioning limit, and of constituting only one of its sides or phases. The conditioning limits are, therefore, the entire content of the thing, because they are the unconditioned in the form of the formless being (Form desform- losen Seyns). On account of this form, however, they have also still another aspect : that of the determinations of content as it is in the Thing as such. They manifest themselves as a multiplicity without unity, intermingled with non-essential and other circumstances, which do not belong to the sphere of particular being, in so far as it consti- tutes the conditioning limits of this particularized thing. The sphere of Being is itself the conditioning limit for the absolute unlimited thing. Ground, which returns into itself, posits it as the primary immediateness to which it relates as its unconditioned. This imme- diateness as the annulled reflection is reflection in the element of Being. This, therefore, as such completes itself to a totality. The form grows as determinateness of being, and manifests itself as a manifold content different from the determination of reflection, and indifferent towards it. The non-essential which appertains to the sphere of being, and which it, in so far as it is conditioning limit, 110 Essence. excludes, is the determinateness of immediateness into which the form- unity has sunk. This form-unity, as the relation of being, is first the category of Becoming, in this place — the transition of one deter- minateness of being into another. But the becoming of Being is its transition into Essence, and hence its return into Ground. Hence particular being, which constitutes the conditioning limits, is in truth not determined to be conditioning limit b}r another, and is not used as its material ; but it, by its own activity, reduces itself to a moment of another. Its becoming is, moreover, not a beginning with itself, as if it were the true primordial and immediate, but its immediateness is only what is presupposed, and the activity of its becoming is the activity of reflection itself. The truth of particular being is, there- fore, its realization as conditioning limit. Its immediateness is solely through the reflection of the ground- relation, which posits itself as annulled. The becoming, so far as it is immediateness, is only the appearance of the unconditioned, since the latter presupposes itself, and has in this presupposition its form, and the immediateness of being is therefore only a moment or phase of form. The other side or aspect of this appearance of the unconditioned is the ground-relation, as such, which is determined as form in oppo- sition to the immediateness of the conditioning limits and the content. It is the form, however, of the absolute Thing which possesses within itself the unity of its form and itself, or its content ; and, since it de- termines its content to be a conditioning limit, it annuls in this very positing its diversity, and reduces it to a moment ; conversely, as form devoid of essence in this self -identity, it takes on the form of immediateness as persistent reality. The reflection of ground annuls the immediateness of conditioning limits, and relates them to mo- ments within the unity of the thing. The conditioning limits, on the other hand, are what is presupposed by the unconditioned thing itself ; it annuls, therefore, its own positing ; or, in other words, its positing reduces itself immediately to a becoming ; the two are, therefore, one unity. The movement of the conditioning limits within themselves is a becoming, a return into the ground, and a posit- ing of the ground. But the ground as posited — that is to say, as annulled — is the immediate. Ground relates to itself negatively, reduces itself to posited-being, and furnishes a ground for the con- ditioning limits. In the fact, however, that by this the immediate particular being is determined into a posited, the ground annuls it, and becomes ground in that act. This reflection, therefore, is the mediation of the unconditioned thing through its negation. Or, in other words, the reflection of the unconditioned is at first a presup- The Thing Emerges into Existence. Ill posing; while, on the other hand, this annulment of itself is a posit- ing of immediate determinations. In the second place, it is in this activity immediately the annulment of what is presupposed, and a determining which proceeds from itself ; consequent!}', this determin- ing is also the annulment of the positing, and is the becoming within itself. In this activity the mediation, as return to itself through negation, has vanished ; it is simple reflection manifesting itself, and an absolute becoming devoid of ground. The activity of the thing through which it is posited, on the one hand by its conditioning limits, and on the other hand b}" its ground, is only the evanescence of the appearance of mediation. The activity of the thing by which it becomes posited is, therefore, a manifestation of itself as Exist- ence— a simple exhibition of itself in the form of Existence; this is the pure movement of the thing within itself. When all the conditioning limits of a thing are present, it comes into existence. The thing is before it exists. It is, first, essence or unconditioned ; secondly, it is particular being, or is determined in a twofold manner : (1) in its conditions, (2) in its ground. In the first, it assumes the form of external, groundless being, for the rea- son that it is, as absolute reflection, negative self-relation, and thus its presupposition. This presupposed unconditioned is, therefore, the groundless immediate, whose being is nothing else than to exist without a ground. If, therefore, all the conditions of a thing are present — that is to say, if the totality of the thing is posited as groundless immediate — this scattered multiplicity is by this fact col- lected within the thing itself. The totality of the thing requires all its conditions; they all belong to its existence. For all together constitute the reflection. In other words, the particular being, since it is conditioning limit, is determined (particularized) by the form ; and hence its determinations are, therefore, determinations of reflec- tion, and are posited essentially through each other. The collection of the conditions in one unity is the destruction of the immediate being and the becoming of the ground. With this the ground is a posited, i. e., it is annulled so far forth as it is ground, and thus it is immediate being. Therefore, when all the conditions of a thing are present, they are all annulled as immediate beings (mutually an- nulled), and as presupposition ; and likewise the ground is annulled. Ground exhibits itself only as an appearance, which immediately vanishes ; this is, consequently, the tautological movement within itself, and its mediation through the conditions and through the ground is the vanishing of both conditions and ground. The entrance 112 Essence. into existence is an immediate affair only through the fact that its mediation is a vanishing of mediation. The thing proceeds from its ground. It is not grounded or posited through it in such a manner that the ground remains standing under it, but the act of positing is the outward movement of ground into itself, and the simple vanishing of itself as ground. It receives external iramediateness through its union with the conditioning limits, and thus attains the phase of Being. But it receives external immedi- ateness, not as an external somewhat, nor through an external relation. On the contrary, it reduces itself as ground to posited-being ; its simple essentiality comes into self-identity in the posited-being ; in this annulment of itself it is the vanishing of its difference from its posited-being, consequently it is simple, essential immediateness. The ground, therefore, does not remain behind as something different from that which is grounded ; but the truth of that which is grounded lies in the fact that the ground unites itself with itself in this move- ment, and consequently its reflection into another becomes its reflec- tion into itself. The thing, consequently, in so far as it is the uncon- ditioned, is also without ground ; and it issues forth from the ground only in so far as it proves itself perishable ("goes to the ground"), and is no ground; it issues forth from the groundless, i. e., from its own essential negativity, or pure form. This immediateness, which is mediated through ground and condi- tion, and is self-identical through the annulment of mediation, is Existence. Phenomenon. 113 SECOND SECTION. Phenomenon. Essence must manifest itself in a phenomenon (erscheinen). Being is the absolute abstraction ; as such its negativity is not any- ^ thing external to it [but something intrinsic] ; this negativity is being itself, and nothing else than being in this phase of absolute negativ- ity. Hence being is only self-annulling being, and is essence. On the other hand Essence, in its phase of simple self-identity , is likewise Being. The science of Being contains the first proposition: Being is Essence. The second proposition : Essence is Being, constitutes the content of the first section of the science of Essence. This " Being " which essence is in one of its phases, is essential being, — [technically termed here] existence — a being that has arisen from negativity and internality. [Being is "absolute abstraction," because, in the thought of being we regard only its phase of self-relation and make abstraction from all other phases. "Relation to others" is not a category of being. In the sphere of being everything is thought of as independent, existing by itself without aid from anything else, and. as having reality b}r itself considered — hence as existing outside of relation. If relation is spoken of in the science of being it does not belong to that stage of thinking which thinks being, or else it is a mere subjective relation just as this paper on which I write is exter- nally related to my pen with which I write, but there is no essential relation between them, no dependence of one on the other, and each of them can be thought as existing without the other. This phase of being is called "absolute negativit}'," in view of the fact that the Science of Being has shown, as a result of investigation in the case of each and every category under Being, that every form of being is vanishing or transitory, each proving to be only an arc of a circle of process. The result is universally negative — the destruction of the particular forms of being — no phase of immediateness having any abiding. Being is therefore the self-annulling. But as entire circle of process it is Essence. Or, more accurately, Essence is the entire process in its aspect of relation or dependence — hence in its aspect of abiding. For the relation is the abiding or identity of a somewhat in its other, its continuation in its other. The proposition "Being is 114 Essence. Essence," of course does not mean that it is Essence, if Being is taken in its immediateness, or as mere transitory phase, but it means that Being when traced out so that we have found its truth, or the totality of its process, or the true nature of it, is Essence or the abid- ing being — that kind of being that abides through all change of par- ticular form or phase. So, too, the second proposition, "Essence is Being," does not mean that Essence is Being no matter how we think it. It means that Essence as this negative self-relation produces and sus- tains itself in immediateness — as has been shown in this book in the chapter on " Ground." It may be truly said that if we think of Being as it truly is we must think it as a phase of self-relation ; hence Being is only an aspect of Essence. Again, Essence is a process which has immediateness and self-relation as its result and as its constant product — hence Essence is Being, or in the form or phase of Being and is more than Being, for it abides, and is true Being, or existence. It must be remarked that Being always has the form of self-relation, or of independence — but not an explicit self-relation, or a relation which is in the form of ''A relates to B which relates hack to A, again " = A determines B and B determines A — so that A relates to itself through B, or so that A determines itself through B. This self-mediation through another is not perceived by the thinking which thinks mere Being. And yet this logical investigation finds this self- mediation through another to be the essential presupposition of an}' or all forms of Being. But the thinking which possesses this insight is the thinking which thinks Essence. The thinking which thinks Essence is able to understand that those categories which it thought as forms of Being, are such arcs of the process of self-relation as include the result of the "positing reflection." (See p. 14.) Es- sence as Being — here termed " Existence " — is the permanent man- ifestation of Essence through its own activity. Hence, "Phenom- enon " means complete manifestation, or essential appearance. This complete manifestation has " emerged from negative and internal- ity ;" that is to say, we have found that the negativity of the process called Essence does not result in zero, but in a reality which pos- sesses immediateness through the annullment of mediation; the mere annullment of external mediation results in " internality," but the "Phenomenon" preserves externality or abiding objectivit}*]. Therefore, Essence manifests itself in a Phenomenon. Reflection is the appearing-to-itself of Essence. The determinations of Re- flection are " posited " or annulled [i.e. dependent] when in the unity of reflection ; in other words, Reflection is Essence as immediately self-identical in its posited-being [its dependence being converted Phenomenon. 115 into self-dependence]. But since this activity [of reflection, which is self-identical in its posited-being] is Ground, it determines itself in the form of reality, through its self-annulling or self-returning re- flection. Moreover, since this determination [of itself as real], or the other of the Ground-relation annuls itself in the reflection of Ground, and thus becomes existence [i.e. it takes up its conditions and includes them within itself], it follows that the Form-determina- tions obtain in this result an element of independent subsistence. Their appearance becomes complete in the Phenomenon. The essentiality which has thus attained to immediateness, is, in its first phase, Existence ; and as such composed of existing some- whats or things ; this phase is the indistinguishable unity of essence with its immediateness. "Thing" contains the movement of reflec- tion, but in the immediateness of Thing the negativity of reflection is annulled ; but for the reason that the ground of the thing is essen- tial^ this movement of reflection it annuls its immediateness ; the thing is reduced to a posited-being. [Hegel's style of writing about the investigation of the categories is dramatic ; each category is treated as though self-active. Its definition is taken for its expressed will or intention, and then its behavior or its implication with others is compared with this its definition and the contradictions noted. This is the famous "dialectic:" each category is treated as though ultimate and final — as though it expressed independent, universal truth. An investigation of its contradictory behavior, when thus treated as universal, reveals to us the imperfection of the category, its dependence upon other categories with which it forms a whole, and the necessity is evident of a new defini- tion which expresses this relation to others in a new unity. The definition of the new unity is a higher, more concrete statement of truth, inasmuch as it readjusts the previous statement and corrects its defects. Here, for example, "Existence" is found to involve existence under the form of particular "things." Furthermore, "Thing" is found to involve the movement of reflection which an- nuls this immediateness of the " things ; " hence "things" exist only in a state of transience. This result here stated is the brief announcement of what is to be shown in detail in the first chapter of this second division of Essence.] Hence, secondly, essence is Phenomenon [not merely " existence " nor "thing," their transitoriness is "phenomenon"]. The phe- nomenon is what the thing is in itself [in its nature], or it is the "truth of the thing." Existence, as posited or reflected in the other-being [as a "thing"] is, however, the transcendence of itself, 116 Essence. the progress ad infinitum, away from itself ; the world of phenomena places itself in opposition to the reflected world, the world of being- in-itself [i.e. to the internal nature of " things"]. [This is a brief announcement of the contents of the second chapter of this second division of Essence]. But the essential being and the being which is a manifestation or phenomenon, stand in immediate relation to each other [they are mere counterparts or counter movements of one activity]. Hence, thirdly, "Existence" [with which we have to do in this second di- vision of Essence] is Reciprocity or essential relation [or state of relation, or that which exists only in relation] ; the manifestation in a phenomenon (Erscheinende) exhibits the essential, and Essence is [oris completely included] in its phenomenon: — Essential relation [ VerJicUtniss] is the as-yet-imperfect union of reflection in the other- being, [or in externality] and of reflection into itself ; the perfect interpenetration of the two is Actuality. [In this announcement of the contents of the third chapter of this second division of Essence we arrive at the idea of Actuality as the complete realization of the internal nature or essence in outer manifestation. We now proceed to take up the subject in detail.] First Chapter. Existence. Since the Proposition or principle of the "Ground" expresses: Everything that is, has a ground or is a posited i.e., a mediated ; the principle of Existence would have to be expressed as follows : Every- thing that is, exists. The truth of Being is not found in a first imme- diate, but rather in the immediateness which has emerged from Es- sence [this immediateness of "Existence"]. If, however, the assertion is made that whatever exists has a ground and is conditioned [through that ground] there icould need an additional statement [to correct the one-sidedness of the former] : it has no ground and is unconditioned. For Existence is the imme- diateness which has resulted from the annulment of mediation as found in the relation of ground and condition — an immediateness which in its production cancels the means that produced it. [An immediateness which results from the cancelling of mediation be- longs to the higher order of immediateness. All self-mediation is of this order. Everything pertaining to the realm of Mind furnishes an illustration. I study Euclid ; I avail myself of his aid, using his Existence. 117 demonstration to comprehend the nature of a triangle, but obtaining insight into the subject I see the truth immediately, and without his aid. At first there was dependence on Euclid, mediation through his labors, but a use of his insight as mediation gives me immediate in- sight, makes me independent of his labors, and therefore annuls the mediation! The history of Mind everywhere furnishes the example of the person who "climbs a ladder and draws the ladder up after him."] If the "Proof of the existence of God " is referred to at this point, it must be remembered that beside immediate Being and Existence [the " Being" of Essence] there is a third form of Being resulting from the Idea [" Begriff" ] which is called " Objectivity." [The three parts of the Logic treat respectively, Being, Essence and Idea; in the first, we have immediate Being, utterly without mediation and hence without persistence and truth ; in the second there is Essence whose immediateness is Existence, persistent and abiding, but imper- fect, because its externality is opposed to internality ; in the third, the Idea, or self-determination as completed in thought and will, or conscious personality we have again immediateness, this time as "objectivity." — subject- objectivit}', or consciousness, the knowing of self, the becoming-completely-objective is Revelatiox. Hence if the thought of mere being gives us the appearance of the Abso- lute, the thought of Essence gives us the self-manifestation and the thought of Idea gives us the self -revelation of the Absolute.1 The process of proving something is, of course, a mediated know- ing. The various kinds of Being demand or contain their own kinds of mediation ; and so it happens that the nature of the process of proof varies with each kind of mediation. The ontological proof of the being of God sets out from ideas, it la}'s down as postulate the idea of the totality of all reality and then subsumes existence under the reality [it argues for the necessity of the existence of the totality] — it is therefore the mediation of the syllogism and is not in place for us to consider here. We have already mentioned in another place what Kant has urged against this form of proof, and have called attention to the fact that Kant understands by the term, " Existence," only particular being, and by the cate- gory of particular being every thing in the total content of our experience is thought as standing in relation to some other thing and as being itself another to something else ; in other words, it falls 1 See Brockmeyer's "Letters on Faust" {Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 1, page 181) for distinctions between self-manifestation, self-revelation and self-definition. — Translator. 118 Essence. under the category of "other-being." For example, "somewhat" is as an existing thing mediated through "another," and existence itself is the side of mediation for all things. Now in what Kant calls the Idea [Begri ff'=I<\e& or "Notion"1] namely, in the somewhat in so far as it is taken simply, as related to itself merely, or as an " idea in the mind," its mediation has been omitted; in its abstract identity, its antithetic relation to other things is left out. The onto- logical proof, according to this view wrould have to show that the absolute Idea, viz. the idea of God comes to particular Being, i. e. to mediation ; in other words, as the simple essence proceeds to self- mediation. This takes place through the mentioned subsumption of existence under a more general term, namely, reality, which is as- sumed as the middle term between God in his Idea, on the one hand, and existence, on the other. Of this mediation so far as it has the form of the syllogism (inference) as remarked before, this is not the place to speak. But with the mediation of Essence with existence — its mode and manner — the present exposition deals. The nature of the process of demonstration is to be considered in the chapter that treats of the science of cognition [third part of this logic]. Here we are to treat only what concerns the nature of mediation in gen- eral. The proof of the existence of God assigns a ground for his exist- ence. This ground, it is understood, cannot be an objective [ex- ternal] ground of the existence of God ; for God exists in and for himself [and without grounds]. Hence this proof assigns merely a ground for the cognition of God's existence. This species of ground \_i.e. for knowledge, or subjective convictions] is of such a kind that it vanishes in the object, which is grounded through it [or the ground of proof is a somewhat whose being involves the object proved, and the perception of the object proved as thus involved in the ground of the proof, realizes the demonstration ; but the ground of the proof is rather an object which is grounded in and through the object proved; hence "ground" and "grounded" are used in opposite 1 English and Scotch writers generalW translate the German word Begriff by "Notion." In America the word "notion" is used for vague idea or one-sided apprehension and seldom for the logical concept, or Begriff. The use of the word Begriff by Hegel is different from that of Kant and others, and misleads Germans as to the tendency of his system. The use of the word "notion" in English makes the matter still worse ; for Begriff like concept may possess an objective meaning without doing violence to the word. "Idea" since Plato's time has pos- sessed an objective as well as subjective meaning, and has signified archetype or pattern as well as subjective " notion." — Translator. Existence. 1H) senses according to their application — subjective or objective. The Neo-Platonists contended that we cannot prove the existence of God, because proving is grounding, and that which is grounded through another could not be divine in its nature. Here was a confusion between subjective ground of knowledge or conviction and objective ground of existence]. Now the ground of proof which is based on the contingency of the world contains [or involves] the return of the world into the absolute essence [the contingency of the world exhibits its dependence — no thing in nature abiding but each pass- ing over into another ; this transitoriness of things is a process of evolvino; and annulling determinations ; the evolution of the deter- minations is the creation of particular beings over against the es- sence ; their annulment is the return into the indeterminate essence ;] for the contingent is the in-itself-groundless and self-annulnng. The absolute essence, consequently, according to this, proceeds from the groundless; the ground annuls itself; and then the appearance of relativity vanishes ; and in the proof vanishes also this appearance of relativity on the part of God as a being that was grounded through another. This mediation [of the absolute through the re- turn into it of the groundless] is consequently the true one, but that stage of thinking to which the "proving reflection" belongs, does not understand the nature of this mediation ; it takes this mediation as a merely subjective affair, and therefore carefully removes it from God himself, but on this account it does not perceive the mediating activity involved in essence itself. The relation of dependence [i.e., of the "grounded" upon the "ground"] which the proof involves or contains, consists in this that they are both in one [i.e. " ground " and "grounded" are one being]— a mediation which is a self- externality which is self-annulling in its nature [i.e., the transitory which is posited by the essence is a self-externalizing of the essence,: but the transitory is self-annulling]. In the mentioned exposition "existence" receives an erroneous construction; it is conceived in the dependent relation of mediated or posited [through the proof — the ground being taken as objective instead of subjective]. On the other hand Existence may be regarded as something not merely immediate. Taken in the phase of immediateness, the cognU- tion of the existence of God has been expressed as an act of Faith, a knowing which does not rest on proof — a knowing by the immedi- ate consciousness. The knowing is said to come to this result, that it knows nothing; that is to sa}-, that it gives up its mediating activity and the cognitions which it has arrived at through such activity. This result we have seen in what precedes ; but it, must be added that 120 Essence. reflection when it ends with the annulment of itself does not on this account have zero for a result; so that after this annulment the posi- tive knowing of essence may take place as an immediate relation to the same and entirely separated from the act of reflection — and as though the act of reflection had not been — as though the immediate knowing were an original act beginning from itself. But this annul- ment of reflection, this " going-to-the-ground " of mediation is itself the "ground" from which the immediate proceeds, or originates. Language [i.e. the German language! unites as above remarked the two meanings of destruction and ground [for "goes to destruction" the German says, "goes to the ground"]. It is said also that the essence of God is the abyss \_Abgrund~] for the finite reason ; it is this through the fact that the finite reason gives up its finitude and loses its mediating activity in the being of God ; but this abyss, the negative ground, is at the same time the positive gtound of the origination of existence, of the essence which is in itself immediate and of which mediation is an essential phase. Mediation through the ground annuls itself, but does not leave the ground lying at the basis so that what originates from it is a " posited," or still depends on that ground, and as though it had its essence elsewhere, viz. in the ground ; but this ground is as " abyss " the vanished mediation, and, conversely, it is only the vanished [self-annulled] mediation which is the ground ; and only through this negation there arises the identical and the immediate. Thus "existence" is not to be taken here in the sense of predi- cate or of determination of essence, so that a proposition or principle could be made of it. "Essence exists" or "essence has exist- ence"; but essence has become here existence. Essence has be- come existence in so far forth as essence no longer distinguishes itself into "ground" and "grounded"; the ground has annulled itself. But this negation (the annulment of the ground-relation) is likewise essentially its positing affirmation or absolutely positive continuity with itself ; existence is the reflection of ground into itself [this means: something is ground, i.e. it utters itself by pos- iting something else which manifests the ground or is its appearance ; in its transitoriness its determinations are annulled, and thus it re- turns to the ground; ground is a reflection into itself — through its process of grounding something, and again annulling what is oTounded by it ; existence includes this whole process of the reflec- tion of ground into itself]. Its identity with itself which results from its negation [relating to itself] is therefore the mediation which Existence. 121 has posited itself as self-identical and through this has come into immediateness. Since existence is this self-identical mediation, the determinations of mediation belong to it. But these determinations as found in existence are reflected into themselves and have essential and imme- diate self-subsistence. As immediateness which posits itself through annulment, existence is negative unity and being-in-itself. There- fore it determines itself immediately as an existing somewhat and as Thing. [This is the general statement of the contents of this first chapter. It goes over the entire discussion, mentioning only the most important aspects. The closing sentence of this paragraph is perhaps a specimen of Hegel's most peculiar insight. It involves the passage from the generic to the individual, from the universal to the singular. The first example given in this logic of this insight is found in the treatment of Being, in Volume I., under the head of Quality (pages 113 and 114 c, "Etivas"). He remarks, after the statement that Somewhat (Etwas) is the first negation of negation, as simple existing relation to itself, " Being [Daseyri], Life, Think- ing, &c, determine themselves essentially in the form of beings, liv- ing beings, thinking beings [egos'], &c. This determination is of the highest importance in order to escape from the mere universal terms, Being, Life, Thought, &c. ; and so to be able to descend from the general idea k deity ' to that of a [concrete, personal] God." Not the abstract universal any more than the abstract par- ticular, is the reality. Hegel here agrees with Aristotle ; only the individual has true reality. But the "individual" must not be un- derstood as mere particular being or phase, but as the self-deter- mining process which we call ego or person. All else is mere "posited being," and has its explanation only through the self- determining totality to which it belongs. Thus in this place Hegel makes existence to be "negative unity" — i.e. a process which an- nuls its particular stages of development, and "returns into itself," and thus becomes being-in-itself ; but each and every phase of the process is reflected into itself; and hence the " return-into-itself " is not by the reduction to zero of the particular stages of development but by the elevation of each particular stage to a totality within itself by adding to it what it lacks of the totality. A, b and c are three mo- ments of a totality, each needs the other two to make its existence possible, the total is the annulment of each, but if the annulment through the total takes the form of " negative unity " it destroys the individuality of the moments, a, b and c (think of the annul- ment of acid and alkali in a salt) ; but if the annulment of a, b and 122 Essence. c takes place by the addition to each of its complement then each comes to true individuality by the possession of the form of totalit}'. Thus a, b, c, the primary, undeveloped unity, the first entelechy, be- comes abc, bca, cab ; each moment annuls itself and becomes its own totality. This is the form of preservation of the individual in the universal and is the especial insight of Hegel, on which he lays most stress. The idea of " reflection-into-itself " is the basis of this preservation of individuality and escape from pantheism or the ab- stract universal as a first principle in the universe. Aristotle, too, seems to have held this concrete principle of reflection-into-itself as the basis of true being and true realitv. It was his commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias, who interpreted the Master's thought as a thought of "external reflection." and hence as setting up the ab- stract universal instead of the concrete universal. This interpreta- tion was adopted by the Arabians ; hence Scholasticism arose as the Christian reaction, which in Aquinas finds the concrete universal ao-ain. Aristotle's thought of first and second " entelechies " and of " energy " and of " active reason " is founded on this insight. Ex- istence is not an abstraction, but, as Hegel remarks, existences or things.] Thing and its Properties. Existence as existing somewhat is posited in the form of negative unity, which it essentially is [a negative unity annuls all of its manifold of determinations, leaving them only a " posited being," just as acid and alkali have a " posited-being " only when they exist in the neg- ative unity of a salt]. But this negative unity is in the first place only immediate determining, and hence it is the oneness of any "somewhat." The existing somewhat is to be distinguished from " somewhat" as a category of Being; the former is essentially such an immediateness as has originated through the reflection of media- tion into itself ["reflection-into-itself" means here a return from mediation, through mediation, back to immediateness ; the mediation is used and then dispensed with ; the ladder has been ascended and now it is drawn up from the ground ; this insight into the use of mediation and its annulment is the key to this whole book of Es- sence]. Hence the existing somewhat is a Thing [" Thing " is the category which expresses a somewhat which is mediated through others, and yet which is re-posited by the others — pre-supposed by them — and thus established in the form of independence; the de- Existence. 123 pendence of the thing upon others, implied by its relation to them, is annulled by the reciprocal dependence of the others upon it, and its immediateness and independence is thereby restored]. A " thing " is to be distinguished from its " existence " just as the " somewhat" can be distinguished from its " Being " [in the treat- ment of Being the category of somewhat is thus distinguished ; a being is a somewhat, and so here an existence is a thing]. The "thing" and the existing somewhat are immediately one and the same. But since existing is not the first immediateness of being [in which case it would belong to the sphere of Being and not to that of Essence], but it possesses the phase or " moment " of mediation within it, and hence its determination as Thing and the distinction between the two [between Existence and Thing] is not a transition, but properly an analysis ; and Existence as such contains this very act of distinguishing [between its generality as existence and its specializing negative unity as Thing] in the phases, or " moments " of its mediation. This distinction within the moments of its media- tion is that between thing-in-itself and external existence. [This characterization is still a summary like the preceding ones in this chapter. But its scope includes only the three sub-sections immedi- ately following]. a. Thing-in-itself. 1. The thing-in-itself is the existing somewhat, as extant through the annulment of the mediation [i.e. taken as it is after the mediation] ; it is the essential^ immediate. Through this fact mediation is like- wise essential to the thing-in-itself ; but this distinction [between the thing-in-itself and its mediation] in this first or immediate existence, falls asunder into two determinations indifferent towards each other. The one side, namely, the mediation of the thing, is its non-reflected immediateness ; hence its being in general, which for the reason that it is determined, at the same time, as mediation, is its own other, a being that is manifold and external in its nature [this phase of the thing is the phase of Being, recognized in the first apprehension : what the first apprehension seizes upon will alwa}'s be found to be a phase of a complex mediation, and all mediation is invisible to first Apprehension]. It is, however, not merely a being, but it is in re- lation to the annulled mediation, which is essential immediateness ; it is, therefore [as related to essential immediateness], unessential being or posited-being. (If the Thing is distinguished from its existence, it is then a possible thing, a thing of the mind, an imagined thing, 124 Essence. which, as such, is not considered as existing. The category of pos- sibility [or potentiality], and of the antithesis of the thing, and its existence belongs later in this Logic.) But the thing-in-itself and its mediated Being are both contained within existence, and both are ex- istences themselves; the thing-in-itself exists and is the essential, while the mediated being is the unessential existence of the Thing. The Thing-in-itself as the simple reflected being of existence [the phase of existence as reflected-into-itself, or as annulled mediation] is not the ground of the unessential being; it is the unmoved, undeter- mined unity, for it is only annulled mediation, and therefore it is the basis of the unessential being [Grundlage = basis ; Grund = ground or reason ; ground arises from the self-annullment of contradiction ; contradiction is self-relation in its aspect of self-negation ; this self- negation is self-determination, the positing of determinations within the undetermined subject of the process ; or likewise the presuppos- ing activity which determines a presupposed immediate ; all this ac- tivity is mediating or grounding — the laying-of-a-foundation for an- other; thing-in-itself is not a foundation or ground for unessential existence, because all existence is such through the annulment of mediation; and the annulment of mediation is the annulment of the very distinction which the process of ground creates.] For that rea- son, Reflection, as a being mediating itself through another, falls out- side of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is defined as having no particularized manifold within it; and on this account it receives this manifoldness only when brought into connection with it through the activity of reflection, but even then the thing-in-itself remains indif- ferent to the manifoldness. For example, the thing-in-itself has color on being brought to the eye, smell to the nose, &c. Its diver- sity of properties according to this view is due to the " respects," "points of view," taken b}' some external observer, particular rela- tions which the outside observer assumes towards the thing-in-itself, and which do not belong to the thing-in-itself as its own determina- tions. 2. On the other hand, the second phase distinguished within exist- ence is the one containing the activity of reflection, that defined as external, and which is in the first place, self-external and particular- ized manifoldness. In the second place it is external to the essen- tially existing and relates to it as to its absolute presupposition. These two phases or " moments " of external reflection, however, their own manifoldness and their relation to the thing-in-itself op- posed to them as their other, are one and the same. [Note carefully Existence. 125 the following demonstration of this point.] For this existence is "external " only in so far as it relates to the essential identity as to another. The manifoldness has therefore no independent self-subsist- ence of its own over against the thing-in-itself, but it is only an ap- pearance or manifestation as opposed to the thing-in-itself ; it is only in its necessary relation to the thing in itself and as a reflection bend- ing back to it again. The diversity therefore arises as the relation of another to the thing-in-itself, but this other is nothing that sub- sists for and by itself; but only in relation to the thing-in-itself; but it is at the same time only the repulsion of the thing-in-itself, there- fore it is a restless self-opposed activity. This essenceless reflection, now, does not belong to the thing-in- itself, for the latter is the essential identity of existence ; but it re- turns into itself externally to the thing-in-itself [i.e., it has thingness or independence]. It goes down ["goes to the ground"], and be- comes through this essential identit}7 or thing-in-itself. This process can also be considered in another way : the unessential phase of ex- istence possesses in the "thing-in-itself" its own reflection into itself ; and at the same time it relates to it as to its own other ; but as the other to that which is in itself [i.e., opposed to its own na- ture] it is only the annulment of itself and its becoming of [transition into] its being in itself. The thing-in-itself is consequently identical with external existence. This [the identity of the thing-in-itself and external existence] is exhibited in the thing-in-itself in this manner. The thing-in-itself is the self-relating, essential existence ; it is self-identity only in so far as it contains in itself the negativity of reflection [for how could it be self-identity or self-relating without being negative self-return or reflection?]; and that which appeared as existence external to it is therefore, a phase or moment within it [for its negativity of reflection being admitted the multiplicity of externality is also given]. For this reason it is also a self-repelling thing-in-itself — a thing-in-itself which stands in relation to itself, therefore, as to another. Conse- quently, there are now before us several things-in-themselves, which stand in the relation of external reflection to each other. This un- essential existence is their relation to each other as mutual others ; but this unessential existence is moreover essential to them — or since it is a return into itself it is (for them) the thing-in-itself ; but it is another as the mentioned first ; for the mentioned first is immediate essentiality, but this has originated out of unessential existence [the "mentioned first" is the thing-in-itself discussed above as the first phase of existence and to which was opposed a manifold of un- 126 Essence. essential existence ; but a consideration of the latter has discovered within it the movement of reflection and hence it is a thing-in-itself like the " mentioned first"]. But this second thing-in-itself is only other in general ; for as self-identical thing it has no further an- tithetic relation to the first [it is only " other," and hns no essential relation, no dependence upon the first thing-in-itself] ; it is the reflec- tion into itself of the unessential existence just like the first thing- in-itself. The determinateness of the various things-in-themselves through which they are opposed to each other belongs therefore to external reflection [and not to things-in-themselves]. 3. This external reflection is a process of relation of the things-in- themselves to each other — their reciprocal mediation as mutual others. The things-in-themselves are, therefore, extremes of a syl- logism whose middle term constitutes their external existence — the existence through which the}' are mutually others to each other and different things. This difference of theirs is found only in their re- lation to each other. As far as they stand in relation they have superficial determinations distinguishing them from each other, but these determinations of difference do not appertain to the things-in- themselves except in this relation to each other. The latter, as re- gards these distinctions, are indifferent, reflected into themselves, and absolute [/'. 2 Essence. of the phenomenal world and a substrate replete with content, it is- the particular substrate of others, but only as regards this content ; for the phenomenal world had still a variety of other content than that realm of laws, because the negative element still properly be- longed to it. But now since the realm of laws likewise possesses this moment of negativity it becomes the totality of the content of the phenomenal world and the substrate of all its manifoldness. But it is at the same time the negative of it, and therefore a world in oppo- sition to it. Namely, in the identity of the two worlds and while the one is defined according to form as the essential and the other as non-essential the category of ground of substrate has again made its appearance ; but at the same time it is the ground-relation of the phenomenon, namely, as relation not of an identical content nor of a merely disparate content such as the law is, but as total relation or as negative identity and essential relation of the content as an anti- thesis. The realm of laws is not merely a realm in which the posited-being of a content is the posited-being of another — but this identity is essentially negative unity, too, as has been seen ; each of the two sides of the law is in the negative unity potentially its other content. The other is therefore not indefinitely another in general, but it is its other or it contains likewise the content of the former ; therefore the two sides are opposed. Since the realm of laws contains this nega- tive moment and the antithesis within it, and consequently, as the totality repels from itself a phenomenal world as opposed to a world existent in and for itself, the identity of the two is the essential re- lation of the antithesis. The ground-relation as such is the antithesis which has been an- nulled in its contradiction, and existence is the ground which has gone into self-identity. But existence becomes phenomenon, and ground is annulled in existence ; it restores itself and reappears as the return of the phenomenon into itself, but it does this at the same time in the form of annulled ground, viz., as the ground of opposite determinations ; the identity of such however is essentially becomin and transition, and not the ground-relation in its proper form. The world that exists in and for itself is therefore itself a world which is distinguished within itself into the totality of manifold con- tent ; it is identical with the phenomenal or posited, in so far as it is its ground ; but this connection of identity is at the same time de- termined as antithesis, because the form of the phenomenal world is the form of reflection into its other being; hence it has returned into the world which exists in and for itself, and thus has returned trulv Phenomenon. 153 into itself, as the latter is its opposite [i. e., it is self-opposed]. The relation is therefore defined as this, that the in-and-for-itself existent world is the inverted, phenomenal world. C. Dissolution of the Phenomenon. The world which exists in and for itself is the definite, determined ground of the phenomenal world, and is this only in so far as it is in itself the negative moment and therefore the totality of the determi- nations of content and of their changes — the totality of determina- tions of content corresponds to the phenomenal world but at the same time constitutes a side in opposition to it. The two worlds therefore stand in this relation to each other: that whatsoever is pos- itive in the phenomenal world is negative in the for-itself-existent world ; and conversely, whatever is negative in the former is positive in the latter. The north pole in the phenomenal world is the south pole when considered in-and-for-itself and, conversely; positive elec- tricity is in-itself negative electricity, &c. Whatever is evil in phe- nomenal existence or misfortune, &c, is in-and-for-itself good and a happy fortune. In fact the difference between these two worlds has vanished in this form of antithetic relation, so that the world which is defined as existing in and for itself is the same as the phenomenal world and the latter is identical with the essential world which exists in itself [it is evident that if the counterpart or opposite of each phase in the one world exists in the other world, that each world will contain all the phases of the other world in an inverted order — provided that either world is a totality and contains all phases of existence]. The phenomenal world is first defined as reflection in the form of other-being so that its determinations and existences are regarded as having their ground and subsistence in another; but since this other is likewise such a being reflected into another they are related in such a way that they become self- relation inasmuch as the other to which they relate is a self-annulling other ; the phenomenal world is hence a self-identical law in itself. Conversely, the world that exists in-and-for-itself is at first self- identical — a content which is elevated above change and otherness; but the latter as perfect reflection of the phenomenal world into itself or for the reason that its difference is reflected into itself and there- 154 Essence. fore absolute distinction [t. e., self-distinction] it therefore contains the negative phase and the relation to itself as to its own other; through this it becomes a self-opposed, a self-inverted, a content devoid of essence. Moreover, this content [i. e., of the self-existent world] has received also the form of immediate existence. For it is, first, the ground of the phenomenal ; but since it contains its opposite within itself it is likewise annulled ground and immediate existence. The phenomenal and the essential worlds are consequently totali- ties — each within itself the totality of the reflection which is identical with itself and of the reflection into another, or in other words, the totality containing the being-in-and-for-itself and the phenomenon. They thus constitute two independent totalities of existence. The one is defined as merely reflected existence and the other as mere immediate existence, but in fact each continues into its other, and is the identity of itself and the other. What we have therefore before us is this one totality which repels itself into two totalities, the one the reflected totality and the other the immediate totality. Each of these is at first independent but independent only as a totality ; and each is a totality only in so far as it contains essentially the other within itself as a moment [N. B. independence implies totality, and totality implies the inclusion of its other within itself. All develop- ment and becoming consist in the process of unfolding from itself its other-being or of developing its counterpart within itself. At first there is a series of mutually limiting elements ; then growth and development of each element l'esults in each element becoming a totality, so that each is identical with the whole and a reflection of it]. The distinct independence of each — the one defined as immediate, distinguished from the other defined as reflected — is now posited in such a manner that it is essential relation to its other, and hence this independence is formed only in this unity of the two. It should have proceeded from the law of the phenomenon ; the latter is the identity of a diversified content with another content — so that the posited-being of the one is the posited-being of the other. In the law this distinction still exists that the identity of its sides is only an inner identity, and these sides do not possess this ideutitj' as yet in themselves ; therefore on the one hand that identity is not }ret realized ; the content of the law is not an identical content but an indifferent manifold. On the other hand it is defined as a mere po- tentiality that the posited-being of the one is the posited-being of the other ; this is not yet present in it. Now however the law is realized ; its inner identity is at the same time externally real ; conversely, the content of the law is elevated into ideality ; for it is annulled in it- Essential Relation. 105 self — reflected into itself, since each side has within it its other and is consequently identical with it and with itself in very truth. The law has therefore become essential relation or " necessary con- nection." The truth of the non-essential world is in the first place a world which exists for its other as an in-and-for-itself-existent, but hence this is the totality, because it is itself and also that former world ; both are immediate existences and consequently reflections in their other-being and therefore true reflections into themselves. The word *' world " expresses in general the formless totalit}- of multiplicity, of manifold indifferent objects. This world of indifferent multiplicity whether essential or phenomenal has gone to the ground ; its mul- tiplied has ceased to be a multiplicity of mere indifferent, unrelated beings ; it is now a totality or universum — an essential relation. There are two totalities of content in the phenomenon ; at first they are defined as mutually indifferent and independent, and they have form each within itself but not as opposed to each other, but this form has shown itself to be their relation and the essential relation is the perfection of their form-unity. Third Chapter. Essential Relation. i The truth of the phenomenon is the essential relation [recipro- cal relation or necessary connection]. Its content has immediate in- dependence, both existing immediateness and reflecting immediate- ness, or reflection that is identical with itself ; at the same time in this independence it is a relative — merely reflected into its other or a unity with its other through relation. In this unity the independ- ent content is a posited and annulled ; but this very unity constitutes its essentiality and independence ; this reflection into another is re- flection into itself. The relation has sides, since it is reflection into another ; it has self-distinction within it ; and the sides have indepen- dent existence, since in their indifference towards each other they are bent back into themselves and disconnected from each other so that the existence of each has its significance only in its relation to the other, or in the negative unity. The essential relation is not yet the true tertium quid of Essence and Existence, but it contains already their definite union. Essence is realized in it in such a manner that it has independent existing elements for its reality ; and these have returned from their indiffer- ence into their essential unity so that they have this essential unity 15G Essence. for their reality. The determinations of reflection — the positive and negative — are likewise reflected into themselves when they are re- flected into their opposites. But they have no other determination than this their negative unity. The essential relation, on the con- trary, has for its sides two independent totalities. It is the same antithesis as that of positive and negative, but it is at the same time an inverted world. Each side of the essential relation is a totality which, however, as essentially an(J opposite, has a "beyond" to itself; it is only phenomenon, its existence is not its own, but rather the existence belonging to its other. It is therefore disconnected or broken within itself. But this self-annulment is, at the same time, the unity of itself and its other, and therefore it is a totality, and on this account it has independent existence, and is essential reflec- tion into itself. This is the definition of the "Essential Relation." But in the first place, the identity which it contains is not yet perfect ; the totality which each relative term is in itself is at first only an internal one. Each side of the essential relation is in the first place posited in one determination only of the negative unity, the proper independence of each of the two sides is that which constitutes the form of the essen- tial relation. Its identity, therefore, is only a relation to which their independence is external, namely, in the two sides ; the reflected unity of that identity and of the independent existences has not yet been attained — substance has not yet been reached. The definition of essential relation as given requires the unity of the reflected and immediate independence. But the first realization of this definition is immediate and its moments are opposed to each other, and their unity is only an essential reference to each other, which becomes afterwards a unity corresponding to the idea or definition, when it is realized, L e., when those moments have posited the mentioned unity through their aetivit}'. The essential relation is therefore at first the relation of the whole and the parts, i. e., the relation of the reflected and the immediate in- dependence in which they mutually condition and presuppose each other. In this form of essential relation neither of the sides is pos- ited as moment of the other; their identity is therefore itself one side ; in other words their identity is not their negative unity. The second phase of this essential relation is that in which the one side is a moment of the other, and is contained in it as in its ground — the true independence of both. This is the relation of force and its man- ifestation. Essential Relation. 157 Thirdly, this inequality or non-identity that still remains within the relation annuls itself, and the final form of essential relation appears — that of Internal and External. In this form of essential relation which has become entirely formal the essential relation goes to the oround, and there arises true activity or Substance as the absolute unity of immediate and reflected existence. The Relation of the Whole and the Parts. The essential relation contains in the first place the reflected -into- itself independence of existence ; hence it is the simple form whose determinations are existences but at the same time are posited — held as moments in the unit}-. This independence which is reflected into itself is at the same time reflection into its opposite, namety, immediate independence ; and its existence is essentially this identity with its opposite, just as much as it is its own independence. For this reason the other side also is immediately posited ; the immediate independ- ence which is determined as the other and is a diversified manifold within itself but in such a manner that this manifoldness is also essen- tially a relation to the other side is that to which the reflected inde- pendence belongs. The former side, the wholeor totality is the inde- pendence which constitutes the in-and-for-itself-existing world. The other side, the parts, is the immediate existence, which was called the "phenomenal world:" In the i*elation of whole and parts the two sides are these independent worlds — each of which, however, reflects the other within itself, and is at the same time only this identity of both. Now since the essential relation is in its first phase only the immediate, it follows that the negative unity and the positive inde- pendence is predicated of it as an additional circumstance ; the two sides are posited as moments and yet likewise as existing independ- ently. That the two are posited as moments means that first the whole, the reflected independence, is an existence which contains the other, the immediate independence as a moment or element of it ; in this the whole constitutes the unity of the two sides, their substrate, and the immediate existence takes the form of posited-being. Con- versely, on the other hand the parts are the immediate — the side which contains within itself a manifold existence, an independent substrate ; the reflected unity, on the contrary, the whole, is only an external relation. 2. This essential relation [of the whole and the parts] contains 158 Essence. therefore the independence of the sides, and likewise their annulment,, and it contains both absolutely in one relation. The whole is the in- dependent, and the parts are only moments or elements of this unity ; but likewise the parts are also independent, and their reflected unity [the whole] is only a moment or element ; and each is in its indepen- dence merely a relative of the other. This essential relation isr therefore, an immediate self-contradiction and annuls itself. A closer examination shows that the whole is a reflected unity which has independent existence for itself ; but this its independence is likewise repelled from it ; the whole is a negative unity in negative relation to itself ; consequently it is self-externalized ; it has its exist- ence in its opposite, in the manifold immediateness — the parts. The whole, therefore, consists of the parts, has its existence in them, and is nothing without them. It is, therefore, the entire essential relation and the independent totality ; and on precisely this ground it is only a relative somewhat, for that which makes it a totality is its other, the parts ; and it has its being not in itself but in its other. So also are the parts likewise the entirety of this essential relation. They are the immediate independence opposed to the reflected inde- pendence, and have their being not in the whole, but for themselves. They have, moreover, the whole as an element which belongs to them : it constitutes their relation [to each other] ; without the whole there are no parts. Since they are independent, this relation or neces- sary connection is only an external phase towards which the}' are in-and-for-themselves indifferent. At the same time, however, the parts as manifold existence consolidate into one, for manifold exist- ence is being without reflection ; the parts have their independence only in the reflected unity, which is this unity as well as also the ex- isting manifoldness ; that is to say, they have independence only in the whole, which is at the same time, however, an independence dif- ferent from the parts. The whole and the parts, therefore, condition each other recipro- cally ; but the essential relation in the form considered here stands higher than the relation of condition and conditioned, as considered above [as the result of the ground-relation]. This l'elation is now realized: namely, it is posited that the condition is the essential in- dependence of the conditioned, and is pi-esupposed by it. The con- dition as such is only the immediate and only an implicit presupposi- tion. The whole, however, is the condition of the parts, and yet it contains the immediate implication that it is only in so far as it pre- supposes the parts. Since, therefore, the two sides of the essential relation are posited as mutually conditioning, to each there belongs Essential Relation. 151) immediate independence, but an independence which is mediated or posited for each through the other. The entire essential relation through this reciprocity becomes a return of the conditioning activity into itself, and hence the not relative, the unconditioned. Since the sides of the essential relation possess their independence only through each other, we have only one identity for the two, and in this identity the}7 are only moments or complemental elements ; but since each is independent within itself, there are two independent existences, mutually indifferent. In the first respect [of the contradiction just stated] the essential identit}' of these sides is the whole equal to the parts and the parts equal to the whole. There is nothing in the whole which is not in the parts, and nothing in the parts which is not in the whole. The whole is not abstract unity, but the unity as a diversified multiplicit}- [of different, independent ones] ; but this unity, within which the mani- fold ones relate to each other, is the determinateness through which each one is a "part." The essential relation has, therefore, an in- separable identity and only one independence. Moreover the whole is equal to the parts, but it is not the same as the parts ; the whole is the reflected unity, but the parts constitute the particularity or the otherness of the unity, and are the many differ- ent ones. The whole is not equal to them when they are regarded as these independent ones, but is equal to them only when taken to- gether. This " together " is nothing else than their unity, the whole as such. The whole is, therefore, in the parts only self-identical, and the identity of the whole and the parts expresses only the tautology that the whole, as whole, is not identical with the parts but with the whole of the parts. Conversely, the parts are equal to the whole, but since they pos- sess the phase of otherness they are not equal to the whole as unity, but only in so far as one of its manifold determinations belongs to each part or the parts are equal to the whole regarded as manifold ; in other words, they are equal to it as a divided whole, that is to say, as divided into parts. Hence we have the same tautologj7 as before ; that the parts, as parts, are not identical with the whole as such, but with the whole considered as the whole of the parts. The whole and the parts regarded in this manner are external and indifferent to each other ; each side relates only to itself. And thus held asunder they are destroj'ed. The whole which is indifferent towards the parts is only the abstract identity, without distinction within itself ; it is not a whole except as containing distinctions within itself, and distinctions within itself such as are reflected into I (50 Essence. themselves as manifold determinations, and have immediate inde- pendence. And the identity of reflection has been shown to have this reflection into its other as its truth. Likewise the parts as in- different towards the unity of the whole are only a multiplicity of ones unrelated towards the other, and are therefore in themselves others, which therefore are self-annulling. This relation to itself of each of the two sides is its independence, but this independence which each possesses is rather its self-negation. Each has therefore its independence not within itself but within the other; this other which possesses its being is its presupposed immediate which prom- ises to be its first and its beginning. The truth of the essential relation consists therefore in the media- tion ; its essence is negative unity in which both the reflected and the existent immediateness is annulled. The essential relation is the contradiction which goes back into its ground, into the unity which as returning is the reflected unity ; but since the reflected unity has also been annulled it relates negatively to itself, annuls itself, and reduces itself to existent immediateness. But this is negative rela- tion in so far as it is a first and immediate or is mediated through another, and on this account a posited. This other existent immedi- ateness is likewise only as annulled; its independence is a first some- what [an immediate] but only to vanish ; and it has a being that is posited and mediated. In this determination the essential relation remains no longer whole and parts ; the immediateness which its sides possessed has passed over into posited-being and mediation ; each is posited in so far as it is immediate as self-annulling and as transition into the other ; and in so far as itself is negative relation it is conditioned through the other as through its positive ; and its immediate transition is likewise an immediate, that is to say an annulment, which is posited through the other. Hence the relation of the Whole and the Tarts has gone over into the relation of Force and Manifestation. Remark. The antinomy of the infinite divisibility of matter has been already discussed in connection with the idea of quantity. Quantity is the unity of continuity and discreteness ; it contains in the independent one its continuity into another and in this identity continued without break it has likewise the negation of that identity. The immediate relation of these moments of quantity are expressed as the essential re- lation of the Whole and the Parts, the One of Quantity being regarded Essential Relation. 161 as part, and the continuit3rof quantity being taken as the Whole which is composed of parts. The antinomy then consists in the contradiction which has been solved in the essential relation of the whole and the parts. Whole and parts are, namely, essentially related to each other and constitute one identity, and they are likewise indifferent to each other and possess independence. The essential relation is therefore this antinomy : when one of the moments frees itself from its other the other at once reappears within it. When the existing somewhat is defined as whole it has parts, and the parts constitute its reality ; the unity of the whole is only a posited relation — an external juxtaposition which does not concern the independently existing somewhats. In so far as the somewhats are parts they are not the whole, not combined, and are accordingly simple. And since the relation to a whole is an external affair it does not concern it ; the independent somewhat is accordingly not a part, for a part is such only in relation to a whole. But since in this view it is not a part, it is a whole itself already ; for there is only this essential relation of whole and parts, and the independent somewhat is either one or the other of the two. But since it is the whole it follows that it is composed of parts, and its parts as independent wholes are again composed of parts, and so ad infinitum. This infinitude consists only in the perennial alternation of the two determinations of the essential relation in which each gives rise immediately to the other, so that the posited-being of each is its own vanishing. Matter defined as whole therefore consists of parts and in these parts the whole be- comes a non-essential relation and vanishes. The part thus for-and- by-itself is not a part but the whole. The antinomy of this syllogism, considered carefully, proves really to be this : since the whole is not the independent, the part is the independent ; but since the part is independent only when not in relation to the whole it is the indepen- dent not as part but rather as the whole. The infinitude of the progress which arises, is the incapacity of uniting the two thoughts which con- tain this mediation so that on this account each of the two determina- tions becomes dependent and passes over into the other just because of its independence and separation. B. The Essential Relation of Force and its Manifestation. Force is the negative unity in which the contradiction of the whole and parts has resolved itself, as the truth of essential relation. 11 ll>2 Essence. The whole and parts is the essential relation as it appears when seized in a thoughtless manner, or by mind in its representative thinking or thinking in images, or, considered objectively, it is the dead mechani- cal aggregate which has form-determinations through which the mani- foldness of its independent matters is brought into relation in a unity, but a unity which is after all only external to it. The essential rela- tion [or necessary connection between force and its manifestation] of force is however a higher form of return-into-itself in which the unity of the whole which constituted the relation of the independent others (parts) has ceased to be external and indifferent to this multi- plicity. As this essential relation has now been defined, the immediate and the reflected forms of independence are posited in one unity as an- nulled or as moments, while in the preceding form of the essential relation (whole and parts) they were real sides or extremes existing for themselves. In this result, first, we see that the reflected unity and its immediate being, in so far as the two are first and immediate, are by nature self-annulling phases and forms of reciprocal transition. The former, the force, passes into its manifestation, and the mani- festation vanishes and goes back into the force as into its ground and only exists when it is posited by the force and sustained by it. In the second place, this transition is not merely a becoming and a vanishing, but it is a negative self-relation ; in other words, that which changes its determination is while doing so reflected into itself and preserves itself. The movement of force is not so much a trans- ition as a translation or transference of itself which remains self- identical in this transference of itself through its own posited change. In the third place, this reflected unity which relates to itself is also annulled and a moment [or complemental element] ; it is mediated through its other, and conditioned through it ; its negative relation to itself which is first and begins the movement of transition from itself has likewise a presupposition by which it is solicited to activity, and another from which it begins. a. The Conditioning of Force. Considered in its special determinations force has, in the first place, the phase of existent immediateness belonging to it ; opposed to this, it itself is a negative unity. But the latter as a determination of immediate being is an existing somewhat. This somewhat, for the reason that it is the negative unity as an immediate, appears to be a first [presupposed as already existing] a somewhat opposed to the Essential Relation. 163 f< 'ice since the force is a reflected existence, a posited-being, and hence it seems to belong to an existing thing or to a matter. This is not understood as though the force were the form of this thing, and the thing were determined through it ; but the thing is conceived to be an immediate and to be a separate existence and indifferent to the force. And according to this view there is no ground or reason in the thing why it should possess a force ; it is the force, on the other hand, as the side of posited being which essentially presupposes the thing. Therefore if the question is asked, how it happens that the thing or matter is endowed with a force, the explanation is given that the force is impressed on it by a foreign power, and that it is only something external to the thing or matter. Eegarded as this immediate reality, force is a quiescent determin- ateness of the thing ; not as a self-uttering or manifesting, but as an immediate externality. Hence the force is designated as a matter and instead of being called a magnetic force, an electric force, &c, there is assumed a magnetic matter, an electric matter, &c. ; or instead of the well-known attractive force there is conceived a subtle ether which holds all things together. There are matters into which the powerless, inactive negative unity of the thing dissolves, and these have been already considered [in Book II., section 2, B and C]. But force contains immediate existence as phase or moment, as such a somewhat as while it is condition, passes into transition and annuls itself ; therefore immediate existence as a phase of force is not an existing thing [has not the form of "thing"]. It is more- over not negation as determinateness, but negative unity which is re- flected into itself. The thing to which the force belongs has conse- quently here no further significance ; it is rather the positing of ex- ternality which manifests itself as existence. Therefore it is also not merely a determined matter [a special form of it] ; such independ- ence [as particular matter] has long ago passed over into posited- being and phenomenon. Secondl}', force is the unity of the reflected reality and of imme- diate reality — or of the form-unity and of external independence. It is both in one ; it is the contact of such somewhats that the one is in so far as the other is not ; the self-identical positive and the negated reflection. Force is therefore the self-repelling contradic- tion. It is active ; in other words it is self-related negative unity, in which reflected immediateness or essential being-in-itself is posited as being only annulled or a phase ; consequently in so far as it dis- tinguishes itself from immediate existence, it passes over into it. Ilj4 Essence. Force therefore is posited as the determination of the reflected unity of the whole as the becoming of existing, external multiplicity. But, thirdly, force is at first only potential and immediate activit}r ; it is reflected unity and likewise essentially the negation of essential unity ; and since it is different from these, and only the identity of itself and its negation, it is related to them essentially as an imme- diateness external to them, and they are consequently its presuppo- sition and condition. This presupposition now is not a thing already existing in contrast with it; such indifferent independence is annulled in the force ; as its condition the presupposition is an independent other to the force. But since it is not a thing, and since the independent immediateness has here determined itself to be a self-relating negative unity, this presupposition is itself force. The activity of force is therefore conditioned through itself as a self-other, i. e., it is conditioned through a force. Force is, according to this, an essential relation in which each side is the same as the other. Forces stand in essential relation to each other [and not forces and things]. In the first place, the}7 are re- garded as indifferent to each other. The unity of their essential relation is at first only an internal, potential unit}7. The condition- ing of one force through another is, therefore, regarded as the product of the force's own activity; in other words, is looked upon at first as a prepositing activity, an act of negative self-relation. This other force which conditions the first force lies beyond its posit- ing activity, viz., the reflection which returns into itself immediately in its activity of returning. b. The Soliciting Force. Force is conditioned because the phase of immediate existence which it contains is a mere posited, but, for the reason that it is at the same time immediate it is a presupposed, in which the force itself is negated. Therefore the externality which force encounters is its own presupposing activity itself, which is posited directly as another force. This presupposition is moreover mutual. Each of the two forces contains the unity-reflected-into-itself as annulled, and is therefore presupposing. It posits itself as external ; this externality is its own externality ; but since it is likewise unity reflected-into-itself, it posits this externality not within itself, but as another force. But the external, as such, is the self-annulling ; moreover the self- reflecting activity is essentially related to that external as its other, Essential Relation. 165 hut likewise as to something nugatory in itself and in identity with it. Since the presupposing activity is likewise reflection into itself, it is the annulment of its mentioned negation, and posits the same as its own external. Therefore the force as conditioning is reciprocally the occasion which excites the activity of the other force against which it is active. It does not stand in the relation of a passivit}r, a being determined by another force which came into it, but it is an occasion which solicits the other. It is within itself a negativity of itself and the repulsion of itself from itself is its own positing. Its activity therefore consists in this, that it annuls its occasion as an external occasion ; it reduces it to a mere occasion, and posits it as its own repulsion from itself — it makes it into its own manifestation [i. e., the force makes the occasion of its activit}' the utterance of the force itself ; it annuls the determination which it finds in the object upon which it, the force, acts, and replaces those determina- tions with its own determinations]. The self-externalizing force is therefore the same that was previ- ously defined as the presupposing activity, i. e., that which made itself external. But the force as self-externalizing is at the same time a negating of externality and a positing of it as its own activity. In so far now as we begin with this view of force as a negative unity of itself, and consequently a presupposing reflection, it is all the same as if we began with the view of the soliciting occasion in the pro- cess of manifestation of a force. The force is therefore defined as a self-annulling identity according to its ideal, but as a reality it be- comes one of twTo forces soliciting or solicited. But the ideal of the force is in general the identity of the positing and presupposing re- flection — in other words, of the reflected and immediate unity — and each of these determinations is only a phase or moment, in one unit}r, and consequently is mediated through the other. But like- wise there is no way of characterizing which of the two forces that stand in mutual relation is the soliciting or which the solicited ; each of the two form-determinations belongs to the one as much as to the other. But this identity is not merely an external one of comparison, but it is also their essential unity. The one force, for instance, is defined as the soliciting and the other as the solicited; these form-determinations appear thus as im- mediate, as belonging essentially to the forces. But they are essen- tiallv mediated. The one force is solicited, the soliciting occasion is a determination posited within it from without. But force is itself the presupposing; it is essentially reflection into itself, and it annuls the externality of the soliciting occasion and makes it its own solici- 166 Essence. tation. The soliciting is therefore its own deed ; in other words, it determines the fact that the other force shall be another and a solicit- ing force. The soliciting relates to its other, negatively, so that it annuls its externality, and is thus so far a positing force ; but it is this only through the presupposition of having another opposed to it. i. e., it is soliciting only so far as it has an externality to it, conse- quently only so far as it is solicited. In other words it is soliciting only in so far as it is solicited to be soliciting. Conversely, also, the former solicits only in so far as the other solicits it to solicit. Each of the two therefore receives its occasion or impulse from the other ; but the occasion which it gives as active consists in this, that it re- ceives from the other an occasion or impulse. The occasion or im- pulse which it receives is solicited by itself. The two, the given and the received occasion, or the active extern alization and the pas- sive externality are therefore not immediate but mediated, and each of the two forces is consequently itself the determinateness which the other has presented to it — is mediated through the other, and the mediating other is likewise its own determining positing. Therefore this fact that an occasion for the activity of a force is pre- sented through another force to which it is in so far passive, but, on account of the occasion, goes over from its passivity into activit}' — all this is only the return of force into itself. It externalizes itself, or manifests itself. The externalization is reaction in the sense that it posits the externality as its own phase or moment, and consequently annuls the solicitation Of itself through another force. The two are therefore one. The externalizing of the force, whereby it gives itself extantness for others through its negative activity upon itself, and the infinite return in this externality to itself, so that this externality is only its own self-relation. The presupposing reflection to which belongs the conditioning activity and the " occasion," is therefore only the reflection returning into itself, and the activity is essential^ reactive against itself. The positing of the occasion, or of the ex- ternal as itself the annulment of the same, and conversely, the annul- ment of the occasion, is the positing of externality [i. e., of the force itself]. c. The Infinitude of Force. Force is finite in so far as its moments have still the form of im- mediateness ; their presupposing and their self-relating reflections are distinct in this determination. The presupposing reflection manifests itself as an external force independently existing, and the self-relating reflection manifests itself in relation to it as passive. Force is there- Essential Relation. 1(37 fore conditioned as regards form, and likewise limited as regards its content ; for a determinateness as regards form contains a limitation as regards content. But the activity of force consists in self-utter- ance. This means, as has been shown, the annulment of externality and the determining of it to be that in which force is identical with itself. Therefore what the force really manifests is this, that its rela- tion to another is its relation to itself, that its passivity consists in its activity. The occasion through which it is solicited to activity is its own soliciting ; and the externality which comes to it [to solicit it] is no immediate somewhat, but mediated through it ; and likewise its own essential identity with itself is not immediate, but mediated through its negation. In other words, the force manifests this, or expresses this, that its externality is identical with its internality. c. Relation of External and Internal. 1. The essential relation of the whole and the parts is the immedi- ate phase of essential relation ; the reflected immediateness and the existent immediateness have therefore within it, each an independence of its own ; but since they stand in essential relation their independ- ence is only their negative unity. This is now posited in the utter- ance or manifestation of force. The reflected unity is essentially the becoming-other as transference of itself into externality, but exter- nality has likewise immediately gone back into the reflected unity. The distinction between the independent forces annuls itself ; the manifestation of force is only a mediation of the reflected unity with itself. It is only an empty transparent distinction — a mere appear- ance ; but this appearance is the mediation which constitutes the independent reality itself. Besides the contrary or opposite deter- minations which mutually annul each other, and besides their activity of transition the immediateness from which the movement into the other is begun is itself only a posited being ; and through this each of the determinations is in its immediateness already the unity with its other and therefore the transition is likewise the self-positing return into itself. The Internal is denned as the form of the reflected immediateness, or of Essence, as opposed to the External which is the form of Being ; they however, form only one identity. This identity is, in the first place, the solid unity of the two as substrate replete with content — in other words as the absolute Thing [Sache'] or substrate in which 1G8 Essence. the two determinations named are indifferent, external moments. In so far as it is content and totality which constitutes the Internal and which becomes likewise External, but in this becoming does not change or pass over out of itself, but remains self-identical. The External in this respect is not only identical with the Internal as regards its content, but the two constitute only one thing \_Sache]. But this thing \_Sache] as simple identity with itself is different from its form-determinations — in other words, the latter are exter- nal to it ; in this respect it is itself an internal which is different from its externality. This externality, however, consists in the two de- terminations, viz., the internal and external, which constitute it. But the thing \_Sache] is itself nothing but the unity of the two. Consequently the two sides are again identical as regards the content. But in the thing [Sache] they form a self-penetrating identity as a substrate replete with content. But in the external, as forms of the thing [Sache] the two sides are opposed to the former identity and are consequently mutually indifferent. 2. They have thus become different form-determinations which possess an identical substrate not in themselves, but in another ; they are/ieterminations of reflection; the internal as the form of reflection- into-itself is essentiality, the external in the form of immediateness reflected into something else is non-essentiality. But the nature of the essential relation has exhibited these determinations as constitut- ing merely one identity. Force is in its utterance a presupposing activity which is identical with the determining activity as returning into itself. Therefore in so far as internal and external are regarded as form-determinations, they are first only the simple form itself ; sec- ondly, since they are defined within it as opposites their unity is the pure, abstract mediation in which the one is immediately because the other is, and the latter immediately because the former is ; thus the internal is immediately the external and it has the form of externality because it is the internal ; conversely, the external is only an internal because it is only an external. Since this form-unity contains the two determinations as opposed, their identity is only this transition, and it is an identity which differs from them, rather than their identity with fulness of content. In other words this firm retention of the form is the side of particular- ity. And what is posited in this regard is not the real totality of the whole, but the totality or the thing [Sache'] itself merely in the de- terminateness of form. Since this is merely a composite or ao-o-re- gate unity of the two opposite determinations, it follows that each is essentially in the other determinateness and only in the other, and it Essential Relation. 109 follows also as first remarked that tbey are only in the former deter- minateness, it being indifferent which determinateness we take first — whether that of substrate or of thing [Sadie]. [It is evident that if the external is outside of the internal the internal is also out- side of the external — i. e., separate from it, beyond its limits. This shows the emptiness of the distinction of external and internal as affording any real explanation.] It follows that anything that is only an internal is likewise for that reason only an external ; and conversely, whatever is only external is likewise onty internal. In other words, since the internal is defined as Essence, while the external is defined as Being, it follows that a thing [Sache] in so far as it is only in sfcs essence is for that reason only an immediate being [i. e., without mediation or essential relation which it ought to have if it is Essence] ; or on the other hand a thing \_Sache] which only is, or has being alone, is for that reason still in its essence [i. e., has not unfolded its nature — manifested its essence, and hence is no true being]. The external and internal ai-e sides of determination in which determinateness is posited in such a manner that each of the two determinations not only presupposes the other and passes over into it as into its truth, but, besides this, remains posited as determinateness in so far as it is the truth of the other, and indicates the totality of the two. The internal is therefore the completion of Essence as regards form. Essence, viz., defined as in- ternal, as such, must necessarily be defective, and a mere relation to its other, the external ; and the external is likewise not mere being or existence even, but a somewhat relating to essence or to the inter- nal. But it is not merely the relation of each to the other that we have here, but the absolute form in its completeness, viz., that each is immediately its opposite, and the common relation of these opposites to their third or their unity. Their mediation lacks however as }^et this identical substrate containing them both ; their relation is on this account an immediate inversion of the one into the other, and this negative unity which combines them is a simple point, without any content. Remark. The activity of Essence is in general the becoming [or production of, or genesis of] the Idea \_Begriff or " concrete Idea," as the being which is both subjective and objective, i. e., self-determined as its own object — conscious being]. In the essential relation of the in- ternal and external the essential feature of the Idea makes its appear- 170 Essence. ance, viz., the existence of such a negative unity that each of its moments is not only its other, but is also the totality of the whole [human nature manifests itself as such a negative unit}" of individual human beings, each one of which not only depends upon the others and avails itself of their strength, but through this relation realizes within itself its own negative unity, i. e., elevates itself to a total by this means]. But this totality is in the Idea as such the universal [i. e., the category of the universal corresponds to the totality in the category of External and Internal] ; the totalit}? however is a sub- strate which has not yet appeared at the stage of the process where we have internal and external. In the negative identity of in- ternal and external, which is the immediate inversion of each of these determinations into the other, there is also lacking that substrate which has been called thing [Sadie-]. The unrnediated identity of form as it is here posited as }'et without the activity filled with content belonging to the thing [#ae/ie] itself ought to be noted very carefully. It makes its appearance in the thing [ Sache ] as it is in its beginning. Similarly pure being is immediately nothing. So too eveiything real in its beginning is such an immediate identity onby ; for in its beginning it has not yet developed its moments, and contrasted them, nor withdrawn itself back out of its externality, and on the other hand it has not yet through its own ac- tivity proceeded forth from its internalhy and externalized itself. In such case it is therefore onl}r the internal as determinateness in con- trast with the external, and only the external as a contrast with the internal. Hence it is in one respect only an immediate being; in another respect, in so far as it is likewise the negativity which is destined to become the activity of development, it is as such essen- tially only an internal. In all natural scientific and spiritual evolution, in general, this phase presents itself and it is important to recognize it : that the first phase of any thing is that of its internality, in other words its exist- ence in its idea [ an ideal not yet realized, e. g., an acorn not yet be- come an oak, a child or a savage not yet become a developed, civ- ilized man] and is for this reason only its immediate passive being. And the most convenient example of this is the essential relation just above considered which has passed through mediation — the essential relation of force, — and has realized the essential relation within itself, — its ideal, or first internality. On this account, because it is first internal only, it is only the external immediate essential rela- tion, — the essential relation of the " whole and the parts " in which the sides have an indifferent reality, outside of relation to each other. Essential Relation. 171 Their identity does not yet essentially exist for them ; it is only internal as yet, and on this account they fall asunder, and have only an immediate external existence. So too the sphere of Being in gen- eral is nothing but an internality, and what is the same thing the sphere of existent immediateness or of externality. Essence is at first only the internal; and consequently as such it is taken for a mere unsystematized common interest and quite external. In German one has the words, Schulwesen = school-essence [where the English say school-system], Zeitungsicesen = newspaper-es- sence [where the English say journalism'] and understand under these expressions a common interest formed by external combination of ex- isting objects, without essential connection or organization. Among concrete objects the seed of a plant is an internal plant [internally a plant J and a child is an internal man [ a man not yet realized]. But on this account the plant or the man as a germ is only an immediate somewhat, an external being, which has not yet attained the negative relation to itself, and is therefore a passive being exposed to external influences ; so also God defined in his immediate idea would not be spirit; spirit is not the immediate, the opposite of mediation, but rather the essence which externally posits immediateness, and eternally returns from that immediateness into itself. Regarded as immediate therefore God would be only nature. In other words Nature is only the internality of spirit, not the actuality of spirit, and is therefore not the true God. In other words God in the first [ or lowest form of ] thinking is only pure being, or mere essence, that is to sa}-, the abstract absolute, and not God as absolute spirit [ self-conscious ] which alone is the true nature of God. 3. The first of the considered identities of the internal and ex- ternal is the identity opposed to the distinction of these determ- inations as an indifferent substrate opposed to a form external to it, or an identity as content. The second of the identities considered is the unmediated identity of the distinction of the external and inter- nal, viz., the immediate inversion of each into its opposite — this is the pure form. But these two identities are onhy the sides of one totality ; in other words the totality itself is only their conversion of each into the other. The totality as substrate and content is their immediateness reflected into itself by means of the presupposing re- flection of form which annuls its distinction and posits itself as in- different identity, as reflected unity opposed to it. In other words the identity is the form itself in so far as it is defined as variety, or indifferent multiplicity, and in so far as it reduces itself to one of its 172 Essence. sides as externality, and to the other of its sides as irnmediateness reflected into itself, or internality. Hence, on the other hand, the distinctions of form — the internal and the external, are by this means posited each as the totality of itself and its other ; the internal as simple identity reflected into itself is therefore the immediate and consequently being and externality, as well as essence. The external, on the other hand as manifold, par- ticular being, mere externality, is posited as unessential, and returned into its ground, and consequently as internal [that which is posited as unessential is thereby posited as dependent and as belonging to some- thing else whose manifestation it is ; and as a manifestation or ap- pearance it is only the internality of something else, which has thus been externalized as appearance]. This transition of each into the other forms their immediate identity as substrate, but it is also their mediated identity, viz., each is through its other what it is within itself, i. e., the totality of the essential relation. Or conversely, the determinateness of each side is meditated with the other deterrain- ateness, through the fact that it is potentially the totality ; the totality mediates itself therefore through the form, or through the determ- inateness, and the determinateness mediates itself through its simple identity. Any somewhat is what it is therefore wholly in its externality; its externality is its totality ; it is likewise its unity reflected into itself. Its manifestation or phenomenal existence is not merely reflection into something else, but reflection into itself, and its externality is therefore the externality of that which it is in itself; and since in this way its content and its form are absolutely identical there is nothing in and for itself but this, to utter itself or manifest itself. It is the revelation of its own essence, so that this essence consists merely in self-revelation. The essential relation has thus defined itself as identity of its jjhe- nomenal manifestation with its internality, and therefore now defines essence as Actuality. Actuality 173 THIRD SECTION. Actuality. Actuality is the unit}- of Essence and Existence. In it the formless essence and the fleeting phenomenon have their truth — in other words, persistence devoid of determination and multiplicity devoid of persistence find here their truth. Although existence is immediateness which has resulted from a ground it has not the form posited within it and as belonging to it. When it determines itself and forms itself it is the phenomenon [i. e., totality of appearance]. And since it develops persistence as reflection-into-another until it becomes reflection into itself, there originate two worlds, two totali- ties of content, the one of which is defined as reflected into itself and the other as reflected into another. The essential relation, how- ever, exhibits its form-relation which arrives at its full development in the essential relation of Internal and External as one identical substrate for the content of both, and thus only one identity of form. Through the fact that this identity of the form has arisen, the cate- gory of form has lost its multiplicity of distinctions [and is hence annulled] and one absolute totality has resulted. This unity of the Internal and External is the absolute actuality ( Wirkliclikeii). This actuality is in its first phase of consideration the absolute as such ; and in so far ( as it is posited as unity in which the form is annulled, it has become the empty or external distinction of External and Internal. The activity of reflection is regarded as an external affair in its relation to this absolute, and not as the activ- ity of the absolute itself, but since this reflection essentially belongs to it, it is [i. e., will be found to be] the negative return of the abso- lute into itself. [Such is the first phase of Actualitj'.] In the second place [?'. e., in the second phase of its consideration] this unity of the Internal and External is the Actuality properly so- called. Actuality, Possibility, and Necessitj' constitute the formal moments [elements or phases] of the absolute, i. e., its reflection. In the third place [the third phase of its consideration] the unity of the absolute and of its activity of reflection is the absolute essential relation — in other words it is the absolute as essential relation to itself ; this is called Substance. [In the preceding paragraphs, Hegel gives the substance or out- line of this third section of Essence.] 174 Essence. First Chapter. TJie Absolute. The simple, pure identity of the absolute is indeterminate [without particularization]. In other words within it all determinateness, whether of essence and existence or of being, have been annulled ; and so has the activity of reflection. In so far as this is the case the definition of that which the absolute is, is merely negative ; and the absolute itself appears only as the negation of all predicates and as entirely empty and void ; but in as much as the absolute must at the same time be pronounced as the affirmation of all predicates, it is manifestly the most formal contradiction. In so far as this negating and affirming belong to external reflection it is a formal, non-system- atic dialectic, which, with little trouble, seizes upon determinations of different kinds here and there, and with just as little trouble shows up their finitude and mere relativity, while, on the other hand, the totality hovers before it, and it pronounces this absolute to possess all determinations inherent within it. It has not the ability to bring this affirming and negating to a true unity. There is a necessity, however, to show what this absolute is, but this exposition must not be a determining or a defining of it, nor an external reflection, because by them determinations of the absolute would appear ; there is admis- sible only an analysis or exposition — the exposition on the part of the absolute itself — which only shows what it is. A. The Display or Exposition of the Absolute. The Absolute is not merely Being, nor is it merely Essence. Beino- is the first non-reflected immediateness ; Essence is the re- fleeted immediateness. Each of the two is a totality within itself, but a definite, particular totality. In the sphere of Essence the cate- gory of Being reappears as Existence ; and the relation of being to essence has developed into the essential relation of Internal and Ex- ternal. The Internal is the Essence as totality, which is related to being and is immediate being. The External is being, but it is re- lated to the activity of reflection and it is immediate identity with essence. The absolute itself is the absolute unity of the two. It is The Absolute. 175 that which constitutes the ground of the essential relation, which as essential relation has not gone back into this identity, and its ground is not yet posited. Hence it is evident that the definition of the absolute makes it to be absolute form, but at the same time not as an identity whose moments or phases are mere simple determinatenesses ; it is rather the identity whose moments or phases are both totalities, and as such are indifferent to the form, and hence constitute the perfect content of the whole. Conversely, the absolute is the absolute con- tent in such a manner that the content which as such is an indiffer- ent [i. e., a non-related] multiplicity and possesses the negative form- relation within it, and through this its multiplicity forms one solid [z'.e., homogeneous or continuous] identity. The identit}^ of the absolute is consequently the absolute through this fact, that each of its parts is the whole, in other words, that each determinateness is the totality. This makes each determinate- ness to be a transparent appearance, a distinction that has vanished in its posited-being. Essence, existence, in-itself-existent world, whole, part, force, — these reflected determinations appear to the imaging [representing] form of thought as if they were something valid in and for themselves — as possessing true being ; but the ab- solute is their ground and they have vanished into it. Since in the absolute the form is only simple self-identity, the absolute does not determine itself [or particularize itself] ; for determination is a form- distinction [a distinction within form.] But since the absolute con- tains all distinction and form-determination — in other words since it is absolute form and activity of reflection, it must have difference or diversity in its content. But the absolute itself is absolute iden- tity. This is its definition since all multiplicity of the self-existent world and of the phenomenal world, or of the internal and external totalities have vanished. In itself there is no becoming, for it is not a form of Being nor is it the self-reflecting form of determination ; it is not essence, which determines itself only within itself; it is moreover not a self-manifestation, for it is the identity of the internal and external. But the activ^ of reflection stands in opposition to its absolute identity. The activity of reflection is annulled in its absolute iden- tity. Hence it is only the internality of it and therefore external to it [?'. e., separate from it]. The activity of reflection consists in this — the annulment of its activity in the absolute. It is " the beyond " of the manifold distinctions and determinations and of their activity which the absolute holds in abeyance. It is therefore their assump- 176 Essence. tion [adoption] but at the same time their destruction. It is thus the negative exposition of the absolute already mentioned. In their true presentation this exposition forms the whole of the logical activ- ity which has preceded in this investigation, including the spheres of Being and Essence, whose content is not gathered together from without as something accidentally found, nor has it gone down into the abyss of the absolute through external reflection, but it is de- termined within it through its own inner necessit}': a becoming, inherent in being, and an activity of reflection belonging to essence has returned into the absolute as its ground. This Display or exposition has however a positive side, namely, in so far as the finite within it — that which perishes — shows by perish- ing that it is related to the absolute, or that the absolute is contained in it [or manifested upon it]. But this side is not so much the posi- tive exhibition of the absolute itself as it is the exhibition of the de- terminations which it has through the fact that the absolute is its foundation and also its ground — in other words, that which gives it, as appearance, a reality, is the absolute itself. The appearance is not a mere nothing, but it is reflection, i. e., relation to the absolute; in other words, it is appearance, in so far as the absolute appears in it. This positive exposition or display, therefore, prevents the finite from disappearing and regards it as an expression and image of the absolute. But the transparency of the finite which permits only the absolute to appear through it, results in its entire disappearance, for there is nothing in the finite which can give it an independent indi- viduality as against the absolute ; it is only a medium which is lost in the manifestation of that which shines through it. This positive analysis or display of the absolute is therefore only an appearance ; for the true positive which contains it and the content which is exhibited, is the absolute itself. As regards the further de- terminations, the form in which the absolute appears is something nugatory which the exhibition assumes as an external affair, and makes its beginning with it. Such a determination has not its beginning in the absolute, but only its end. This exhibition is therefore an abso- lute deed through its relation to the absolute into which it returns ; but it is not this in its point of departure, for that is only an external determination to the absolute. In fact, however, the display or exposition of the absolute is its own act, and it begins with itself as well as arrives at itself. The absolute is determined solely as absolute identit}' ; through the activ- ity of reflection it is posited as identical in contrast with antithesis and multiplicity ; in other words it is only the negative of reflection The Absolute. 177 and of determination in general. Not only that exhibition of the abso- lute is something incomplete, but so also is this absolute itself at which it has arrived. In other words, that absolute which exists only as absolute identity is such an absolute merely as belongs to external reflection. It is therefore not what is absolute in an absolute sense, but it is the absolute in the form of determinateness or particularity — it is what is called " Attribute." The absolute however is not attribute merely because it is the object of external reflection and is particularized through that. In other words reflection is not external to it solely ; but it is also imme- diate, and therefore because it is external it is also internal. The absolute is the absolute only because it is not abstract identity, but the identity of being and essence — i. e., the identity of the internal and external. It is therefore the absolute form which causes its manifestation within itself and determines it to be an attribute. B. The Absolute Attribute. The expression which has been used — the absolute absolute [the absolute taken absolutely] — denotes the absolute as returned into itself in its own form, or that whose form is identical with its content. The attribute is only the relative absolute — an expression which means only that the absolute is in a form-determination. The form is namely at first, before its complete analysis or exposition, only inter- nal, or, what is the same thing, only external — particularized form or negation. But since it is the form of the absolute, the attribute is the entire content of the absolute; it is the totality — such a totality as we formerly named a "world" [the " phenomenonal world " and the " in-itself -existent world "] or as one of the sides of the essential relation — each of those sides being at the same time the entire rela- tion. But those two " worlds " — the phenomenal and in-itself-exist- ent worlds — were defined as antithetic to each other in their nature. One side of the essential relation was identical with the other : the whole identical with the parts ; the manifestation of the force pos- sessed the same content as the force itself, and the "external''' was the same as the " internal." At the same time however each of these sides possessed an immediate reality of its own ; one side possessed an existent immediateness and the other a reflected immediateness. In the absolute on the contrary these distinctions of immediateness are reduced to a mere appearance [or seeming"! and the totality 12 178 Essence. which is the attribute is posited as its true and only proper reality ; but the determination in which it appears is posited as non-essential. The absolute is therefore attribute for the reason that it is simple, absolute identity in the determination of identity. There may be other determinations joined to this determination — so that there are several attributes. But since the absolute identity has only this meaning, not only that all determinations are annulled, but that it is also the activity of reflection which has annulled itself, it conse- quently happens that all determinations belonging to it are posited as annulled. In other words, the totality is posited as the absolute ; or the attribute has for its realit}7 and content the absolute. Its form-determination through which it is attribute is therefore also posited immediately as mere appearance, and thus the negative is posited as negative. The positive appearance, which the exhibition or exposition reaches through the attribute, — since it takes the finite in its limitation as something lacking self-existence, and annuls its independent existence in the absolute and reduces it to an at- tribute,— again annuls it as attribute; it causes it to perish in the simple absolute, and thus it recalls the act which distinguished or displayed it as attribute. Since, however, the reflection thus returns from its act of distin- guishing back to the identity of the absolute, it has not emerged from its externality and arrived at the true absolute. It has reached only the indefinite, abstract identity; i. e., that form of it which has the determinateness of identity. In other words, the reflection, since it is determined as attribute, — as the internal form of the absolute, — is in this determining, different from the externality; the internal de- termination does not interpenetrate the absolute — its manifestation is a vanishing, as a mere posited on the absolute. The form therefore taken as external, or as internal, whereby the absolute becomes an attribute, is therefore posited as a self-nugatoiy, a mere appearance, a mere mode and manner of existence. C. The Modus of the Absolute. The attribute is in the first phase the absolute as simple self-iden- tity. In the second phase it is negation, and as such negation it is the formal activity of reflection into itself. These two sides consti- tute the two extremes of the attribute while it itself is the middle term, since it is itself both the absolute and the determinateness. The Absolute. 171) The second of these two extremes is the negative as negative, the activity of reflection external to the absolute. In other words, in so far as it is taken as the internal of the absolute, and it is defined as the activity of positing itself as modus, it is the externality of the absolute, its lapse into the realm of change and contingency, of im- mediate being — its transition into the opposite without return into i self ; the multiplicity of form and content determinations, without totality. The modus as the externality of the absolute is moreover the ex- ternality posited as externality, a mere " mode and manner;" conse- quently the appearance as appearance, or the reflection into itself of form ; consequently the self-identity which is the absolute. In fact therefore the absolute is posited as absolute identity first in the modus ; it is only what it is, i. e., self-identity as self-relating negativ- ity, as appearance which is posited as appearance. Therefore in so far as the analysis or exposition of the absolute begins with its absolute identity and passes over to the attribute and thence to the modus it has in these moments completed its course. But, in the first place, it is not a merely negative activity in its atti- tude towards these determinations, but it is the reflecting activity it- self, the very activity by which the absolute is true absolute identity. In the second place it does not have to do merely with externality, and the modus is not the extreme of externality, but since it is ap- pearance as appearance, it is the return into itself, the self-annulling reflection as which the absolute is absolute being. In the third place the exhibiting reflection appears to commence with its own determinations, and with the external — the modus or the determinations of the attribute — taking them up as though they were already existent outside of the absolute, and the activity of the existing reflection seems to consist in this — that it reduces these determinations to independent identities. But in fact the exhibiting reflection finds the determinateness with which it begins in the abso- lute. For the absolute as first indifferent identity is only the deter- mined absolute, called the attribute because it is the inactive absolute devoid of reflection. This determinateness, since it is determinate- ness, belongs to the reflecting activity ; only through it is it deter- mined as the first identical and only through it does it possess the absolute form, and is not merely in identity but a positing of itself in identity. The true meaning of the modus is therefore that it is the reflecting activity belonging to the absolute ; an activity of determination whereby it does not become another, but only becomes what it is 180 Essence. already ; it is thus a transparent externality, which shows what it is in itself ; a movement away from itself whose externality is at the same time its internality ; and hence it is a positing which is not a mere positing, but absolute being. If therefore the question is asked regarding the content of the ex- position of the absolute, what it is that the absolute exhibits? it must be remembered that the distinction between form and content in the absolute has utterly vanished. Or that the content of the absolute is self-manifestation. The absolute is absolute form, which as the diremption or dualization of the absolute is wholly self-identical — the negative as negative ; or it comes into identitv with itself which is likewise indifferent towards its distinctions and is thus absolute con- tent; the content is therefore only this very exposition (or exhibition of itself). The absolute as this self-sustaining activity of exposition as mode and manner, which is its absolute self-identity, is manifestation not of an internal, nor a manifestation made to something else, but it is only a manifesting of itself for itself absolutely ; it is therefore Actuality [ Wirklichkeit] . Remark. The idea of the " substance " of Spinoza corresponds to this idea of the absolute, and to the essential (reciprocal) relations of reflec- tion belonging to it, as we have explained above. Spinozism is defi- cient as a philosophy through the fact that the activity of refleetion and its manifold determining is an external form of thinking:. His "substance" is one substance, one indivisible totality ; there is no determinateness or particularity that is not contained in or annulled by this absolute ; and it is important enough that all which appears to the naive representation, or the defining understanding as some- thing independent, is reduced utterly to a mere posited-being [de- pendence] within that necessary thought [of the absolute or substance]. " Determinateness is negation," is the absolute principle of Spinozistic philosophy ; this true and simple insight establishes the absolute unity of substance. But Spinoza remains at the stand- point of negation as determinateness or quality ; he does not reach the idea of absolute negation, i. e., self-negating negation ; hence his " substance " does not contain absolute form [self-determined form] and the science of it is no immanent scientific process [i. e., a nec- essary procedure]. His " substance " is absolute unity of thought and being or extension ; therefore it contains the thinking activity, The Absolute. 181 but only in its unity with extension. This implies that the thinking does not separate itself from extension, and consequently is not an activity of determining and form-giving, nor a return into itself, nor a beginning with itself. The "•substance " therefore lacks the prin- ciple of personality, a defect which has been urged against the Spino- zistic system most frequently. Moreover its form of knowing is ex- ternal reflection, which takes up the determinateness of attribute and mode as a finite phenomenon without deducing it from the idea of " substance," and it makes reflections upon the same in an external manner, and, assuming those determinations as given, refers them to the absolute, without commencing its procedure in the absolute. The definitions which Spinoza gives of "substance" are those of self-cause — causa sui — defined as a somewhat, "whose essence includes within itself its existence;" and he says that " The idea of the absolute does not need the idea of anything else for its concep- tion." These definitions, deep and true as they are, are nevertheless assumed without proof in his system. Mathematics and other sub- ordinate sciences are obliged to begin with presuppositions ; they are under the necessity of assuming their elements or matter with which they have to deal. But the absolute cannot be a direct immediate something ; it is essentially its own result. After the definition of the absolute, Spinoza gives next his defini- tion of attribute, namely, as " That which the intellect comprehends as the nature or essence of the absolute." Not to dwell upon the fact that the intellect is assumed as something subsequent to the attribute according to its nature — for Spinoza defines the intellect as a modus — it must be observed that the attribute which is a determina- tion of the absolute is made by Spinoza dependent upon something else, namely, the intellect which regards " substance " from an exter- nal and independent point of view. Spinoza defines the attribute further as infinite ; and infinite also in the sense of infinite multiplicity. There appear however only two attributes — thought and extension and it is not shown how infinite multiplicity is reduced to this antithesis of thought and extension. These two attributes are therefore taken from experience. Thought and being are the absolute conceived in a determination. The abso- lute itself is their absolute unity, and within it they are only non- essential forms ; the arrangement of things is the same as that of mental images or thoughts, and the one absolute is perceived only by the external reflection, by a modus, as existing in those two determ- inations [thought and extension] — on the one hand, as the totalit}7 of mental images, and on the other, as a totality of things 182 Essence. and events. As it is this external reflection that makes that distinction, so it is the same reflection that carries it back into the ab- solute identity, and annuls it. This entire activity however goes on outside of the absolute. Although the absolute is also the activity of thought, and hence thinking occurs only in the absolute, jret, as already remarked, thought, in the absolute, is only in unit}r with exten- sion, consequently not as the activity which is essentially opposed to extension. Spinoza makes the sublime demand upon thought that it shall consider things under the form of eternity, sub specie ceterni, i. e., as they are in the absolute. But in that absolute which is only the inactive identity, the attribute, as well as the modus, exist only as vanishing, not as beginning, so that even that vanishing has its posi- tive origin only from without. The third, the modus, is understood by Spinoza as an affection of substance, particular determinateness, that which is in another and is apprehended through that other. The attributes really have for their determination only indefinite multiplicity. Each of the attri- butes should express the totality of substance and be understood through itself, but, in so far as the absolute exists as determined or particular, it involves other-being and cannot be understood through itself. In the modus therefore the definition of attribute is first posited in its true form. This third remains moreover mere modus ; on the one hand it is an immediately given somewhat, and on the other hand its nugatoriness is not recognized as reflection into itself. The Spinozistic exposition of the absolute is therefore complete only in so far as it begins with the absolute, proceeds to the attribute, and con- cludes with the modus. These three, however, are merely mentioned one after the other without showing any inner necessity of develop- ment; the third is not negation defined as negation — the negation relating to itself negatively, through which it would be a return into itself within the first identity, and thus the true identity-. Therefore it lacks the necessity of procedure from the absolute to the non-essen- tial, as well as their dissolution again into the identity. In other words it lacks the becoming of the identity as well as of its determina- tions. In like manner the oriental idea of emanation conceives the abso- lute as the self-kindling light. But the light not only originates within itself, it streams forth away from itself. Its rays are depart- ures from its undimmed clearness ; the remote results are more im- perfect than the preceding ones from whence they came. The raying forth of the light is taken onby as an event, and the process only as a continnous loss of energy. Hence the being continually The Absolute. 183 grows dimmer and the end of the line is night — the negative, which does not turn back to the source of light. The defect of reflection, which Spinoza's exposition of the abso- lute contains as an emanation theory, does not exist in the idea of the monad as set forth by Leibnitz. The one-sidedness of the philosophical principle usually draws out its opposite principle in another system so that the whole, the totality, exists in its com- pleteness although sundered into different systems. The monad is merely one, a negative reflected into itself ; it is the totality of the content of the world. The variety and multiplicity within it has not vanished altogether but is preserved in a negative manner. Spinoza's *' substance" is the unity of all contents. But this manifold con- tent of the world does not exist as such within the " substance " but only in the activity of reflection external to it. The monad is essentially a representing activity. And although it is finite it pos- sesses no passivity; but the changes and determinations within it are manifestations in itself. It is an " Entelechy;" the revelation is its own activity. By this the monad is particularized and distinguished from others ; the determinateness of particularity consists in the special content and in the mode and manner of the manifestation. The monad is therefore potentially — as regards its substance — the totality, but not in its manifestation. This limitation of the monad does not appertain to it as self-positing or self-representing, but, to its nature, its potential^ ; in other words it is an absolute limit, a predestination imposed upon it through another being. Moreover the limited ones are in relation to each other while the monads are self-contained absolutes. Hence the harmon}' of these limitations, namely, the relation of the monads to each other, is external to the monads and proceeds from another being, or is a "pre-established harmony." It is clear that through the principle of reflection-into-itself, which constitutes the fundamental principle of the monad, that otherness and the influence of the external is removed, and the changes which happen to the monad are through its own activity. But on the other hand, the passivity is converted into an absolute limitation, a limita- tion of nature or constitution [a limitation impressed upon it from with- out]. Leibnitz ascribes to the monads a certain kind of completeness within themselves, a kind of independence. They are created beings. Upon a closer examination of the nature of this limitation it appears that the self-manifestation which belongs to the monad is the totality of form. It is an extremely important idea that the changes in the monad are conceived as self-manifestations, as actions devoid of 18-4 Essence. passivity, and the principle of reflection-into-itself, or of individual- ization, is made prominent as essential. Moreover it is necessary that the finitude or particularity is allowed to exist within the monad — that the content or the substance is distinguished from the form, and moreover that the content is limited while the form is infinite. But in the idea of the absolute monad we ought to find not only the men- tioned unity of form and'content, but also the nature of reflection as self-related negativity which repels itself from itself and is thereby a positing and creating activity. In the system of Leibnitz we find further the doctrine that God is the source of the existence and of the essence of the monads: which means that the mentioned absolute limitations in the nature of the monads are not existent in and for themselves but that they vanish in the absolute. But these notions are derived from current conceptions which are without philosophical development and not brought up to the speculative stand-point. Hence the principle of individualization does not receive its deeper meaning; the thoughts on the distinction between the different finite monads and upon their relation to the absolute, do not originate in this essence itself, i. e., in an absolute manner. They belong only to discursive reasoning — 'to dogmatic reflection, and they therefore attain no internal coherence. Second Chapter. Actuality. The absolute is the unity of the internal and external as the first phase of unity existing in itself or potentially. The exhibition or exposition proved to be an external reflection, which possessed the immediate on its side as an already given somewhat ; but it is an activit}^ which relates the immediate to the absolute, and as such connects it to the latter, and determines it as a mere mode and man- ner. But this mode and manner is the activity of determination which belongs to the absolute itself ; it is namely its first identity or its mere in-itself-existent unity. And although by means of this reflection, that former being-in-itself or nature is posited as a non- essential determination, yet through its negative relation to itself it becomes the mode (" modus ") as described. This activity of reflec- tion as annulling itself in its determinations and as activity that returns into itself, becomes true absolute identity, and is at the same time the determining [particularizing] of the absolute — in other words, its modality. The mode is, therefore, the externality of the Actuality. 185 absolute, but only as its reflection into itself ; in other words, it is its own manifestation, so that this externalization is the reflection into itself of the absolute, and, therefore, its being-in-and-for-itself. Therefore as the manifestation which shows the absolute as having no other content than to be self-manifestation, the absolute becomes absolute form. The " actuality" is to be seized or conceived as this reflected absoluteness. The category of being does not express actu- ality ; for it is only a first immediateness ; its reflection is, therefore, only a becoming — a transition into something else; in other words its immediateness is not being-in-and-for-itself. The category of Actuality is moreover higher than that of Existence. Existence has an immediateness which has issued forth from Ground and Condi- tions— in other words from Essence and its reflection. It is there- fore potentially what actuality is, real reflection, but it is as yet not the posited unity of inflection and immediateness. Existence ac- cordingly passes over into "Phenomenon" wdien it develops the activity of reflection that it contains. It is the category of Ground that has become annulled (" gone to the ground ") ; its determination is its restoration, hence it becomes essential [or reciprocal] relation ; and its final activity of reflection is the positing of its immediateness as reflection into itself, and conversely. This unity, which contains Existence or immediateness and being-in-itself as mere moments or subordinate elements, is now before us as the Actuality. The actual is therefore manifestation, it does not pass over into the sphere of change through its externality nor is it an appearance in something else, but it manifests itself. This means that it is itself in its exter- nal^*, and is only in that externality ; in other words, it is only the activity which distinguishes and determines. In the actuality as this absolute form, the moments or elements are only as annulled — formal, not yet realized; their diversity [multi- plicity] belongs, therefore, to external reflection, and is not defined as content. Actuality as immediate unity of form of the internal and external is consequently in the determination of immediateness as opposed to the determination of reflection into itself ; in other words it is an ac- tuality opposed to a possibility. The relation of the two to each other constitutes therefore a third term : the actual defines itself as a being reflected into itself, and the latter is at the same time an imme- diately existing somewhat. This third term is Necessity. But in the first place, since the actual and p is.sible are formal dis- tinctions, their relation too is only formal, and consists only in this 18 b* Essence. that the one as well as the other is a posited-being, hence mere Con- tingency. Now, because the contingency contains the actual as well as the possible, as mere posited-being, they have received the determination within themselves ; there arises therefore, secondly, the real actuality. And with this likewise there arises the real possibility and the relative necessity. The reflection of the relative necessity into itself gives, thirdly, absolute necessity, which is absolute possibility, or poten- tiality and actuality. Contingency or Formal Actuality, Possibility and Necessity. 1. Actuality is ''formal" in so far as it is mere immediate unre- flected actuality — the first phase of actuality — consequently merely in this form-determination, but not as totality of form. It is in this phase nothing more than a being or existence in general. But since it is not merely immediate existence but essentially the form-unity of the being-in-itself or of internality and externality it contains imme- diately being-in-itself or potentiality. Whatever is actual is pos- sible. 2. This potentiality is actuality that is reflected into itself. But this first phase of reflected-being is also a formal phase and hence only the determination of identity with itself, or of being-in-itself in general. Since, however, the determination here is the totality of form, this being-in-itself is determined as annulled or as essentially a mere rela- tion to actuality ; as the negative of actuality posited as negative. Potentiality contains therefore two phases ; first, the positive phase, its reflection into itself ; but since it is within the absolute form it is reduced to a mere phase, its reflection into itself is no longer valid as essence, but in the second place possesses the negative significance, viz., that the potentiality is something defective, something that refers to another, i. e., to the actuality, and supplements its deficiencies with the same. According to the first phase, the merely positive side, the poten- tiality is therefore the mere form-determination of self-identity, i. e., the form of essentiality. In this phase it is devoid of relativ- ity, an indefinite receptacle for everything in general. In the sense of formal potentiality eveiything is possible which does not contra- dict itself; the realm of potentiality is therefore the limitless multi- Actuality. 187 plicity. But eveiy individual of the multiplicity is particularized or determined within itself and in opposition to others, and has the negation inherent in it. Indifferent variety or diversity passes over into antithesis \_i. e., is found upon careful examination to irapty antithesis as the basis of its distinction] ; but antithesis is contradic- tion [i. e., implies contradiction, which is the first phase of self- distinction ; that is to say, all distinction or difference rests finally on self-distinction]. Therefore every particular thing is likewise a contradictory somewhat [as well as a possible one], and therefore everything is impossible. This merely formal statement regarding anything — that it is pos- sible— is therefore likewise shallow and empty, like the principle of contradiction, and every content that it may have, e.g., "A is pos- sible," means only that A is A. In so far as one regards this without considering the development of the content it has the form of sim- plicity. Distinction arises within it only upon the annulment of the form of simplicity. When one holds fast to the simple form, the content remains a self-identical one and therefore a possible. There is nothing more expressed, however, by this term " possible " than with the formal principle of identity. The possible contains however more than the mere principle of identity. The possible is the reflection-into-itself again reflected ; in other words, the identical as phase of the totality is also de- termined or defined to be not in-itself, i. e., potential. It has therefore the second determination — to be a mere possible something — and its ideal is the totality of the form. The potentiality without this ideal is the essentiality as such ; but the absolute form contains the essence merely as moment, and has no truth except as being. Potentiality is this mere essentiality posited in such a manner as to be a mere phase and not commensurate with the absolute form. It is being-in- itself defined as mere posited ; in other words as not possessing being-in-itself. The potentiality is therefoi'e the contradiction or the impossibility. In the first place, this states that the possibility whose posited form- determination is annulled, possesses a content. This as possible is a being-in-itself which is at the same time annulled or other-being [i. e., a being for others or dependent]. Since it is for this reason only a possible being it follows that another being is possible, and even its opposite. A is A ; likewise not-A is not-A. These two principles both express the possibility of its content. But these principles as identical are indifferent towards each other ; when one of them is posited the other is not of necessity also posited. The 188 Essence. potentiality is the relation in which the two are brought into compari- son. It contains in its determination as a reflection of the totality, the implication that the opposite is also possible. It is therefore the relating ground: that because A is A also not-A is not-A. In the possible A the possible not-A is contained, and it is this relation that determines both as possible. As this relation however — that in one possible thing its other is also contained — it is the contradiction that annuls itself. Since now accord- ing to its definition it is reflected and the reflection is self-annulled, as has been shown, it is consequently also the immediate and with this it is actuality. 3. This actuality is not the first phase of actuality, but the re- flected form of it — posited as unity of itself and potentiality. The actual as such is possible ; it is in immediate positive identity with potentiality ; but potentiality has defined itself as mere potentiality ; consequently the actual is defined as merely a possible. And it follows immediately that because the potentiality is found in the actuality that it is annulled and mere potentiality. Conversely, actuality which is in unity with potentiality is only the annulled im- mediateness ; in other words, because the formal actuality is a mere immediate, first phase, it is only an element, a mere annulled actu- ality. Hence a more accurate definition is reached of the degree in which possibility is actuality. Possibilit}' is, namely, not all actuality — of the real and absolute actuality we are not speaking heie. This phase is only the first one, namely, the formal one which has been defined as mere possibility, 'therefore formal actuality, which is mere being or existence in general. Every possible therefore possesses being, or existence. This unity of potentiality and actuality is contingency. The con- tingent is an actual which is at the same time defined as merely possible and whose other or opposite is likewise possible. This actuality is therefore mere being or existence posited in its truth as having the value of a posited-being or potentiality. Conversely, potentiality as reflection into itself or being-in-itself, is posited as posited-being. Whatever is possible is an actual in this sense of actuality ; it has only as much value as the contingent actuality, and is itself contin- gent. The contingent presents therefore two sides. First, in so far as it possesses potentiality immediately, or, what is the same thing, in so far as potentiality is annulled in it, it is not posited-being nor medi- ated but it is immediate actuality, it has no ground. Since this im- Actuality. 189 mediate actuality belongs also to the possible, it is defined as the contingent and likewise as devoid of ground, just as the actual was. The contingent is however, in the second place, the actual as a mere possible, in other words, as a posited-being ; and so too the possible is as formal being-in-itself, mere posited-being. Conse- quently, the two are not in and for themselves but each has its true reflection into itself in another, in other words, it has a ground. The contingent has therefore no ground, just for the reason that it is contingent; and likewise it has a ground because it is contingent. It is the posited, unmediated vanishing of the external and internal into each other ; in other words the vanishing of the reflection into itself — into being — and vice versa. It is posited through this that possibility and actuality each within itself possesses this determination and consequentl}' that they are moments or elements of the absolute form. The actuality in its immediate unity with potentiality is mere existence and therefore defined as groundless, that is as a mere posited or mere potential. In other words, it is posited as reflected and determined in opposition to potentiality, and therefore it is sun- dered from the potentiality and from reflection into itself and conse- quently it is likewise immediate and only a possible. Likewise poten- tiality as simple being-in-itself is an immediate somewhat, merely an existent in general. In other words, opposed to actuality it is a being in itself devoid of actuality, merely a possible ; and just on this account an existence in general which is not reflected into itself. This absolute unrest of the becoming of these two determinations is contingenc}'. But for the reason that each vanishes immediately in its opposite, it goes together with itself — [returns into itself — A vanishing in B, which vanishes again into A] and this identity of the same, of one in the other, is Necessity. The necessary somewhat is an actual somewhat, hence it is devoid of ground, as it is an immediate ; but it has likewise its actuality through another, or in its ground ; but it is at the same time the posited-being of this ground and its reflection into itself ; the poten- tiality of the necessity is annulled. The contingent is therefore necessary because the actual is deter- mined as possible, and hence its immediateness is annulled, and is repelled into ground, i.e., being-in-itself, and grounded; and also since this its potentiality is the ground-relation, it is entirely annulled, and it is posited as being. That which is necessary is ; and this exis- tent is itself that which is necessary. At the same time it is in itself ; this reflection into itself is something else than the immediateness of the sphere of being ; and the necessit}' of the existent is something 190 Essence. else. The existent itself is therefore not that which is necessary ; but this being-in-itself is mere posited-being — it is annulled and even immediate. Therefore actuality is in its distinctions, i. e., its possi- bility, self-identical. As this identity it is Necessity. B. Relative Necessity, or Real Actuality, Possibility and Necessity. 1. Necessity as thus derived is formal, for the reason that its ele- ments are formal; they are, viz., simple determinations, which are totality only as immediate unity or as the immediate conversion of the one into the other, and consequently not as having the form of independence. In this formal necessity the unity is therefore only asimple one, and indifferent towards its distinctions. As immediate unity of form-determinations this necessity is actuality ; but such an actuality as possesses a content for the reason that its unity is now defined as indifferent towards the distinction of its form-determina- tions, viz., itself and possibility. This content- contains an indif- ferent identity, also an indifferent form, i. e., as a mere diversity of determinations, and it is a manifold content. This actuality is real actuality. Real actuality, as such, is in its first phase the thing with many properties, the existing world ; but it is not the existence that loses itself in the phenomenon, but as actuality it is at the same time being-in-itself and reflection-into-itself ; it preserves its indi- viduality in the multiplicity of mere existence ; its externality is only an internal activity of relation to itself. That which is actual can act; its actuality is manifested in what it produces. Its activity of relation to another is the manifestation of itself ; not a transition as the existent somewhat relates to another, nor a phenomenal ap- pearance like that of the thing which has mere relativity to another which is independent, but possesses its reflection-into-itself, its par- ticular essentiality in some other independent being. The real actuality has likewise the potentiality immediately within itself. It contains the element of being-in-itself ; but as mere first phase the immediate unity is in one of the determinations of form, hence as the existent, which is different from the being-in-itself or the potentiality. 2. This potentiality as the being-in-itself of the real actuality is the real potentiality and as such a being-in-itself full of contents. Formal potentiality is the reflection into itself only as abstract iden- tity, an identity in which a something is not self-contradictory. But in so far as one examines the determinations, circumstances, and con- Actuality. 1(J1 ditions of a somewhat with a view to learn its potentialities he deserts the formal point of view and comes to the consideration of its real potentiality. This real potentiality is itself immediate existence, not however for the reason that the potentiality as such as a formal element is immediately its opposite — an actuality that is not reflected; but, because it is real possibility, this determination belongs to it itself. The real possibility of a thing is therefore the existing multiplicity of surrounding conditions which stand in relation to it. This multiplicity of existence is potentiality as well as actuality, but its identity is only the content which is indifferent towards the determi- nations of form ; they constitute therefore the form, determined [par- ticularized] in respect to their identity. In other words, the immedi- ate, real actuality, for the reason that it is immediate, is determined against [or defined and distinguished from] its potentiality; as this determinate [definite, special] and reflected it is the real potentiality. This is the posited totality of form, but the form in its determinate- ness [particularity], namely, the actuality as formal or immediate, and likewise the potentiality as the abstract being-in-itself. This actuality which constitutes the potentiality of a thing is therefore not its own potentiality but the being-in-itself of another actuality ; it is itself the actuality which is to be annulled — the potentiality as mere potentiality. Hence the real potentiality constitutes the totality of conditions which is not an actuality reflected into itself but which is defined as something whose destiny is to go back into itself and to become another. What is really potential is therefore as regards its being-in-itself something formally identical, that is, something which does not con- tradict itself as regards its simple contents ; but it is necessary also that it should not contradict itself as regards the developed condi- tions and various surroundings with which it is connected — it must be self-identical even in these. Secondly, because it is manifold and stands in manifold connection with others, there is diversity within itself, and this diversity passes over into opposition [antithe- sis] and into self-contradiction. When one speaks of potentiality and undertakes to show its contradiction he has only to call attention to the multiplicity of its content, or of its conditioned existence ; by this its contradiction is easily shown. But this is not a contradiction of external comparison. For the existence that contained multiplicity, on that account, essentially annuls itself and is destro}'ed ; hence it is essentially a mere potentiality. If all the conditions of a thing are complete and present the thing becomes actual ; the completeness of 192 Essence. the conditions is the totality of the content of a thing and the thine itself is this content determined as actual in the entire scope of its possibility. In the sphere of the conditioned ground the conditions have the form outside of them — that is to say : the ground or the reflection which exists for itself, is outside of them ; and this relates to the moments of the thing and brings them into existence. Here, on the contrary, the immediate actuality is not defined to be condi- tioned through a presupposing reflection, but it is posited that it itself is the potentiality. In the self-annulling, real potentiality, that which is annulled is two- fold ; for it is itself twofold — actuality and potentiality. (1.) The actuality is the formal, or an existence which has an immediate, independent manifestation, and through its annulment has become reflected and a moment of another being, and hence contains within it the being-in-itself. (2.) The mentioned existence was also deter- mined as the potentiality or as being-in-itself, but it was the being-in- itself of another. Since it therefore annuls itself, the being-in-itself gets annulled, and passes over into actuality. This movement of the self-annulling, real potentiality produces therefore the same moments that were already extant, each arising from the other ; in this nega- tion it is therefore also not a transition but a return into itself. In the case of the formal potentiality, for the reason that the somewhat was potential, it was not itself but something else that was potential. The real potentiality has no longer such another over against it, for it is real in so far as itself is also the actuality. Since it annuls therefore the immediate existence of the same — i. e. , the circle of conditions — it becomes being-in-itself which it already is, namely, the being-in-itself of another. And since conversely it annuls at the same time its moment of being-in-itself, it becomes actuality ; that is, it becomes the moment which it likewise is alreadj^. That which vanishes is therefore the definition of the actuality as the potentiality or being-in-itself of another; and, conversely, there vanishes the potentiality as an actuality which is not the actuality of its poten- tiality. (3.) The negation of the real potentiality is consequently its identity with itself ; since it therefore is the opposite of this annul- ment in its annulment, it is the real necessity. That which is necessary cannot be otherwise than it is ; but that which is possible, is ; for the potentiality is the being-in-itself, the mere posited-being, and therefore it is essentially other-being. The formal potentiality is this identity as transition into an absolute other; but the real, since it has the other moment, the actuality, belonging to it, is already itself necessity. What, therefore, is really Actuality. 193 possible can never be anything else ; under these conditions and cir- cumstances, nothing else can happen. Real possibility and necessity are therefore only apparently distinct ; their identity is not one that develops, but one that is presupposed and underlies them. The real necessity is therefore relation which is full of contents [i. e., a totality of conditions] ; for the content [which consists in these details] is the mentioned identity existing in itself, which is indif- ferent as regards the distinctions of form. This necessity is however at the same time relative. That is to say : it has a presupposition as its origin — it has its beginning in what is contingent. The really actual as such is a completely defined actual, and possesses this completely defined character as its immediate being — as a multiplicity of existing circumstances ; but this immediate being as definiteness is also the negative of it [i. e. , of the really actual] — it is its being-in-itself or potentiality ; hence it is real possibility. As this unity of the two moments it is the totality of form, but the totality which is still external to itself ; it is there- fore unity of possibility and actualit}' in such a manner that (1) the multiplex existence is immediately or positively the potentiality — a potential that is self-identical, because it is actual. (2.) In so far as the potentiality of existence is posited, it is determined as mere potentiality and as immediate conversion of actuality into its oppo- site — or as contingency. Therefore this potentiality which has the immediate actuality attached to it as its condition, is only the being- in-itself as the potentiality of another. Through the fact that — as has been shown — this other-being annuls itself and this posited- being is itself posited, the real potentiality becomes necessity. But this necessity begins with that real potentiality as a unity of the potential and actual, which is not yet reflected into itself. This pre- supposition, and the self-returning movement are as yet separate. In other words, the necessity has not as yet determined itself into contingency. The relativity of the real necessity presents itself in the content as an identity which is indifferent to the form, and which is, therefore, distinct from it and a definite content altogether. The really neces- sary is on this account a limited actuality which, on account of this limitation, may be regarded also as a contingent. In fact the real necessity is in itself also contingency. This is evident in the fact that the really necessary as regards the form is lim- ited as regards its content, and through this limitation possesses con- tingency. But also in the form of the real necessity there is found contingency; for, as has been shown, the real potentiality is only in 194 Essence. itself necessary, but it is posited as the other-being • of actuality and potentiality opposed to each other. The real necessity contains therefore contingency : it is the return into self out of the mentioned restless other-being of actuality and potentiality opposed to each other, but it is not the return- into itself, from itself. In itself therefore there is found here the unity of necessity and contingency ; this unity is to be called the absolute actuality. C. Absolute Necessity. The real necessity is definitely determined necessity; the formal has as yet no content nor determinateness belonging to it. The determinateness of necessity consists in the contingency or the nega- tion which it possesses. This has been shown. This definite determinateness in its first simplicity is actuality. The definitely determined necessity is therefore immediately actual necessity. This actuality which as such is itself necessary because it contains the necessity as its being-in-itself is the absolute actuality. It is actuality which can never be other than it is ; for its being-in- itself is not potentiality but necessity itself. But this actuality, because it is posited, is absolute, that is to say, it is the unity of itself and with possibility — a mere empty determination ; in other words it is contingency. The emptiness of its determination reduces it to a mere potentiality — to a determination which can be just as well something else and be determined as potential. This poten- tiality is however itself the absolute ; for it is precisely the poten- tiality which will be determined as potentiality as well as actuality. Through the fact that it is this indifference to itself it is posited as an empty, contingent determination. Thus the real necessity contains contingency not only in itself [/. e., potentially], but this will also develop itself; this develop- ment however as externality is only its being-in-itself, because it is only an immediate determinateness. It is not only this but its oivn development or the presupposition that it has its own positing. For as real necessity it is the annulment of actuality in potentiality and conversely. Since it is the simple conversion of one of these moments into the other, it is also its simple positive unity, since each as shown goes together with itself [*'. e., comes into identity with itself in the other]. But it is thus actuality; such an actuality, however, as is only this simple going together of the form with itself. Its negative positing of those elements is therefore presupposition or the positing of itself as annulled or as immediateness. Actuality. 1(J5 In this, however, this actuality is defined as negative ; it is a going- together-with-itself [arrival at self-identty] that proceeds from actu- ality which was real potentiality- Therefore this new actuality arises only from being-in-itself, from the negation of itself. Thus it is determined immediately as potentiality, as mediated through its nega- tion. This potentiality, however, is nothing but this mediation in which the being-in-itself (namely, it itself and the immediateness) are both, in the same way, posited-being. Hence it is the necessity which is just as well the annulment of this posited-being or the positing of immediateness and the annulment of being-in-itself, as it is the determining of this annulment as posited-being. It is there- fore itself which determines itself as contingency, and in its being repels itself from itself, and in this repulsion has only returned into itself — and in this return as into its being, has repelled itself from itself. Hence the form in its realization has penetrated all of its distinc- tions and made itself transparent ; and as absolute necessity is only this simple identity of beiiig-with-itself, in its negation, or in the essence, the distinction of content and form even has likewise van- ished. For that unity of potentiality and actuality and of actuality in potentiality is the form indifferent to itself in its determinate- ness or in the posited-being — a thing with its totality of conditions from which the form of necessity has been removed as far as it is external. But in this way it is this reflected identity of the two determinations as indifferent to it, and consequently the form-deter- mination of the being-in-itself opposed to the posited-being, and this potentiality constitutes the limitation of content that the real neces- sity possessed. The dissolution of this difference, however, is the absolute necessity whose content is this self -penetrating difference within it. The absolute necessity is therefore the truth, into which actuality and potentiality in general, as well as formal and real necessity, return. It is, as shown, the being which in its negation — in essence — relates to itself and is being. It is likewise simple immediateness, or pure beiug as simple reflection-into-itself or pure essence within it, these two are one and the same. The purely necessary ?'s, oniy because it is ; it has no other condition .nor ground. It is likewise pure essence, its being is the simple reflection into itself; it is because it is. As reflection it has ground and condition, but it has only itself for ground and condition. It is being in itself, but its being-in-itself is its immediateness — its potentiality is its actuality. It is there- fore because it is. As the going together with itself of being [i. e. , 196 Essence. the arrival at self-identity] it is essence ; but for the reason that this simple somewhat is likewise immediate simplicity it is being. Absolute necessity is therefore reflection, or the form of the abso- lute. It is the unity of being and essence — simple immediateness, which is absolute negativity. On the one hand, its distinctions are nothing but determinations of reflection, only however as existent multiplicity, actuality full of distinctions, and this has the shape of independent somewhats opposed to each other as others. On the other hand, their relation is the absolute identity ; it is the absolute conversion of their actuality into their potentiality and of their poten- tiality into actuality. Absolute necessity is therefore blind. On the one hand, the distinctions of actuality and potentiality have the form of reflection-into-itself as being ; they are therefore both as free actualities, neither of which appears in the other, nor exhibits a single trace of its relation to the other — each is grounded in itself and is necessary in itself. Necessity as essence is included within this being. The contact of these actualities with each other appears therefore as an empty externality. The actuality of the one in the other is the mere potentiality — contingency. For being is posited as absolutely necessary, as mediation with itself, which is absolute negation of mediation through another, or as being which is only identical with being. It is another which has actuality in being, and is therefore determined as merely potential, empty posited-being. But this contingency is rather the absolute necessity. It is the essence of those free actualities necessary in themselves. This essence avoids light, because in these actualities there is no appear- ing, no reflex, for the reason that they are grounded only within themselves, and shaped for themselves, — self-manifestations — be- cause they are mere being. But their essence will manifest itself in them and reveal what it is and what they are. The simplicity of its being, of its repose upon itself, is the absolute negativity : it is the freedom of their non-manifesting immediateness. This negative breaks forth in them, because being is the contradiction of itself through this, its essence. And this negation breaks forth in contrast to this being in the form of being, — hence as the negation of those actualities — which is absolutely different from their being, as well as from their non-being, — and hence comes forth as a free other-being opposed to it as its being. Yet it was not to be ignored in them. They are, in their self-dependent formation, indifferent to form, hence a content of different actualities — a definitely determined con- tent. This is the seal which necessity impresses upon them, since it sets them free as absolute, actual things, possessing absolute return- Actuality. 197 into-itself in their determination. Upon them it impresses itself, and its impressions are marks of its right over them, and they are seized by it and perish. This manifestation of that Avhich is the deter- minateness in truth — negative relation to itself — is blind dissolution in other-being. The manifestation or reflection appears, in the phase of being, as becoming or transition of being into naught. But being is conversely also essence, and in the phase of essence "becoming" is reflection or appearance. Hence externality is their internality, their relation is absolute identity ; and the transition of the actual into the possible, or of being into naught, is a going together with itself [arrival at self-identity]. Contingency is absolute necessity, it is itself the presupposition of the mentioned first absolute actuality. This identity of being with itself in its negation is the category of Substance. It is this unity as in its negation, or as in contingenc}' ; hence it is Substance as essential relation to itself. The blind transi- tion of necessity is rather the self-exposition of the absolute, the movement of the absolute within itself which in its externalization exhibits or manifests only itself. Third Chapter. The Absolute Essential-Relation or Reciprocal-Relation. The absolute necessity is not the necessary — still less a, necessary — but Necessity — being which is pure and simple reflection. It is essential relation [Verhaeltniss, reciprocity, relativity] because it is the activhy of distinguishing, each of whose moments is the entire totality, and whose moments have independent existence in such a manner that the totality has only one simple existence [notwith- standing the multiplicity that it includes] , and therefore the distinc- tions within it have only the appearance of independence, and this appearance is the absolute itself. The Essence as such is reflection or appearance ; essence as absolute relativity \_Verhaeltniss, reciprocal relation] is, however, appearance posited as appearance, and this as self-relation is the absolute actuality. The absolute, which has been unfolded and exhibited by external reflection, now unfolds itself, it being absolute form or necessity [it sunders itself into a form of relation or disrupts itself]. This self-unfolding [self-disruption] is its self-positing and it is only in this self-positing. As light in nature is not a something nor a thing, but exists only as appearance, so manifestation is absolute actuality in its self-identity. The sides of absolute relativity are therefore not attributes. In an 198 Essence. attribute, the absolute appears only in one of its moments [phases] as a presupposed somewhat and taken up by the external reflection. The unfolding or display of the absolute [its self-sundering] is performed by the Absolute Necessity, however, which is self-iden- tical as self-determining. Since it is the activity of appearing which is posited as appearance, the sides of this relativity are totalities, because they are appearance ; because as appearance the distinctions are both themselves and their opposite, and thus the whole. Con- versely, they are appearance, because they are totalities. This act of distinction, or activity of appearing, which pertains to the abso- lute, is therefore only the positing of itself as self-identity. This essential relation [reciprocity] in its immediate form is the relation of Substance and Accidents, the immediate vanishing and becoming of absolute appearance in itself. Since substance deter- mines itself as being for itself opposed to another, or the absolute reciprocity becomes real [in both its moments] it becomes the recip- rocal relation found in Causality. Finally, when the latter [causality] passes over into self-relation in reciprocal action [interaction], then the absolute essential relation [interrelation] is posited in all the essential characteristics that it contains. This posited unity of itself in its determinations — which are posited as the whole and as deter- minations at the same time, is the category of the Idea [Beg r iff = concrete idea] . A. The Reciprocal Relation as Substantiality. Absolute necessity is absolute essential-relation or reciprocity, because it is not being as such, but being which is because it is [being which expresses the ground of itself] being as the absolute mediation of itself through itself. This being is Substance ; as the ultimate unity of Essence and Being ; it is the being in all being. It is neither the unreflected immediate, nor an abstract something stand- ing behind existence and phenomenon, but it is the immediate act- uality itself as absolute reflection into itself as in-and-for-itself, inde- pendent, existence. Substance as this unity of being and reflection is essentially their appearance and posited-being. The activity of appearing is the self-relating appearing and hence it has the form of being [the "form of being" is that of self- relation']. This being is substance as such. Conversely, this being is only the self-identical, posited-being, hence it is the totality as appearance or it is Acci- dentally. The Reciprocal Relation as Substantiality. 199 This activity of appearing is identity as form [the form is the determining activity which makes the distinctions which belong to the object] ; — it is the unity of potentiality and actuality. First it is Becoming, — Contingency as the sphere of beginning and ceasing. For according to the determination of immediateness the relation of potentiality and actuality is an immediate transformation of each into its other. But since being is appearance its relation is also identical relation, in other words, the appearance of each in the other — hence it is reflection. The activity of accidentally, therefore, presents in each of its moments the appearance of the categories of being and of the reflection-determinations of essence — each appearing in the other. The immediate somewhat has a content : its immediateness is at the same time a reflected indifference as regards the form. This content is determined and since this is the determinateness of being the some- what passes over into another. But quality is also a determinateness of reflection : hence it is indifferent variety [different things existing without relation to each other] . This annuls itself ; but it is self- reflected being-in-itself; hence it is potentiality and this being-in- itself is in its transition, which is likewise reflection-into-itself — the necessarily actual. This activity of accidentally is the effectiveness [Actuosilat = ex- ternal manifestation] of substance as a quiet outflow from itself. It is not an activity as directed against anything else, but active against itself as simple element offering no resistance. The annulment of what is presupposed is the vanishing of appearance. First in the activity which annuls the immediate originates the immediate itself. This is the activity of appearance. The beginning with itself as source or origin is the positing of this very self from which it starts [its presupposing is a positing]. Substance, as this identity of the activity of appearance, is the totality of the entire process, and includes accidentality within it, and accidentality is the entire substance itself. This distinction of suit- stance into the simple identity of being, on the one hand, and the reciprocity of accidents, on the other hand, is a form of its activity of appearance. The former [identity] is the formless substance conceived by the imagination, to which appearance does not seem to be appearance. This image-thinking clings to an absolute which is an indeterminate identity that possesses no truth, but is only the deter- minateness of immediate actuality, or in other words, the being-in- itself, or potentiality. These are determinations of form which per- tain to accidentality. The other determination, that of the reciprocity of accidents, is 200 Essence. the absolute form-unity of accidentally — substance as absolute might or power. The ceasing of the accident is its return as actu- ality into itself, as into its being-in-itself or into its potentiality. But this its being-in-itself is only a posited-being. Hence it is also actuality, and because these form-determinations are likewise con- tent-determinntions this potential somewhat is, as regards content, another particular, actual somewhat. Substance manifests itself through the content of the actuality, into which it translates the potential, as creative might ; and through the content of the poten- tiality, into which it transmutes the actual, it manifests itself as destructive might. But the two are identical. The creative activity is destructive, and the destructive activity is creative. For the negative and positive, potentiality and actuality are absolutely united in substantial necessity. Accidents as such — and there are many of them, since multiplicity is one of the determinations of being — have no power over each other. The}- are existent somewhats or existent for themselves — things existing with manifold properties — wholes consisting of parts, independent parts — forces which need to be solicited into activity by each other and which are conditioned through each other. In so far as such an accidental somewhat seems to exercise power over another, it is the power of the substance that is manifest- ing itself. This substance includes both within it, and as nega- tivity it gives them unequal values — it posits the one as vanishing and the other as arising, or it determines the former as passing over into its potentiality and the latter as passing over into its actu- ality. Substance eternally dirempts itself into these distinctions of form and content and eternally purifies itself from this one-sidedness ; but in this purifying it dirempts itself again into the distinctions, one accident replaces another only because its own subsistence is this totality of form and content in which it, as well as its other, vanishes. On account of this immediate identity and presence of substance in its accidents, there is no real distinction remaining between them. In this first determination substance is not yet manifested according to its whole extent. If substance is distinguished as the self- identical being-in-and-for-itself from itself as totality of accidents, it is the mediating-power. This is necesshVy which retains positive persistence in the negativity of accidents, and in its persistence retains its mere posited-being. This mediating term is consequently the unity of substantiality and accidentality itself, and its extremes have no proper self-subsistence of their own. Substantiality is there- The Reciprocal Relation as Substantiality . 201 fore only reciprocal relation as immediately vanishing ; it relates to itself not as negative, and is immediate unity of power with itself in the form of identity alone, and not of its negative essence. This can also be explained in another way, as follows : Appearance or accidentality is in itself substance through power, but it is not so posited as this activit}' of appearance identical with itself. There- fore substance possesses accidentally in its form or posited-being, but not in itself ; accidentally is not substance as substance. The substantiality-relation therefore reveals itself as a formal power whose distinctions are not substantial; substance is in fact only the internal of accidents, and the accidents are only nt'ached to the substance. In other words, this reciprocal relation is only an appearing-totality as a becoming ; but it is likewise reflection ; accidentality which is in-itself substance is therefore posited as substance. Therefore it is defined as self-relating negativity opposed to itself, — determined as self-relating, simple identity with itself ; and it is f or-itself-existent might}' substance. The substantiality-relation, through this, passes over into the causality-relation. B. The Causality- Relation. Substance is might, that is reflected into itself and not merely transition. But it is a might, which posits determinations, and dis- tinguishes them from itself. In its determining it is self-relating and it is that which posits its determining as negative or as posited-being. This is consequently annulled substantiality, merely posited — it is Effect ; the substance existing for itself however is the Cause. This causality-relation is in the first place only this reciprocal rela- tion of cause and effect ; it is the formal causal-relation. a. Formal Causality. 1. Cause is the source, in contrast with the effect; but the sub- stance is the power of manifestation, or it possesses accidentality. But it is as power likewise reflection into itself in its appearance ; therefore it unfolds its transition and this activity of appearing is determined as appearance — in other words, the accidents are posited as mere effect [or as merely posited.] The substance however in its determining does not start from accidentality as though the latter existed already in another, and now was to be posited as determi- nateness — but both substance and its accidentality are one activity. Substance as power determines itself; but this determining is imme- 202 Essence. diately the annulment of the determining and the return. It deter- mines itself — it, the determining is therefore the immediate, and itself already the determined. Since it determines itself it posits this already determined as determined ; it has therefore annulled the posited-being, and returned into itself. Conversely, this return, because it is the negative relation of substance to itself, is itself a determining or repelling from itself. Through this return the deter- mined originates and from this it seemed to begin, and to posit it as an already existent determined somewhat. Therefore the absolute activity of manifestation [Actuosilat] is Cause. The power of sub- stance, in its truth as manifestation, which unfolds what was within itself, namely, the accidents, which is the posited-being immediately n the development of the same, — it sets up this as posited-being: the Effect. This is therefore, in the first place, the same as the acci- dentality which occurs in the relation of substantiality, viz., sub- stance as posited-being. But, secondly, the accidents as such are subtantial only through their vanishing — ■ as transitory. As effect, however, they are posited-being as self-identical. Cause is mani- fested in the effect as the whole substance, viz., as reflected into itself in the posited-being as such. 2. The substance as not-posited, original source stands over against this posited-being reflected into itself — the determined as deter- mined. Since it as absolute might or power is return into itself, but as self-determining in this return, it is not any longer the mere in- itself of its accidents, but it is also posited as this being-in-itself. Substance has therefore actuality first in the category of Cause. But this actuality, viz.. that its being-in-itself — its determinateness in the relation of substantiality is now posited as determinateness in the category of Effect. Substance, therefore, has its actuality which it possesses as cause, only in its effect. This is the necessity which the cause is. It is the actual substance, because the substance as power determines itself. But it is at the same time cause, because it unfolds this determinateness or posits it as posited-being. Therefore it posits its actuality as posited-being or as the effect. This is the other of the cause, the posited-being over against the origin or source and mediated through this. But the cause as necessity annuls also this its mediation, and is in the determining of itself as the origi- nal self-relating opposed to the mediated, the return into itself. For the posited-being is determined as posited-being, and is therefore self-identical. The cause is therefore first in the effect truly actual and self-identical. The effect is therefore necessary because it is the manifestation of the cause or it is this necessity which the cause is. The Causality-Relation. 203 Only as this necessity is the cause self-acting, originating from itself, without being solicited by another — and the independent source of self-production. It must act ; its originality consists in the fact that its reflection-into-itself is a determining-positing, and conversely, both are in one unity. The effect contains therefore nothing that is not in the cause. Conversely, the cause contains nothing that is not in its effect. The cause is cause only in so far as it produces an effect. And the cause is nothing else than this determination which produces an effect, and the effect nothing else than the determination which has a cause. In the cause as such lies its effect ; and in the effect its cause. In so far as the cause has not yet acted, or in so far as it has ceased to act, it is not cause. The effect in so far as its cause has vanished is no longer effect but only an indifferent actuality. 3. In this identity of cause and effect, has vanished the form through which they were distinguished as being-in-itself and posited- being. Cause is quenched in its effect ; and with this the effect is likewise quenched because it is only the determinateness belonging to the cause. This causality that is exhausted [quenched] in its effect is consequently an immediateness that is indifferent towards the necessary connection between cause and effect, and is external to it. b. The Specialized Causality-Relation in its Special Applications. 1. The identity of the cause in its effect is the annulment of its power and negativity, and therefore the unit}* indifferent towards distinctions of form — it is content. It is therefore related only in- itself to the form which is here causalit}*. They are therefore posited as differing, and the form opposed to the content is an actual only in an immediate sense — a contingent causality. Moreover, the content as thus determined is a content diverse within itself ; and the cause is determined as regards its content, and is therefore the effect. The content, since the reflected-being is here also immediate actuality, is, so far forth, actual but the finite sub- stance. This is the causality-relation in its reality and finitude. As formal it is the infinite, necessary connection within the absolute power whose content is pure manifestation or necessity. As finite caus- ality, on the other hand, it has a given content and is an external distinction appertaining to this identical somewhat which is in its determinations one and the same suhstanee. Through this identity of content causality is an analytical proposi- 204 Essence. tion. The same content is taken in the first instance as cause and in the second instance as effect ; there it is self-existent, and here only posited-being or a determination belonging to another. Since these determinations of form are external reflection, it follows that it is only a tautological activity of a subjective understanding which describes one phenomenon as effect, and traces it back to its cause for the purpose of comprehending and explaining it. It amounts only to a repetition of one and the same content. There is nothing in the cause different from what is in the effect. Rain, for example, is the cause of the moisture which is its effect. The rain makes moist — this is an analytical proposition; the same water which con- stitutes the rain constitutes the moisture. As rain this water exists in the form of an object per se; as moisture or wetness, on the other hand, it is an adjective, a posited which does not possess its own self-subsistence ; and the one determination as well as the other is external to it. Thus again the cause of a color is said to be a coloring-matter, a pigment, which is one and the same actuality as the color itself ; at one time being taken in the external form of an active — that is to say, externally-connected with an activity different from it [£. e., as cause] ; and in the second place in the likewise external determination of an effect. The cause of a deed is the internal resolution in an active subject which as an external being has received through an action the internal resolution and is the same content and value. If the activit}^ of a body is regarded as an effect its cause is an impelling force. But it is the same quantum of activity before and after the impulse — the same existence which the impelling body contains and imparts to the impelled body. So much as it imparts, so much it itself loses. The cause, e. g., the painter or the impelling body, has, it is true, other content besides — the former as the colors and the form com- bining them into paintings ; the latter as an activity of determined strength and direction. But this latter content is a contingent matter not concerning the cause. What the painter possesses in other qualities is to be abstracted in considering him as cause of this painting — they have nothing to do with this painting; only those qualities of his which exhibit themselves in this effect are its cause, the rest is not cause. Thus, in the case of the impelling body whether it is stone or wood, green or yellow, etc., does not concern this impulse — in those qualities it is not cause here. It is to be noted of this tautology of the causality-relation that it does not seem to contain tautology when only the remote causes of an effect are adduced and not the proximate ones. The change cf rThe Causality-Relation. 205 form which the subject that forms the basis suffers in this passage through several members of a series conceals the identity which is preserved in it. It connects itself in this multiplication of causes which enter between it and the ultimate effect, with other things and circumstances in such a manner that it is not the first member of the series which is called cause that contains the perfect effect, but only this series of causes taken together. So, for example, if a man came into circumstances such that he developed his talents, through the fact that he had lost his father, killed by a bullet in a battle, it would be possible to regard this shot, or in an ascending series, the battle, or the war, or the causes of the war, etc., ad infinitum, as the cause of the development of this man's talents. But it is evident that, for example, the shot in question is not the cause of this intrinsically, but that it is only the condition of it through its connection with other active determinations. In other words, it is not the cause, but only a single phase of the circumstances which gave it possibility. In the next place, it is to be especially noted how inadequate is the application of the causal relation to phenomena of physical- organic and spiritual life. Here it is shown that what is called the cause has quite a different content from the effect ; and for this reason that that which acts upon the vital is determined as independent of this and is changed and transformed, since vitality does not allow a cause to produce its effect, that is to say annuls it as cause. Therefore it is not proper to say that nourishment is the cause of the blood, or that articles of food or coldness or moisture is the cause of fever etc. And it is improper to speak of the Ionic climate as the cause of the Homeric poems, or to allege Caesar's ambition as the cause of the destruction of the republican constitution of Rome. In history spiritual masses and individuals are in reciprocal determination with each other. It is the nature of mind in a far higher sense than the character of organic life to take up into itself something that origi- nates in another ; it does not allow it to continue its causal activity when within it, but it transmutes and transforms it. But these reciprocal relations belong to the stage of the Idea and will receive consideration with it [i. e. , in the Third part of this Logic] . It may be further remarked here that in so far as the necessary connection of cause and effect is conceded although not in its proper sense, the effect cannot be greater than the cause, for the effect is nothing but the manifestation of the cause. It is a play of wit, much resorted to in history, to explain great effects through small causes, and for a deep and widely prevailing event to allege an anec- dote as the first cause. Such a cause so-called is nothing but an 206 Essence. occasion, an external incitement of which the internal spirit of the event did not stand in need, or it might have used any one of an innumerable multitude of others for the occasion of its manifestation. Conversely, it is to be regarded that the small and contingent has been determined by the great event as its occasion. That arabesque- painting of history which builds up a great shape on a slender stalk is therefore though brilliant only a superficial treatment. In this development of the great out of the small, the true order of things is inverted and spirit is made to take its occasion from external circum- stance. But for this very reason this external is not conceived as a real cause in it — in other words this inversion itself annuls the causal relation. 2. But this determinateness of the causal relation that content and form are diverse and indifferent to each other, extends further. The form-determination is also the content-determination; cause and effect, the two sides of the relation, are therefore also another con- tent. In other words, the content because it is only the content of a form, has its distinction within itself and is essentially diverse or varied [possessing variety within itself] . But since its form is the causal relation which jte a content identical in cause and effect, the varied content is connected externally with the cause and with the effect ; consequently it does not enter into the activity of the causal relation. This external content is therefore outside of the necessary con- nection between cause and effect — it is an immediate existence. In other words, because as content it is the in-itself existent identity of cause and effect it is also immediate, existent identity. This is therefore something or other which possesses manifold determinations in its being, and among these the determination that it is in one respect a cause or an effect. The form- determinations, cause and effect, have their substrate in it ; that is to say, have their essential subsistence — and each side has a special subsistence — for their identity is their subsistence. At the same time, however, it is its immediate subsistence, and not its subsistence as form-unity or as essential connection. But this thing is not merely substrate, but also substance, for it is the identical self-subsistence only in the form of essential connection. Moreover, it is finite substance, for it is determined as immediate in opposition to its causality. But it has likewise causality, because it is identical only as this causal relation. As cause this substrate is negative relation to itself. But itself to which it relates is first a posited-being, because it is determined as an immediate actual. The Causality- Relation. 207 This posited-being as content is some one determination. Secondly, the causality is external to it; this, consequently, makes its posited- being. Since it is now causal substance, its causality consists in this: to relate to itself negatively and therefore to its positi'd-boing and external causality. The activity of this substance begins there- fore from without, and emancipates itself from this external deter- mination, and its return-into-itself is the preservation of its immediate existence and the annulment of its posited existence, and consequently of its causality. Thus, a moving stone is a cause ; its movement is a determination which it possesses — one among many determinations, such as color, shape, etc., which do not belong to its causality. Because its imme- diate existence is separated from its form-relation, •%. e., its causality, this form-relation is something external. Its movement and the causality which pertains to it is only a posited-being within it. But the causality is also its own. This is involved in the fact that its substantial self-subsistence is its identical relation to itself, but this is now denned as posited-being. it is therefore at the same time neg- ative relation to itself. Its causality which is directed upon itself as upon the posited-being or an external, consists therefore in this, that it annuls it and by its removal returns into itself ; consequently it is not self-identical in its posited-being, but it restores only its abstract independence. In other words, the rain is the cause of the moisture which is the same water as before. This water is determined as rain and cause, through the fact that the determination is posited in it by another. Another force or something has elevated the water into the air by evaporation and brought it together into a mass whose weight has made it fall. Its removal from the earth is a determina- tion alien to its original identity with itself — its weight. Its caus- ality consists in removing the same and in restoring that identity, and therewith annulling its causality. The now considered second determinateness of causality belongs to the form ; this connection is causality as self-external as primary independence which is at the same time in-itself-posited-being or effect. This union of the opposite determination as in an existent substrate constitutes the infinite regress in the series of causes. Beginning is made with the effect ; this has a cause ; the cause again has a cause, and so on. Why has the cause again a cause? That is, why is it that the same side which, previously determined as cause, is now determined as effect, and a new cause now demanded for it? On the ground that the cause is a finite, a determined ; it is determined as one element of the form opposed to the effect as the 208 Essence. other element ; hence it has its determinateness or negation outside of it. Precisely for this reason it is itself finite, has its determi- nateness on it, and is consequently posited-being, or effect. This, its identity, is also posited, but it is a third — the immediate sub- strate. Causality is therefore self- external, because its originality is here an immediateness. The form-distinction is therefore first deter- minateness and not yet determinateness posited as determinateness — ■ it is existent other-being. Finite reflection holds fast to this immedi- ate, removes the form-unity from it and makes it a cause in one respect and an effect in another ; and on the other hand it transposes the form-unity into the realm of infinitude, and by this perpetual progress or regress from cause to cause it expresses its incompetency to attain and hold it. "With the effect it is the same case — ■ or rather the infinite progress from cause to cause. In the latter the cause develops into an effect which has again another cause. Conversely, the effect becomes cause which again has an effect. The considered particular cause begins in an externality, and returns into its effect not as cause, but it loses its causality in it. Conversely, the effect arrives at a sub- strate which is substance, an original, self-relating subsistence. In it therefore this posited-being, becomes posited-being — i. e. , this sub- stance, since an effect is posited in it, takes ont he form of cause. But the mentioned first effect, the posited-being which was external to it is a different one from the second which is produced by it ; for this second is determined as its reflection-into-itself , but the first one was an externality to it. But since the causality is here, the self-ex- ternal causality, it returns, in its effect, not into itself. In its effect it becomes external, its effect is again posited-being in a substrate — as another substance — which reduces it to a posited-being, or mani- fests itself as a cause, and repels its effect again from itself, and so on in the infinite progress. 3. It is now for us to see what has become through the move- ment of the determination or limited causal relation. The formal causality exhausts itself in the effect ; through this the identity of the two moments has arisen ; with this the unity of the cause and the effect is only in-itself, and the form-relation is external to it. This identity is also immediate according to the two determinations of immediateness — first as being-in-itself, a content, to which caus- ality comes externally; secondly, as an existing substrate in which cause and effect inhere as different form-determinations. These are in themselves one, but each is on account of this-in-itself, or the externality of form, self, hence in its unity with the other, deter- The Causality-Relation. 209 mined also as other in opposition to it. Therefore the cause has an effect and is at the same time an effect itself ; and the effect has not only a cause bnt is also itself a cause. But the effect which the cause has, and the effect which it is — -likewise the cause which the effect has and the cause which it is — are different, Througrh the movement of the limited causal relation it lias resulted that the cause is extinguished not only in the effect, and with it the effect also, as in formal causality, but the cause in its extinction reappears again in the effect, and that the effect vanishes in the cause, hut reappears again, likewise. Each of these determinations annuls itself in its positing and posits itself in its annulment. It is not an external transition of causality from one substrate to another, but this becoming- other is its own positing. Causality therefore presupposes itself, or conditions itself. The identity preexisting merely-in- itself, the substrate, is therefore now determined as pre- supposition, or it is posited in opposition to the active causality, and the reflection (formerly external to the identity) stands now in essen- tial connection with the same. c. Action and Keaction. Causality is presupposing activity. The cause is conditioned, it is the negative relation to itself as presupposed, as external other, which however is in itself, but only in itself, causality. It is, as we have seen, the substantial identity into which formal causality passes over, that has now determined itself in opposition to it as its negative. In other words, it is the same as the substance of the causality-rela- tion, but which stands in opposition to the power of accidentality as self-substantial activity. It is the passive substance. That which is passive is the immediate, or in-itself- existing which is not also for- itself : the pure being or the essence which is only in this determinate- ness of abstract self-identity. To the passive stands in opposition the active substance as negative self-relation. It is the cause, in so far as it has restored itself from the effect in the limited, specialized causality, through the negation of itself — and which is active as a positing in its other-being, i. e. , as immediate — and through its nega- tion mediates itself through itself. On this account causality has no longer any substrate in which it inheres and is not form-determina- tion opposed to this identity, but is itself the substance, or the ulti- mate and original is only causality. The substrate is the passive substance which has presupposed itself. The cause now acts ; for it is the negative power related to itself ; 14 210 Essence. at the same time it is presupposed by it ; hence it acts upon itself as though itself were another — upon itself as upon passive substance. Consequently, in the first place it annuls its other-being and returns within it into itself. Secondly, it determines the same, and posits this annulment of its other-being, or the return-into-itself as a deter- minateness. This posited-being, for the reason that it is at the same time its return into itself, is. in the first place, its effect. But, con- versely, because it determines itself as its other, presupposing it, it posits the effect in the other, the passive substance. In other words, because the passive substance is itself the duplicated, namely, an independent other, and at the same time is a presupposed, and in- itself already identical with the active cause, the activity of this passive substance is also double. Both phases of activity are in one, the annulment of its being-determined, namely, its condition, or the annulment of the independence of the passive substance ; and besides this, that it annuls its identity with the san^e, and conse- quently presupposes itself or posits itself as other. Through the last moment the passive substance is preserved ; the first annulment of it manifests itself in relation to it, in such a manner that only a few of the determinations are annulled in it, and their identity with the first in the effect becomes external to it. In so far it suffers external compulsion. The external compulsion is the manifestation of the power, or the power as external. But the power is external only in so far as the causal substance is pre- supposing in its activity at the same time that it is positing — i. e., it posits itself as annulled. Conversely, therefore, the act of external compulsion is an act of the power. It is only another, presupposed by itself, that the external-compulsory cause acts upon — its effect on it is negative relation to itself, or it is the manifestation of itself. The passive is the independent, which is only a posited — something broken in itself — an actuality which is conditioned, and the condi- tion now in its truth, namely, an actuality which is only a possibility, or, conversely, a being-in-itself which is only the determinateness of the being-in-itself, only passive. Hence that upon which the external compulsion is exerted not only may be subject to violence but must be. That which exerts compulsion upon the other does it because it is the power of the same which manifests itself and the other in it. The passive substance is posited only through the external com- pulsion as that which it is in truth, namely, because it is the simple I h isitive or immediate substance, and for this reason is only a posited. The presupposition which is its condition is the appearance of inime- diateness, which appearance the active causality removes from it. The Causality- Relation. 211 The passive substance is therefore given its dues only through the influence of another constraining force. What it loses is the men- tioned immediateness — the substantiality foreign to it. What it receives as a foreign, namely, the being-determined as a posited-being is its own determination, but since it is now posited in its posited- being or in its own determination it is not annulled through this, but it goes into identity with itself, and is therefore, in this activity of becoming, determined, primitive independence. The passive sub- stance is therefore, on the one hand, preserved or posited through the active, namely, in so far as the latter makes itself merely an annulled activity — but on the other hand it is the doing of the pas- sive itself, to go into identity with itself and consequently to make itself primitive independence and cause. The being-posited through another and its own becoming is the same thing. Through the fact that the passive substance has inverted itself into a cause, the effect is annulled within it. This constitutes its reaction in general. It is in itself the posited-being as passive sub- stance ; also the posited-being is posited within it through the other substance in so far, namely, as it received on it the effect. Its reaction contains therefore two phases: (1) That it is posited as what it is in itself, and (2) that it exhibits itself in its being-in-itself as that which it is posited. It is in-itself posited-being, and there- fore it receives an effect upon it through the other. But this posited- being is, conversely, its own being-in-itself, hence this is its effect and it exhibits itself as cause. Secondly, the reaction is opposed to the first-acting cause. The effect which the previously passive substance annuls within itself is, namely, that effect of the first-acting cause. The cause has however its substantial actuality only in its effect. And since this is annulled its causal substantiality is also annulled. This takes place first in itself and through itself when it becomes effect ; in this identity its negative determination vanishes, and it becomes passive. Secondly, this happens through that which was formerly passive, but is now the reacting substance which annuls its effect. In the limited causality, the substance upon which it acts becomes also again the cause, it acts therefore against the activity which has posited it as an effect. But it does not react against that cause, but it posits its effect again in another substance, and thus the progress of effects ad infinitum presents itself. For the reason that the cause here in its effect is first self-identical only in-itself, and. therefore, on the one hand, it vanishes into an immediate identity in its inactivity; on the other hand, it arouses its activity, again, in another substance. 212 Essence. In the limited causality, on the other hand, the cause relates to itself in the effect, because it is its other as condition, as presupposed, and its action is therefore just as much a becoming of its other as it is a positing and annulling of the other. Moreover it stands in this relation as passive substance. But, as we saw, it originates through the effect that has been produced upon it as primitive substance. The mentioned first cause which acts, and receives its effect as reaction upon itself, appeals again therefore as a cause ; and by this the activity which in the finite causality extends into the infinite progress, is redirected toward its origin and returns into itself, and becomes an infinite reciprocal-action. C. Reciprocal Action. In finite causality there are substances which act upon each other. Mechanism consists in this externality of causalhy in which the cause is reflected into itself in its effect, and is a repelling being. In other words, the identity which has the causal substance, and its effect within it, remains immediately self-external, and the effect passes over into another substance. In reciprocal action, this mech- anism is annulled ; for it contains in the first place the vanishing of that original persistence of immediate substantiality. In the second place, it involves the origination of the cause, and hence the primitive independence mediates itself through its negation. Reciprocal action first exhibits itself as opposite causal activity proceeding from substances that are presupposed and self-condi- tioning. Each one of them is opposed to the other as active and at the same time as passive substance. Since both are passive as well as active, each of these distinctions is annulled. It is a perfectly transparent appearance. They are substances only in so far as they are the identity of the active and passive. Reciprocal action is there- fore still an empty form and mode. It needs only an external com- bination of that which is just as well in itself as posited. In the first place, there are no longer any substrates which stand in relation to each other, but they are substances. In the activity of the conditioned causality the other presupposed immediateness is annulled, and the conditioning of the causal activity is only an influence from without, or it is its own passivity. This influence from without, however, does not come from another original sub- stance but from a causality which conditions throi: — « — -^ . rvi> U 3> ^-^rvAvc4^ JzJt .-■3- * l*-1 fWvrdttf